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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 19 January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

In Military Region (MR) 5 in South Vietnam, Communist plans for an attack in western Kontum Province on "the morning of the 20th" were partially revealed in a message exchanged between an unidentified PAVN B3 Front-associated entity and a suspect artillery unit in the Laos-Cambodia-Kontum border area. Additional evidence that elements of the PAVN 2nd Division are effecting a general repositioning in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area appeared on 18 January when the Hq, 2nd Division, its probable Forward Element, and the possible Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 1st Regiment all indicated that they were about to move. In MR 1, Vietnamese Communist interest in northeastern Tay Ninh Province continues to be reflected in communications serving military intelligence elements of the Hq, VC 9th Light Infantry Division.

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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIAA. MILITARY1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South VietnamMilitary Region 5

In the western highlands, plans for an impending attack in western Kontum Province were partially disclosed in an 18 January message from an unidentified PAVN B3 Front-associated entity to a suspect artillery unit. In the message, the B3 Front element stated, "Suggest the company provide an additional (C val radio station) right away, since the station is going into combat on the morning of the 20th." The originator of the message was located on 18 January in the Laos-Cambodia-Kontum border area near 14-42N 107-28E (YB 682264); the suspect artillery unit was positioned on 16 January, also near the tri-border, at 14-30N 107-28E (YB 670051). This artillery unit communicates sporadically with the Hq, PAVN 1st Division, the possible 1st Division Forward Tactical Element, and the Hq, B3 front; additionally, since 7 January the unit has communicated with an unidentified station located on 16 January in northwestern Pleiku near 14-30N 107-43E (YA 952552).

In other activity in the western highlands, additional information indicates that the two units in the western highlands which have discussed attacks against specific targets in west-central Pleiku Province are probable elements of the Hq, PAVN B3 Front and of the Hq, PAVN 1st Division. The probable Hq, 1st Division element was located at 13-51N 107-30E (YA 711337) and 13-50N 107-36E (YA 812308) on 17 and 18 January, respectively reflecting a 10 km eastward move toward Le Thanh. The location of the probable Hq, B3 Front authority has not been determined; however, on 17 January this probable authority informed the 1st Division element that it had set up an ambush on Route 19 near Ha Ra Bridge, west of Mang Yang Pass, indicating that this probable authority may be in northeastern

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Pleiku. On 18 January, the probable Hq, B3 Front authority informed the 1st Division's element "After you arrive at the final destination for the mission, have the main body halt. I will notify you later of the central area of operations. Remember to report everything, including Comrade PHUEN's messages." Another message passed from this probable B3 Front authority stated in part "You must provide guidance for the men to firm up their anxiety concerning air and artillery; and you must see that their health is good. Pay special attention to fortifications and to setting up the defense and guard properly. If you encounter commandoes, attack right away." The identification of the recipient of these messages as a probable Hq, 1st Division element rests upon the reference to it as "Farm site 1." Farm site is the generic Vietnamese Communist cover term for division. Additionally, Hq, 1st Division was located due west of Dak To on 16 January in Laos near the common border of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

Intensive military intelligence reporting on Allied convoy activity by elements possibly associated with the PAVN B3 Front in the area north and east of Kontum City (13-22N 108-01E, AR 780880) continued through at least 17 January.

Elsewhere in MR 5, indications of repositioning Vietnamese Communist military units continue in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area. On 18 January Hq, PAVN 2nd Division, its probable Forward Element, and the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment 2nd Division, all indicated that they were about to move. Additionally, the probable 2nd Division Forward Element informed the possible Hq, 1st Regiment that it would not contact the regiment until 0145Z on 19 December. Hq, 2nd Division was last located on 17 January near 15-41N 108-06E (AT 902369), in southern Quang Nam Province. The probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element and possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment were located in this same area near 15-41N 108-08E (AT 928359) and 15-45N 108-11E (AT 993425) on 16 and 17 January, respectively.

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Recently available captured material has revealed that the unidentified Rear Service Headquarters, Quang Nam Province is Hq, Rear Services Group 44. This headquarters was located on 18 January in southern Quang Nam Province near 15-50N 108-10E (AT 975538); however, at least one of its elements continued to operate in its normal base area in the vicinity of 15-45N 107-56E (ZC 1543) as of 17 January.

Finally, in southern Quang Tin Province a possible Rear Services element subordinate to a Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control associate was located near 15-20N 108-27E (BS 260960) on 18 January, approximately 40 km north of its 4 December location in Quang Ngai Province.

(2/G12/VCM/R0170-68, 190421Z; R0169-68, 190400Z; R0168-68, 181715Z; R0167-68, 181719Z; 3/0/STY/R13-68, 152010Z)

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Military Region 1

Reflections of continued Vietnamese Communist interest in northeastern Tay Ninh Province were contained in messages of 17 January passed by a subordinate to the probable Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company, Military Intelligence Section, Hq, VC 9th Light Infantry Division. The messages made reference to a Communist "artillery group", and possibly to a Communist heavy weapons unit and a light weapons unit. The messages also referred to Allied activity in the vicinity of Bau Cham (11-33N 106-23E, XT 5076) and Ba Chiem (11-29N 106-50E, XT 4968). This area of northeastern Tay Ninh has also been covered in recent reports passed by the possible Hq, VC 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion to the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN. The subordinate of the probable C95 Reconnaissance Company was tentatively located on 13 January near 11-38N 106-18E (XT 431862).

(2/G10/VCM/R23-68, 181616Z; 3/0/STY/R16-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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Military Region 10

Through 17 January, SIGINT has reflected a more prominent role being assumed by the unidentified possible Front Headquarters located in northern Binh Long Province. On 16 and 17 January, the Hq, PAVN B3 Front and Hq, MR 2 attempted to contact the Front headquarters and on 15 January, Hq, MR 6 also attempted contact. On 14 and 15 January, the Front attempted to contact an unidentified station possibly associated with Hq, MR 5. Communications on the this level (i.e., front and MR headquarters) and the lack of activity between the Front Headquarters and former tactical subordinates, suggests that this Front Headquarters may be assuming a more strategic role.

(2/0/VCM/R17-68, 172329Z; 2/G10/VCM/R22-68, 181030Z)

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2. DRV CommunicationsPAVN High Command - 304th/320th Divisions

On 18 and 19 January, the probable PAVN 304th Infantry Division was observed in increased communications activity. The Division Headquarters, located in the vicinity of 16-30N 106-36E (XD 715407) on 19 January, was noted in communications with an unidentified suspect infantry regiment, located in the vicinity of 16-43N 106-20E (XD 438 488) on 17 January; an unidentified, suspect regimental subordinate last heard on 18 December and located in the vicinity of 17-10N 106-05E (XD 1697) on 12 December; and a new, unidentified entity associated with this division and first noted on 17 January. This latter entity was located on 17 January at 16-26N 106-36E (XD 718158) and on 18 January at 16-28N 106-42E (XD 822235). A significant increase in message activity from the headquarters to all of the above entities was observed on 19 January. The broadcast serving this division was also

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observed active on 18 January -- the first noted occurrence since 11 January.

(2/G11/VCM/R099-68, 170901Z; R105-68, 18----Z; R109-68, 181506Z, 3/0/STY/R06-68) (~~SECRET SAVIN~~)

PAVN Rear Services

A PAVN Rear Services message of 18 January disclosed the following weapons shipments:

GDRS Forward (18-05N 105-45E, WE 7999)

<u>TYPE OF WEAPON</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
K-56 (7.62 Assault rifle)	17 cases/305 weapons/2,142 kg
K-57 (7.62 heavy machine gun)	25 cases/25 weapons/3,220 kg
K-44 (unidentified)	4 cases/72 weapons/490 kg
Liberation mortar	40 cases/160 weapons/1,470 kg
K-59 (unidentified prob automatic weapon)	5 cases/20 weapons/275 kg

B6 (unlocated)

B-40	1 case/1 weapon/40 kg
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Tri-Thien A Tuc (possibly A Shau Valley Area 16-15N 106-59E, XC 102981)

60-mm mortar	48 cases/48 weapons/1,876 kg
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B5T8 Sappers (probable DMZ area)

60-mm mortar	11 cases/11 weapons/407 kg
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Tri-Thien Vinh Linh (DMZ area)TYPE OF WEAPONAMOUNTK-53 (Soviet 7.62 carbine bolt
action)

3 cases/_____/330 kg

60-mm mortar

21 cases/21 weapons/777 kg

12.7 heavy machine gun

2 cases/2 weapons/400 kg

B5 Vinh Linh (DMZ/Vinh Linh Area)

Liberation mortar

20 cases/80 weapons/640 kg

12.7 heavy machine guns

6 cases/6 weapons/1,200 kg

KHU 5 (possibly Military Region 5)

K-56 (7.62 Assault rifle)

31 cases/31 weapons/304 kg

K-59 (Unidentified, probable
automatic weapon)

5 cases/(20) weapons/925 kg

Liberation mortar

25 cases/100 weapons/925 kg

60-mm mortar
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69 cases/69 weapons/2,533 kg

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D. SOUTH VIETNAM

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General MINH Trying to Return to Vietnam

General DUONG VAN MINH (Big MINH) has requested permission of President THIEU to return to Vietnam for Tet, according to a 19 January diplomatic message.

Collateral indicates General MINH has been in exile in Bangkok since early 1965 following his involvement in an unsuccessful coup attempt.

Tet is celebrated this year at the end of January.

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