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OCI No. 1195/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
6 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Current Viet Cong Strategy

1. More detailed and comprehensive reporting based on prisoner interrogations is beginning to come in concerning the strategy and objectives of the Communists in their mass attacks on urban areas.

3.3(h)(2)

2. One report is based on statements by several medium level political and military cadre from the [redacted] city area in [redacted] Province. The burden of their testimony is that the enemy had plans--in this area at least--for following up either a success or failure in the assaults. If complete success had been achieved and if the cities were held against government reaction, the VC would have attempted to organize a new front apparatus whose main objective would have been to enlist popular support in favor of the overthrow of the Thieu regime and the withdrawal of the Americans from South Vietnam.

3.3(h)(2)

3. If the attackers failed to hold the cities--and it does not appear that very many of them confidently expected to do so--they were to withdraw to previously assigned rendezvous points in the countryside to await new orders.

4. It does not appear that the attackers at least in the [redacted] area were promised that a major second wave assault would be launched if the first one failed. Most prisoners stated they had no orders beyond withdrawal to base points if the attacks failed.

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5. [redacted] the enemy high command apparently saw the possibility that their assault would be repulsed in short order. They appear to have chosen the weakest elements of the NVA division in the local area to support the assault, holding the others in reserve.

3.3(h)(2)

6. Thus far no concrete evidence has been developed to indicate that a second major attack is now planned. The enemy clearly retains the capability to do so in this area, however, according to local observers. A new attack would be hampered by loss of the element of surprise and probably by loss of part of the covert VC apparatus which existed in [redacted] prior to 30 January.

3.3(h)(2)

7. As in other areas of South Vietnam, the chances for a new, major assault will probably depend primarily on the Communist assessment of the need for it and its chances for success. Most of the prisoners expected in any case, that the city would be subjected to continuing harassment and small scale ground probes.

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