

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 51410

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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GROUP 1
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CONFIDENTIAL

151134Z

CITE

3.5(c)

DIST 15 FEBRUARY 1968

17145-77-5

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

3.3(h)(2)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] PLATOON LEADER OF A [REDACTED]

PROVINCIAL MOBILE BATTALION ON OBJECTIVES
OF THE TET ATTACKS AND POSSIBLE CLAIMS AND
FUTURE PLANS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
AND HANOI.

3.3(h)(2)

ACQ

3.3(h)(2)

SOURCE

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IN-51410

3.5(c)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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1. ASKED WHAT HE WAS TOLD WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, [REDACTED] REPLIED 3.3(h)(2)
 THAT VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY OBJECTIVES WERE TO FIGHT HARD, INFILTRATE DEEP INTO CITIES, DISTRICTS, AND PROVINCES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE POLITICALLY SO THAT THE REVOLUTION COULD CREATE AN UPRISING AND ORGANIZE A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

2. ASKED WHAT HIS FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES WERE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT 3.3(h)(2)
 HE WAS GIVEN THE MISSION OF ATTACKING THE POWER HOUSE AND THE RADIO STATION [REDACTED] ONLY AND THAT HE HAD 3.3(h)(2)
 NO FUTURE RESPONSIBILITIES. HE ADDED THAT HE IS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS JUST BEFORE AN OPERATION.

3. ASKED IF HE WAS TOLD, AND IF HE BELIEVED, THAT THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND THE AMERICAN FORCES, HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS TOLD THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE GENERAL UPRISING, AND HE BELIEVED IT AT THAT TIME.

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IN-51410

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3.5(c)

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls)

4. ASKED WHAT ACUTAL SUPPORT HE RECEIVED FROM THE POPULACE, HE SAID HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. INSTEAD, THE PEOPLE SHOWED GVN SOLDIERS WHERE HE AND HIS TROOPS WERE HIDING.

5. ASKED IF HE WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT MILITARY ACTION DURING TET WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH AT KHE SANH OR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ), [] 3.3(h)(2) SAID THAT IN POLITICAL INDOTRINATIONS HE AND HIS COMPANY WERE TOLD TO FIGHT HARD AND ATTACK AND OCCUPY [] BECAUSE 3.3(h)(2) FORCES FROM KHE SANH AND THE DMZ WOULD SUPPORT VC FORCES IN THE SOUTH. HE DID NOT BELIEVE SUCH FORCES WOULD 3.3(h)(2) SUPPORT THE VC NOW, BECAUSE THE VC HAD FAILED IN [] PROVINCE.

6. [] KNEW NOTHING ABOUT EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE AN 3.3(h)(2) "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV).

7. IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION CONCERNING FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN CURRENT VC STRATEGY, [] SAID THAT THE VC WERE 3.3(h)(2) DETERMINED TO OPERATE STRONGLY IN EVERY WAY--MILITARILY,

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IN -51410

[Redacted]

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY-- IN THE WINTER/SPRING INSURRECTION
CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THE VC FAILED
IN ITS TWO ATTACKS ON [Redacted], IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
VC WILL STRIVE TO SUMMON MORE FORCES IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK
AGAIN, HARASS, AND WEAR DOWN GVN AND ALLIED FORCES.

3.3(h)(2)

8. ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT THE NFLSV OR HANOI WOULD EXPLAIN
AN INDECISIVE MILITARY CONCLUSION TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AS
OPPOSED TO POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS, HE SAID THAT HE
THOUGHT THAT THE NFLSVN OR HANOI WILL SAY THAT THEIR FORCES
HAVE WON OVER THE GVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN EVERY WAY. IT
WOULD NOT BE STRANGE IF THEY DID. EVEN IF THE VC FAILED TO
ATTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES, THEY SUCCEEDED POLITICALLY, AND
"POLITICAL SUCCESS WILL SOUND AN ECHO IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS
IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES."

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

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