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Logistic Requirements in South Vietnam
If NVA Forces are Augmented by Three Divisions

If Communist troop strength in South Vietnam were to be augmented by three NVA divisions, the daily logistical resupply requirement would probably be increased by about 45 short tons per day. Approximately one half of this requirement would have to be obtained from external sources. This estimate of the increased requirement for logistic support would apply generally to a situation in which the total increment in enemy forces is concentrated in I Corps, and also in the event that one division was deployed in I Corps and two divisions in II Corps. (See Table I for details)

Currently VC and NVA forces in South Vietnam require approximately 300 tons of logistic support daily of which almost 95 tons are obtained from external sources. Sixty tons represent food and the remainder weapons, equipment and ammunition. (See Table 2 for details)

The total daily requirement for logistic support in the event that NVA forces in South Vietnam are augmented by three divisions would total a maximum of 345 tons of which over 115 tons will have to be obtained from external sources. About 75 tons would consist of food and the remaining 40 would consist of weapons, equipment and ammunition. We assume that a major portion of the food requirement from external sources will still be obtained from Cambodia. The remaining food requirements and the tonnages of

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weapons, equipment and ammunition that would have to be obtained will come almost exclusively from North Vietnam and would amount to 70 tons a day. The movement of this volume of supplies would involve the use of less than 15 percent of the capacity of the truck routes leading from Laos to the South Vietnamese border.

During the first two months of 1968 truck traffic through Laos has been at such a high level that an average of 200 tons a day or almost 3 times the anticipated requirements, could have been made available for the forces in South Vietnam. Even this high level of traffic has used less than 50 percent of the capacity of the road system.

Given this demonstration of resupply operations under conditions of heavy interdiction, and the fact that in three years no road seems to have reduced much more than 25 percent of its capacity, there is little reason to believe that logistical considerations will be a meaningful restraint to a build-up of forces.

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Table 1

Daily Logistic Resupply Requirements
for Three Additional NVA Divisions
in South Vietnam *

(In Short Tons)

	<u>Total Requirement</u>	<u>Requirement from External Sources</u>
<u>Case 1. (All Divisions Deployed in Northern I Corps)</u>		
Class I	35.00	17.50 **
Class II and IV	6.13	2.02 **
Class III	Negl.	Negl.
Class V	3.45	3.09 **
Total	<u>44.58</u>	<u>22.61</u>
<u>Case 2. (1 Division Deployed in I Corps; 2 Divisions in II Corps***)</u>		
Class I	35.00	17.50 ****
Class II and IV	6.13	2.02 **
Class III	Negl.	Negl.
Class V	2.32	2.08 **
Total	<u>43.45</u>	<u>21.60</u>

* Total strength estimated at 35,000 men.

** Source: North Vietnam.

*** 1 division in Western Highlands and 1 division in coastal areas.

**** Source: Cambodia.

Note: This estimate is predicated on combat ammunition expenditure of one-third the basic load per engagement, and combat levels of each unit being engaged one in 15 days in I Corps, and one in 30 days in II Corps.

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Table 2

Daily Logistic Resupply Requirements for
Current VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam*

	<u>Total Requirement</u>	<u>In Short Tons Requirement from External Sources</u>
Class I	236.00	60.00
Class II and IV	42.00	14.00
Class III	Negl.	Negl.
Class V	<u>23.09</u>	<u>20.56**</u>
Total	301.09	94.66

* Order of Battle includes 156,000 NVA, and VC main and local force troops, as well as 80,000 administrative service troops.

** This estimate is predicated on combat ammunition expenditures of one-third the basic load per engagement, and combat levels of each unit engaged one in 15 days in I Corps, one in 30 days in II Corps, one in 20 days in III Corps and one in 30 days in IV Corps.

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