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
INTERROGATION REPORT

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

NIC REPORT NO : 247/68

SUBJECT



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

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DATE AND PLACE : 6 February 1968 (H-P)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

REF: None

This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 6 February 1968 in SAIGON City, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further exploitation.

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1. Prior to the Tet attack on Saigon, Source had been in combat on four occasions. His unit engaged the ARVN 25th Division in March, April, and September 1967, the last encounter taking place at LUONG HOA Village, BEN LOC District, LONG AN Province. The unit never fought with U.S. troops or saw U.S. prisoners of war. From September 1967 through January 1968, Company 1 quartered at LUONG HOA Village where it dug strongholds and trenches, and received rifle training. Political training was not offered.
2. Company 1 was told that it was going to liberate Saigon at 1700 hours 30 January. When the soldiers arrived in District 8, they were told that their target would be the District 8 Police Station. Three companies (1, 2, and 3) were scheduled to participate in the attack; their strength totaled 250 men. Company 1 was armed with AKA light machineguns for each man and a total of 200 rounds of ammunition (30 rounds per magazine). Five men had B40's with four rounds per weapon. No one was issued grenades, but each man was issued five BE TA explosive dynamite charges. These resembled flares and were 20 centimeters long and had a diameter of about 10 centimeters. The men had been issued their weapons and ammunition three months previously and had not received additional supplies or reissues since. They were told before the attack that if they used up all their ammunition, they would be resupplied by civilian laborers who would carry ammunition to them from GIA DINH Province. Companies 2 and 3 were equipped with AKA's with 200 rounds each for every soldiers, eight B41's with eight rounds each, and five B40's with four rounds each.
3. Company 1 left LUONG HOA Village at 1700 hours 30 January and arrived in Saigon's 8th Precinct at midnight 2 February; they had travelled through CAN DUOC and CAN GUOC before crossing National Route 5 to Precinct 8. The soldiers prepared trenches for nine hours; at 0900 they were attacked by ARVN ranger troops. The battle lasted until 1515 hours when Company 1 withdrew to a rice paddy outside the city because the other two companies of Battalion 1 had not yet arrived. The soldiers intended to withdraw to GIA DINH, but were forced to remain in the paddy because of a gun ship which strafed the field. Source was captured at 1700. Company 1 suffered 12 casualties. Before going to battle, Company 1 was instructed that if withdrawal were necessary, it should go to GIA DINH to a place along Route 5 where liaison agents would meet the soldiers to guide them to a reassembly point in GIA DINH. Nothing was mentioned about reserve forces or reinforcements. No women were included in Company 1, and the soldiers were not given any medication before coming to Saigon.
4. The company cadres told the troops that they would be able to obtain food from the local people, and they therefore did not carry food with them. However, the people seemed to be afraid and gave no material or other support to Company 1. Shortly after 0500 hours 2 February the population began to flee the area carrying their effects with them. The cadres did not say how long the attack on SAIGON would last, but advised the soldiers that the unit would return to LUONG HOA Village after.
5. Cadres told the troops that attacks whose purpose was to liberate SVN were taking place on a countrywide basis, but did not mention any specific locations. The Company Command Section instructed that all military foreigners who were caught in the attack in Precinct 8 were to be taken back for exploitation at VC Military Region 2 Headquarters. Civilian foreigners, including United States citizens, were considered as residents of Vietnam and were not to be captured. If civilian foreigners were caught in the combat area, they would be detained and released within the week. Civilians were not to be treated as prisoners of war and were to receive good treatment.

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6. Two additional infantry battalions from LONG AN Province were scheduled to take part in the attack on SAIGON. Battalion 2, located at DUC HOA, LONG AN Province, consisted of 250 men, having the same equipment as Source's battalion. Source did not know when Battalion 2 was expected in Saigon. Battalion 6, equipped with nine DKZ-75's (number of rounds unknown), four 80 MM mortars (number of rounds unknown), eight 81 MM mortars (number of rounds unknown), and an AKA for each man, was to give artillery support to the infantry attack on Saigon. Battalion 6 was composed of about 200 men, and came from TAN TRU District, LONG AN Province, to CAM GUOC, LONG AN, on 29 January and planned to remain there for about two weeks.
7. Source was afraid of fighting in Saigon because he thought he would be discovered and because he felt that GVN soldiers were good fighters. Although some of his comrades shared his feelings, others had high morale. Cadres held a pep talk session before starting out for SAIGON to boost the morale of the troops.
8. (Interrogator's Comment: Source appeared to be cooperative and answered questions promptly. His story compares favorably with that he gave to his National Police interrogator).

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