SUMMARY -- ACCORDING TO A PRISONER INTERROGATION THE VIET CONG /VC/ IN LONG AN PROVINCE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORM VILLAGE-LEVEL LIBERATION COMMITTEES IN ORDER TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF A COALITION FAILS TO MATERIALIZE, THE LIBERATION COMMITTEES CAN BE USED TO SPEARHEAD A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY DIVIDED SOUTH VIETNAM INTO TWO.
AREAS AND WILL CONDUCT A SEPARATE MILITARY PROGRAM IN EACH AREA. THE VC CONTINUE TO SUFFER FOOD, MEDICAL AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES, BUT THESE SHORTAGES DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED MORALE. THE LOW RALLIER RATE MAY BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST AND THE PROMISED HWLT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN LONG AN AFTER TET. END SUMMARY.

3.3(h)(2)

Observers in the province believe that the VC are attempting to
demphasize the communist overtones of the "Liberation"
move-ment and, by creating a new governmental front, present a
non-communist or neutralist face. This new face would allow
negotiations to be started while the VC continue the revolution
through political action instead of guerrilla warfare. Extensive
debriefings of ralliers and prisoner interrogations during the
past several months indicated a feeling among the VC that the
war will not be won on the battlefield, but will be won by political
means. Thao stated that the VC have divided South Vietnam into
two areas, and that a different military plan will be followed in
each area. The area north of an imaginary line
drawn across the northern provinces of III Corps will be the scene
of the decisive battles of the war. The area to the south of this line
will follow a program of tying down U.S. and GVN forces.

2. During December the VC attempted to isolate GVN-controlled
areas and destroy or cut lines of communication /LOC/. The majority
of VC military activities were directed at National Route 4, which
runs through Long An province and serves as the main traffic link
between Saigon and the Mekong Delta. American observers in Long An
believe VC military activities were intended not only to cut the

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LOCUs, BUT WERE ALSO DESIGNED TO PRESENT A SHOW OF VC STRENGTH TO
THE POPULACE IN CONTESTED AREAS AND TO APPLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING A CONDITION WHERE
FAVORABLE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE INITIATED.

3.

VC EFFORTS TO RECRUIT YOUTHS AND FEMALES INTO THEIR RANKS.

ACCORDING TO AN ALLEGED DISTRICT-LEVEL VC DOCUMENT THE VC LONG AN PROVINCE

CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ISSUED AN ORDER ON 9 DECEMBER CALLING FOR
RECRUITMENT OF ABOUT 1500 VILLAGE HAMLET GUERRILLAS BY 10
JANUARY 1968. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT EACH DISTRICT WAS REQUIRED
TO RECRUIT 400 GUERRILLAS AND EACH VILLAGE WAS TO RECRUIT 100
GUERRILLAS. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION THAT THE VC HAVE HAD ANY
OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN THIS RECRUITMENT DRIVE. AMERICAN OBSERVERS
IN LONG AN BELIEVE THAT IN VC-CONTROLLED AREAS OF THE PROVINCE SOME
SUCCESS WILL BE MET, BUT THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE VC CAN RECRUIT
1500 USEFUL GUERRILLAS WITHIN THE ONE MONTH TIME FRAME.

PROBLEMS

4. FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE VC.

NGUYEN VAN THAO STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE VC HAVE SUFFICIENT RICE,
OTHER STAPLES SUCH AS MEAT, FISH AND VEGETABLES ARE BECOMING SCARCE.
HE STRESSED THAT VC REAR SERVICE ELEMENTS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE A
5. THE LACK OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IS A CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR THE VC. GVN MILITARY AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ON MAJOR LOCATIONS HAVE EFFECTIVELY REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF MEDICINE BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE VC BY SUPPLIERS FROM SAIGON. THE VC HAVE SOUGHT TO REPLACE A PORTION OF THEIR SUPPLY LOSSES, CAUSED BY THE GVN RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM, BY DIRECTING LEGAL RESIDENT VC AND FEMALE CADRES WITH FRIENDS IN GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS TO HAVE THEIR FRIENDS PURCHASE ANTIBIOTICS AND MEDICINES FOR THE VC.

6. THE ACQUISITION OF SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO SUPPORT THE VC MOVEMENT CONTINUES TO BE A CHRONIC VC PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO RALLIER REPORTS, GVN AND ALLIED SWEEPS AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS HAVE FORCED PEOPLE TO FLEE TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS, THEREBY REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER POOL AVAILABLE TO THE VC. THAT THE VC ARE SHORT OF PERSONNEL IS SUGGESTED THAT IN PAST YEARS THE VC COULD CONSCRIPT LABOR FORCES TO ASSIST IN MINING ROADS AND IN REMOVING WOUNDED AND DEAD FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT THAT NOW THREE-MAN UNITS CONDUCT THE MINING OPERATIONS AND VC TROOPS SOMETIMES
LEAVE THEIR DEAD BEHIND AFTER AN OPERATION.

7. VC REACTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN. RALLIER FIGURES CONTINUE TO BE LOW AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN LONG AN FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THESE LOW FIGURES SUGGEST THAT THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE VC ARE NOT AS SERIOUS AS HAS BEEN BELIEVED AND THAT CADRES ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPS FROM THE CURRENT THEME BEING EXPRESSED IN THE PROVINCE THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL CEASE AFTER THE TET HOLIDAYS. THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST IN LONG AN PROVINCE MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOW DECEMBER FIGURES OF TWO INFRASTRUCTURE RALLIERS. OTHER VC INFRASTRUCTURE LOSSES WERE 9 KILLED AND 12 CAPTURED.

3.5(c) 8. DIS EM-- STATE USMACV CORDS 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/USPAO / CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.