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# MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

## *The Situation in Vietnam*



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
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Information as of 1600  
7 November 1967

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### HIGHLIGHTS

Food shipments to North Vietnam from China and the USSR continue to rise, reaching a total of over 370,000 tons so far this year (cf. 55,000 tons last year). Sharp clashes between Allied and Communist forces were reported in scattered areas of South Vietnam.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
Heavy fighting was reported near Dak To in the central highlands and in several other widely scattered areas on 6-7 November (Paras. 1-4). The South Koreans reported killing 113 enemy soldiers (Paras. 5-6). An update of the 5 November fighting near Song Be discloses that the South Vietnamese lost nearly 100 killed (Paras. 7-9). Additional fighting was reported at Loc Ninh and in an area south of Da Nang (Paras. 10-12).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:  
The Communists persist in terror tactics against the Chinese community and have sent threatening letters to Chinese newsmen in Cholon (Para 1). A Liberation Front official claims that the Front will not transfer itself into a formal government as long as the war continues (Paras. 2-3).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:  
Unusually heavy MIG activity was reported over North Vietnam on 6 and 7 November, [redacted]

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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:  
There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: Communist propaganda still claims that recent military actions at Loc Ninh were in retaliation for

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
US attacks on Hanoi (Paras. 1-2). Le Duan has written a major article in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (Paras. 3-7).



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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Heavy fighting was reported near Dak To in the central highlands and in several other widely scattered areas on 6-7 November.

2. A battalion of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, operating with the US 4th Infantry Division in Kontum Province, killed 18 North Vietnamese soldiers in clashes southwest of Dak To. US losses were 16 killed and 29 wounded.

3. The major fighting began in midafternoon when a US company patrolling in the vicinity of a recent B-52 strike came under heavy small-arms fire from an enemy force in well-fortified positions. The positions were overrun after another US company, air strikes, and artillery were called in. During the night the two companies' defensive perimeter was hit by a ground probe and several mortar rounds.

4. Two other companies of the US 173rd reported brief but violent clashes in the same general area, ten to 12 miles southwest of Dak To. US 4th Infantry Division troops have also fought North Vietnamese regulars in this area recently.

5. In Khanh Hoa Province along the central coast South Korean troops reported killing 113 enemy soldiers in another cordon operation around two villages near Ninh Hoa, capital of the district of the same name. Twenty-two ROK troops have been killed so far.

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6. The enemy troops, an estimated two companies of the North Vietnamese 18B Regiment, were believed to have been on a rice collection mission when they were trapped by the South Koreans. The cordon-and-search operation is a favorite tactic of the South Koreans who have made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to operate in the heavily populated coastal districts of Khanh Hoa Province. Nonetheless, the enemy has persistently attempted to maintain a presence in this region, taking high casualties in the process.

7. South Vietnamese suffered badly in the fighting on 5 November three miles south of Song Be. Ninety-six South Vietnamese were killed and 33 wounded. Three US advisers were wounded, and 25 ARVN soldiers are listed as missing. The enemy's losses are reported as 23 killed.

8. Reporting on the engagement is sketchy. It appears, however, that the South Vietnamese 31st Ranger Battalion ran into trouble while en route to reinforce another South Vietnamese unit which had engaged an enemy battalion.

9. Both the North Vietnamese 88th and the Viet Cong 275th regiments are believed to be in the area. The 88th, formerly a subordinate of the North Vietnamese 1st Division in the central highlands, moved down to Phuoc Long Province late in the summer. It opened the current enemy offensive in III Corps with a heavy ground assault against an outpost near Song Be on 27 October. The 275th, a regiment of the Viet Cong 5th Light Infantry Division in southeastern III Corps, has been noted moving cross-country to the Phuoc Long area since early October.

10. Meanwhile, 25 miles west of Song Be at Loc Ninh, 18 US infantrymen were wounded in a brief enemy mortar barrage. The fire was returned but enemy casualties were not determined.

11. In other action, US Marines in Operation ESSEX, some 25 miles southwest of Da Nang, ran into stiff resistance on 6 November from an enemy force in a village fortified with bunkers, trenches, spider holes, and barbed-wire barriers. Two Marine companies attacked with air and artillery support,

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forcing the enemy to fall back from one defense line to another, taking their dead and wounded with them. Six Americans were killed and 45 wounded in 12 hours of sporadic fighting.

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The Communists are continuing terror tactics against the Chinese community in the Saigon-Cholon area. [redacted] warning letters from the "Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Operations Unit" were delivered on 30 October to all Chinese newspapers in Cholon, Chinese newsmen at Saigon radio and the Voice of Asia, and the Chinese Correspondents' Club in Cholon. The letters to the newspapers criticized them for having encouraged voting in the recent elections and warned that they must immediately stop publishing news favorable to the government. The newspaper editors, as a result, are reportedly avoiding appearing in the streets, and at least one paper has stationed a 24-hour police guard at its offices.

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2. Foreign Ministry officials in Paris have offered a few comments on the National Liberation Front. The Front's representative in Hanoi told the French delegate general there in September that the Front would not transform itself into a formal government as long as the war continued. He emphasized the importance of the Front's new political program, however, and stressed in particular the alleged differences between the Front and the North Vietnamese Government. He cited the program's call for a coalition government in the South and its encouragement of "bourgeois" economic elements in making his point. Other Front spokesmen have taken a similar line recently.


3. The French also believe the Front has adopted a harsher line toward a negotiated settlement of the war. They say that, in both public and private statements recently, Front spokesmen have been talking less about negotiations or the relevance of the Geneva agreements than they had earlier this year. We have reported this trend before; it is in keeping with Hanoi's very rigid approach toward negotiations in recent months.

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


III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. Unusually heavy MIG activity during the past two days once again raises questions about the size and mission of the North Vietnamese fighter force. Pilot reports of MIG sightings and encounters on 6 November indicated a greater number of Communist interceptors active in the defense of the Hanoi/Haiphong area than had shown up in

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Since no new aircraft have been detected flying into North Vietnam, it is assumed that Hanoi either is using MIGs kept in concealed storage areas or has received a new shipment of fighters from China or the Soviet Union.



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3. The air activity of the past two days has demonstrated again the resilience of Hanoi's air defense. Despite heavy MIG losses North Vietnam can continue to launch enough aircraft to pose a significant threat to US air operations.

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The aggressive performance of North Vietnamese MIGs on 6-7 November suggests that at a minimum Hanoi will attempt to have enough fighters operating from bases in the Red River Valley to force US strike aircraft to be accompanied by heavy fighter cover.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The Communists continue to portray the current military activity around Loc Ninh as a retaliation for recent US bombings of the Hanoi area and to herald it as the beginning of the winter-spring campaign. An article in the 2 November issue of the Hanoi army daily, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, stated that the "victories of the Southern peoples' armed forces" were a foretaste of greater successes to come in the winter-spring campaign. The paper asserted, "it is obvious that if the US aggressors attack the North one time, the Southern armed forces and people will counter-attack five or ten times--no matter how many difficulties and hardships we have to overcome and even if we have to make sacrifices and engage in protracted fighting." The article praised the skillful fighting methods used in the Loc Ninh "victories," especially the use and close coordination of infantry and artillery units.

2. Further Hanoi commentary on the same theme is found in the party daily, Nhan Dan, and in regular Hanoi broadcasts. Nhan Dan on 3 November referred to the Loc Ninh battles as the "bugle call" of the winter-spring assault and a Hanoi broadcast of 6 November claimed that the "punishing blows" dealt by the Communists at Loc Ninh were in response to the political program of the NFLSV and in retaliation against "the savage US raids on Hanoi."

3. Nhan Dan has published a lengthy and wide-ranging article in praise of the Bolshevik Revolution and its lessons for today's struggle against the US. The article was written by party First Secretary Le Duan, who is now in Moscow as head of Hanoi's delegation to the 50th anniversary celebrations. It is broader and more pointed than the pro forma items by Ho Chi Minh and Defense Minister Giap published recently in the Soviet press. The latter were confined largely to praise for Soviet accomplishments. Le Duan's fuller treatment seems intended as the major North Vietnamese pronouncement on this occasion and is aimed mainly at interpreting current Communist problems in the light of the 50 years' experience.

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4. Le Duan comes down hard on the need for Communist unity in pursuing the struggle in Vietnam. His language is more specific on this point than that of any recent Vietnamese Communist spokesman. Today's "urgent problem," he says, is "to consolidate and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp," and the "unity of the international Communist movement" in order to continue the "common struggle for socialist revolution." Le Duan calls for the "establishment of a world united front" against the United States similar to that used by the USSR in the 1930s against Nazi Germany. He asserts that setting up such a front is one of the "most basic problems" facing the Communist movement.

5. While his call for Communist unity doubtless will please Soviet leaders, Le Duan also reaffirms North Vietnam's insistence on revolutionary violence as an indispensable ingredient of national liberation movements. He emphasizes the responsibilities of all Communist countries to support such movements wherever they exist, but makes it clear that the Vietnam struggle is the main task at present. The "world revolution," he reminds his audience, will surely enter a new phase "provided the socialist camp and other revolutionary forces in the world prove resolute" in promoting the "offensive spirit of the October revolution and follow the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism."

6. Reflecting Hanoi's deep-rooted nationalist sentiments, Le Duan also asserted that, while working for unity, each Communist party must "firmly preserve its independence, and fully accomplish its duties as a revolutionary vanguard."

7. North Vietnamese dependence on other Communist countries for material support to continue the war has made cooperation within the "socialist camp" an issue of paramount concern to the Vietnamese Communists. The ramifications of the Sino-Soviet conflict

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continually complicate the situation for Hanoi, and it has been forced to tread a razor's edge between Moscow and Peking. While maintaining an essentially neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the North Vietnamese seem to be using the Soviet anniversary as an occasion again to remind both Moscow and Peking that their differences must not be allowed to undermine the Communist effort in Vietnam.

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
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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and  
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 September 1967

## 1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
	1967	3369	887	6064	2036	-	166	-	3089	--	738	2360
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
	1967	3183	771	7341	2125	-	154	-	3050	--	532	2395
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	-	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
	1967	3379	1718	10313	2786	-	468	-	4372	10313	984	4215
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
	1966	3190	573	2818	1522	-	121	483	2216	3301	594	829
	1967	3494	935	6227	2490	-	134	-	3559	--	725	2118
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
	1966	3566	661	4239	1454	-	196	652	2311	4891	493	1087
	1967	3571	1026	9808	2830	-	148	-	4006	9808	646	2781
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
	1966	3359	860	4815	1800	-	183	752	2843	5567	735	3761
	1967	2893	771	7354	2118	-	139	-	3028	7354	536	1979
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882
	1966	2844	862	5532	1638	-	242	414	2742	5946	744	1483
	1967	3078	666	7923	1935	-	123	-	2724	7923	560	3508

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
	1966	2401	722	5857	1491	-	209	924	2422	6781	654	1298
	1967	3271	852	5810	2282	-	131	-	3265	5810	521	2068
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
	1966	2864	566	4447	1554	-	185	839	2305	5286	426	1580
	1967	3757	740	6354	2416	-	103	-	3259	6354	444	1877
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
	1966	2923	906	5665	2118	-	216	2438	3240	8103	851	1977
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
	1966	2778	804	5227	1933	-	200	816	2937	6043	650	1423
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158
	1966	2837	815	3864	1851	-	338	701	3004	4565	830	1338

## Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
1966	37446	9469	55524	20974	-	3283	9719	33726	65243	9381	18606
**1967	29932	7766	66232	21018	-	1566	--	30350	--	5686	22912

\*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

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## 2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 September 1967

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Harassment & Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa-ganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small Unit	Bn. Size or Larger	Total				
Jan 1962	1825	549	0	549	839	180	257	-
1963	927	250	2	252	447	49	179	-
1964	1770	220	3	223	1244	129	174	-
1965	2206	62	1	63	1489	272	170	212
1966	3914	65	5	70	2490	312	299	743
1967	3369	141	1	142	1772	70	128	1257
Feb 1962	1460	500	0	500	613	137	210	-
1963	788	194	1	195	433	69	91	-
1964	2078	214	3	217	1389	210	271	-
1965	1982	79	3	82	1411	267	91	131
1966	3100	60	9	69	1829	201	172	829
1967	3183	115	2	117	1499	39	76	1452
Mar 1962	1961	588	0	588	660	290	423	-
1963	1282	344	0	344	653	131	154	-
1964	2160	202	1	203	1632	158	167	-
1965	2056	83	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1966	3670	42	10	52	2332	212	154	920
1967	3379	212	7	219	1844	50	45	1221
Apr 1962	1933	497	0	497	1024	220	192	-
1963	1331	380	3	383	688	105	155	-
1964	2284	217	3	220	1738	169	157	-
1965	1860	39	4	43	1407	149	96	165
1966	3190	68	9	77	2238	252	110	513
1967	3494	155	7	162	1992	67	109	1164
May 1962	1825	518	0	528	892	154	251	-
1963	1208	357	0	357	608	93	150	-
1964	2143	173	2	175	418	217	140	193
1965	2263	47	11	58	1558	365	115	170
1966	3566	46	7	53	2552	295	106	560
1967	3571	189	4	193	1985	74	59	1260
Jun 1962	1477	362	0	362	736	157	222	-
1963	1311	409	1	410	652	107	142	-
1964	2062	138	2	140	1390	176	162	194
1965	2597	63	6	69	1784	469	103	172
1966	3359	57	11	68	2382	211	110	588
1967	2893	166	2	168	1557	72	44	1052
Jul 1962	1564	447	1	448	735	158	223	-
1963	1368	416	1	407	698	80	183	-
1964	3045	178	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965	2520	42	6	48	1706	400	154	212
1966	2844	91	0	91	1906	200	86	561
1967	3078	188	9	197	1739	141	61	940

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Harassment & Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
		Small Unit	Bn. Size or Larger	Total				
Aug 1962	1642	378	0	378	885	146	233	-
1963	1349	367	1	368	647	113	221	-
1964	2580	110	3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965	2498	47	5	52	1597	349	200	300
1966	2401	59	5	64	1752	113	87	385
1967	3271	203	1	204	1653	145	96	1173
Sep 1962	1375	391	0	391	624	178	182	-
1963	1763	500	3	503	889	164	207	-
1964	3091	114	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	26	5	31	1530	278	185	449
1966	2864	84	2	86	1972	90	115	601
1967	3757	255	5	260	2148	206	65	1078
Oct 1962	1357	418	1	419	583	189	166	-
1963	1422	365	0	365	802	105	150	-
1964	2827	77	6	83	1790	480	197	277
1965	3330	32	12	44	1969	415	198	704
1966	2923	119	2	121	1749	103	81	869
Nov 1962	1311	418	3	421	614	144	132	-
1963	3182	642	3	645	1990	269	278	-
1964	1982	59	1	60	1391	247	109	175
1965	3638	42	10	52	2234	486	255	611
1966	2778	84	2	86	1701	125	72	794
Dec 1962	1346	383	1	384	670	107	185	-
1963	1921	261	0	261	1298	111	251	-
1964	2504	90	6	96	1719	318	128	243
1965	4106	50	7	57	2572	442	317	718
1966	2837	97	4	101	1761	98	112	765

## Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5459	6	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4475	15	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1792	41	1833	19556	3178	20080	1879
1965	31529	612	73	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
1966	37446	872	66	938	24664	2212	1504	8128
*1967	29932	1624	38	1662	16126	864	683	10597

\*Through 30 September 1967

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