

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

2/0/VCM/R43-68
 FOLLOW-UP NR 8 TO
 2/0/VCM/R32-68
 SPOT REPORT
 AVC,AVN/OPER-G-H/.
 29 JANUARY 1968 2320Z
 DIST: OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA
 PLUS USM-604, GCU 1 AUSTF
 WHITE HOUSE
 HCF

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER 8 TOCOORDINATED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE EVIDENCED IN SOUTH VIETNAM (252332Z)

Messages of 29 January transmitted from the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front authority, last located on 25 January near 13-50N 107-26E in the Pleiku Province-Cambodia border area to the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element operating in the same area and last located on 25 January near 14-03N 107-22E (YA 559541) have discussed targets and plans for attack in the western Pleiku Province area. One message transmitted at 0035Z on 29 January stated, ". . . be careful and maintain vigilance . . . the enemy carefully, cautiously and precisely. Smash and kill the dogs and personnel right away. Do not let them search further . . . when the . . . attack is finished, move in gradually. If you stay close, then you will not come under air and artillery attack. 2. Where is the enemy . . . at Chu Ba [13-53N 107-35E, YA 8036] . . . if there really are, then the enemy will come out to search with a platoon and possibly more. You should look for a site and tomorrow (C val have the unit lie in ambush there). Annihilate them element by element. Be sure to reconnoiter in the direction of Chu Ba, and when they come out to search the river bank and your crossing point. 3. This is a good opportunity to score achievements. Take precautions against their deceptions and against their . . . 4. You must discuss the combat plan carefully, democratically and in great detail. Commanders must be clever, brave and courageous in handling situations."

A later message transmitted at 0820Z on 29 January stated, "1. You are to report the enemy situation in your areas: Chu Ngot [unlocated], Chu Ba, and the river bank. 2. Having met to study your reports we estimate that there are no 105s at Chu Ba at all. It is possible that all they will do is bring 175s up to Sung Le [13-54N 107-40E, YA 8939] and fire them. 3. If Chu Ba has 105s 100 percent for certain then it will be necessary to investigate one enemy battalion there and, therefore, you comrades will have to conduct reconnaissance, stay close and (C val slip) approximately one squad into Chu Kram [13-50N 107-36E, YA 8131]. Take precautions against their [i.e., the enemy's] conducting a search as a decoy for a withdraw to Le Thanh [13-49N 107-40E, YA 8930]. If the enemy is really at Chu Ba then stop and block and destroy them through numerous small and separate attacks. 4. If the enemy actually searches in large numbers then this is tremendous. Try in every way to bog them down. You must keep watch on your thinking at times of difficulty and severity or when discussing withdrawing the troops."

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

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