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# INTERROGATION REPORT

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSFICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 8199TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY : South Vietnam (SVN) NIC REPORT NO : 251/68  
 SUBJECT :  NIC CASE NO : FET  
 the TET DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/68  
 Attack on SAIGON. NO. OF PAGES : 2  
 DATE OF INFO : January 1968 REF: None

DATE AND PLACE : 14 February 1968  
OF ACQUISITION : Vietnam, SAIGON

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This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team 14 February 1968 in SAIGON City, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further exploitation.  
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3.3(h)(2)

1.  was assigned to Viet Cong (VC) Company 213 between January and October 1967. Its mission was to build and repair a district base in a thickly forested area of QUANG DA District, QUANG NGAI Province. The base consisted of thatched houses for the district unit of 20 men. Although DAO was trained to fire a carbine, he had no practical experience in combat. District women carried rice, vegetables, pork, salt, and salted fish to the troops every three to five days. DAO occasionally went to a Government of Vietnam (GVN) strategic hamlet to visit a relative there. 3.3(h)(2)

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NIC REPORT NO : 251/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Page 2

2. After Company 213 merged into Battalion 21B in October 1967, it moved to another base where it remained until 24 January 1968 when the company went to SAIGON. Commander NAM THU told the troops to prepare for combat. They walked night and day led by NAM THU who knew the liaison route. [redacted] did not see any other units moving south. Company 213 reached a large coconut grove on 30 January where they were met by a liaison cadre who said that other groups and units had passed through the area. Source did not know in what area or province he was in. After resting for three hours in the coconut grove, the unit followed the liaison cadre for two hours and at midnight came to a wide river where the soldiers boarded two wooden boats containing 10 persons each. Each boat was rowed by a boatman and no engines were used. [redacted] thought that the trip took two hours. Before boarding the boats the soldiers were told that they were going to SAIGON to support friendly units who were attacking the city. If the friendly units suffered casualties, the soldiers of Company 213 were to evacuate them, following the same route as they did to enter SAIGON. They were not given a specific location to which the wounded were to be carried. The 20-man group carried four carbines with three magazines (15 rounds) each; 15 AK rifles with 3/4 magazines (number of rounds unknown) each; and one B40 with three rounds. NAM THU carried a pistol. A nurse accompanying the unit carried a small package of medicine.

3.3(h)(2)

3. After the group disembarked near a large concrete road, it walked along until it reached a bridge, crossed, walked about 200 meters, and lay down to wait for orders. At approximately 0600 hours, 31 January Company 213 was ordered to withdraw. NAM THU told the soldiers to give their weapons to the cell chief [redacted] was a member of Cell 4), [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

4. [redacted] had received no briefings about what to expect from the population in SAIGON, how long his unit was to remain there, his unit's military objectives, or any future attacks planned by the VC. His unit had carried enough rice and sesame for seven days from QUANG NGAI to SAIGON, and had not been told when food would be resupplied. The unit had been given to special training before leaving for SAIGON.

5. [redacted] interrogator found him to be cooperative although he did not respond well to being questioned on some points. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

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8

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