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Non Responsive

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VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:

Situation report. A-3

NORTH VIETNAM:

Air strikes. A-7

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VIETNAM
AND
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in South Vietnam

(c) Enemy activity was at a relatively low level throughout the country on 28 February. The most significant ground fighting took place in 3d Corps, between ARVN elements and Communist forces in Hau Nghia Province.

1st Corps

(•) At Khe Sanh, enemy gunners fired 181 rounds of artillery, mortar and rockets between 280900H and 290900H February, a slight increase over the previous day's total. All other US bases along the DMZ reported light shelling.

(b)(3) COMUSMACV analysis of a sharp drop in enemy communications, on 28 February in northern 1st Corps, indicates that tactical operations may be initiated in the near future. This report lends credence to an intercepted message which indicated that elements of the 164th NVA Artillery Regiment might perform a mission on the night of 1 March.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424; (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 enemy troops are desperately short of rice in Quang Nam Province. The rice is needed not only for Viet Cong and NVA troops already in South Vietnam, but to supply troops infiltrating from the north. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 villagers have been told to buy rice at any price and have been given money for this purpose. The villagers allegedly obtain most of the rice from ARVN and GVN officials who move the rice by truck from Da Nang to villages within the province.

2d Corps

(b)(3) No significant enemy military activity has been reported by any of the provinces in 2d Corps in the past 24 hours. The populace in most provincial capitals continues to be apprehensive of further attacks, however, and considerable effort is reportedly being devoted to building defensive positions around private homes as well as GVN installations.

(Continued)
Kontum and Darlac Provinces continue to receive reports of large VC/NVA units outside their provincial capitals, but there are no details on when these units might attack the cities.

American military officials in Darlac Province have information that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units are regrouping into battalion-size units, possibly for an attack on Ban Me Thuot City.

There has been a southerly move by some B-3 Front elements from the western Kontum-Cambodian border area to positions threatening the provincial capitals of Darlac, Kontum, and Pleiku. While the repositioning of these highland units has probably temporarily weakened the enemy's over-all offensive posture in the Dak To area, at least one regiment, the 66th of the 1st NVA Division, along with artillery and other support units still pose a threat in western Kontum Province.

In the coastal provinces, provincial capitals continue to appear threatened also. On 25 February, ARDF fixed the Headquarters, 95th NVA Regiment, 19 miles northwest of Tuy Hoa, in Phu Yen Province. The move in the direction of Tuy Hoa supports agent reports that the enemy will initiate a new attack on the city. The deployment of the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95th NVA Regiment near Tuy Hoa City.

The Headquarters, 18th NVA Regiment to a position nine miles northwest of Qui Nhon. This move south may indicate an impending attack on that city.

3d Corps

Saigon was quiet during the night of 28-29 February, but there were several low-level actions within 20 miles of the capital.
In Gia Dinh Province on the 28th, ARVN airborne troops engaged an estimated reinforced enemy company four miles north of Tan Son Nhut, resulting in 20 VC killed. In Hau Nghia Province, ARVN elements engaged enemy forces on the 28th, three miles northeast of Duc Hoa. Fighting continued throughout the day. Enemy losses were 93 killed and six persons detained; friendly casualties were five ARVN killed and 28 ARVN and one US wounded. Elsewhere in the Corps, the enemy was again active in the Bien Hoa area. US Army troops two miles northwest of Bien Hoa received smallarms and antitank rocket fire on the 28th, resulting in eight US killed and three wounded; enemy losses are not known. US materiel losses were one tank and one armored personnel carrier (APC) destroyed and two APCs damaged.

The 274th VC Regiment, 5th Division, has been put on alert status, possibly preparing for an "artillery" mission to be directed against Allied activities along Route 1, east of Bien Hoa. Elements of this regiment may have been involved in recent mortar and rocket attacks on Bien Hoa Airfield and other installations throughout Bien Hoa Province.

Elements of the US Army 25th Inf Div captured four enemy soldiers on 28 February, four miles east of Cu Chi in southwest Hau Nghia Province. Preliminary interrogation of the captives indicated that they were from the 88th NVA Regiment. They said their unit had arrived in the area about two and one-half weeks ago. According to the prisoners, the 88th Regiment is subordinate to the 5th VC Division deployed in the provinces north of Saigon. They said the 88th has two subordinate infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, an engineer or sapper battalion, and a 122-mm rocket team. (The COMUSMACV enemy order of battle carries the 88th Regiment subordinate to the B-3 Front, deployed in the Central Highlands in 2d Corps).

If the information obtained from the prisoners is correct, COMUSMACV concludes that eight of the nine regiments subordinate to the three

(Continued)
division headquarters, the 5th and 9th VC and the 7th NVA, have been identified in the Saigon/Bien Hoa/ southern Binh Duong areas in recent weeks. The only regiment that may not have been identified in this area, therefore, is the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th Division, which was fixed by ARDF on 22 February in northern Binh Duong Province. It is possible that the Communist commander in the area is utilizing the 165th in a tactical reserve role in the Saigon/Bien Hoa area.

4th Corps

 Viet Cong initiated activity on 28 February in 4th Corps consisted of several harassing attacks, most of which were directed against isolated outposts. The corps headquarters area in Can Tho City, Phong Dinh Province, received four rounds of 75-mm recoilless rifle fire, wounding two South Vietnamese officials.

the Viet Cong in Phong Dinh Province are attempting to upgrade guerrillas in the province into Main Force units while "Combat Hamlet" defenders and locally-recruited males between the ages of 14 to 45 are being used to strengthen local force units. In this way, the Viet Cong are attempting to create one or two more Main Force battalions to operate in the province, one or two more companies per district, and one or two more platoons for each village.

Political Developments

 Field intelligence reports indicate that some ARVN officers are losing confidence in President Thieu and the present government. Col Tran Van Hai, Commander of the Vietnamese Rangers, remarked that he and many of his fellow officers are greatly concerned over the lack of leadership shown by Thieu. The officers feel that Thieu is too dependent on American advice and lacks the political instinct necessary for leadership.

(Continued)
While Thieu is considered honest and sincere, many field grade commanders feel he has isolated himself from the people, from prominent political and religious leaders, and from the situation in the rural areas. During the Tet offensive Thieu failed to visit commanders in the field or to send messages of congratulations while Ky visited troops fighting the Viet Cong in the Cholon sector of Saigon, and generally impressed officers as having a better understanding for the needs of the people.

Despite disappointment over the performance of President Thieu, Col Hai believes there is no support for a coup among any ARVN officers. Hai indicated that most officers felt that reaction to a coup in the US would threaten US support in Vietnam, but the officers also fear that the weakness shown by the present government might cause the US to push for negotiations with the Communists to establish a coalition government. Col Hai, therefore, feels it is most important for the US to reiterate at every opportunity that it will not settle for a "negotiated defeat."

Hai sees the only solution to the problems facing the GVN to be a showing of strong leadership by President Thieu, and less corruption in all walks of Vietnamese life. He believes the main problem of the government today is corruption; the enemy's strength lies not in his brilliant strategy but rather in his ability to feed on the social, economic, and moral problems which the system of corruption fosters. Hai claims that the corruption of the National Police was the major factor in the Chinese support of the Viet Cong in the Cholon area. Even in the armed forces corruption is a fact of life, and many officers find it impossible to maintain their families without resorting to it. The result of honesty in his own case, Hai remarks, is that he owns no real property and has no savings.
North Vietnamese Rocket Launchers and Assault Guns Reported in Laos

(2) A Royal Lao Army company commander, evading Communist forces in the Lang Vei-Ban Houei Sane area, claims to have seen and counted 174 North Vietnamese artillery rocket launchers, assault guns, and tanks on 11 and 12 February; the weapons were said to have been on Route 92 in eastern Savannakhet Province and moving southeast toward Muong Nong.

(2) The officer tentatively identified the weapons as self-propelled 240-mm rocket launchers (on the AT-S chassis), JSU-122 assault guns, and PT-76 amphibious tanks. The reported sightings are based on preliminary interrogation, and the weapon identifications are tenuous. Although PT-76 tanks have been confirmed and photographed in the area, neither the rocket launchers nor JSU-122 assault guns are currently carried in the North Vietnamese order of battle. If the report is true, the weapons could be destined for the Khe Sanh area. They might also be associated with recent reports on enemy armor and artillery moving into the A Shau Valley.

(2) See (b)(3) and Sec. 3.3 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424; (b)(3) 10.
Summary of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam on 28 February

A total of 120 US aircraft conducted strikes against North Vietnamese targets on 28 February. There was one aircraft presumed lost when a USN A-6A on a strike against Bai Thuong Airfield was overdue. Last known position was about 67 nautical miles south of Hanoi, en route to the target.

Of these sorties, 11 were against the following significant targets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>BDA (Pilot Reports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SAM Sites 4, 19, 243</td>
<td>Ten SHRIKEs launched; results not observed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hanoi Radar</td>
<td>No BDA due to darkness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Phu Ly Railroad Yard</td>
<td>No BDA due to darkness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haiphong Railroad Yard West</td>
<td>No BDA due to darkness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armed Reconnaissance Strike Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged/Cratered/Cut</th>
<th>Struck/ (No Report)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causeway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road segments</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad sidings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBL craft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA site</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun sites</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar site</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop concentration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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