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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 04 Jan 68. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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
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SITUATION SUMMARY

In South Vietnam, communications serving elements of the PAVN 2nd Division continue to reflect contact with Allied forces in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area of Military Region (MR) 5. Difficulties in mounting a planned attack on Dak To airfield in Kontum Province were reported to the Military Intelligence Section, PAVN 1st Division by a subordinate on 3 January. In eastern Pleiku Province the initial appearance of communications between a main force unit of PAVN B3 Front and a provincial unit in MR 5 was also noted. Communications activity in MR 1 was highlighted by military intelligence reporting on Communist attacks on Bien Hoa Province and by reflections of a B-52 strike in Tay Ninh Province. In MR 2, foreknowledge of "enemy" sweep activity scheduled for Dinh Tuong Province on 4 and 5 January, was contained in a message of 3 January passed between two Party-associated elements.


Communications serving the probable PAVN 304th Infantry Division and its subordinates have continued the decline which began in mid-December 1967. Additionally, the probable Hq, 320th Division was last noted in communications with the unidentified entity suspected to be associated with Hq, MR 5 on 31 December.



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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications-South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Communications serving the PAVN 2nd Division continued to exhibit characteristics indicating tactical involvement with Allied forces. On 3 January the Hq, 2nd Division--located on 31 December 1967 in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area near 15-40N 108-05E (AT 869324)--reported to the Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control (MFUC) that it was about to move. Earlier on the same date, the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment, while in communications with the 2nd Division Forward Element, reported that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment. The possible regimental headquarters was located on 3 January also in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin area near 15-36N 108-08E (AT 948273).

Communications serving the Hq, 2nd Division and its forward element continue to be sporadic. Both entities were last observed in communications with their subordinates on 3 January at 0350Z and 0920Z, respectively.

In the same area on 3 January, the Hq, MR 5 MFUC--after indicating on the previous day that it was engaged in combat--was located near 15-36N 107-53E (ZC 081275) approximately 17 km northwest of its 31 December location.

The tentative 1st or 3rd Battalion of the PAVN 68th Artillery Regiment was in southern Quang Nam near 15-39N 107-57E (ZC 168346) on 3 January. The unit was last tentatively located on 17 December in the same general area.

An unidentified Rear Services element--located on 2 January in eastern Quang Nam near 15-52N 108-14E (BT 037546)--indicated on 3 January that it was about to move.

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Additionally, an unidentified subordinate of the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit was located on 3 January in north-eastern Quang Tin near 15-34N 108-22E (BT 193202) approximately 27 km south-southwest of its 13 December position.

Indications of Vietnamese Communist difficulties in mounting a possible planned attack on Dak To airfield were noted on 3 January. In a message on that date, a subordinate of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), PAVN 1st Division--located on 31 December in western Kontum Province near 15-35N 107-44E (YB 957149)--reported that "conditions are extremely difficult for carrying out the mission." This situation was attributed to Allied "bombing and strafing," artillery fire, and possibly "enemy commandoes searching everywhere." In an earlier message of 3 January, the subordinate stated that "K-13" had reported that Allied artillery fired "five rounds into the assembly area" on 2 January. According to collateral, there is a 13th Air Defense Battalion subordinate to the 1st Division. This subordinate had been ordered by the MIS on 2 January to "make one careful attack to annihilate" Allied forces when the Allies assembled to get on aircraft. On the following day, the MIS asked the subordinate if it had been able "to shell the airfield" (probably at Dak To) on 3 January and requested the results.

On 2 January, the MIS reported to a second subordinate located in the Dak To area (near 14-37N 107-34E, YB 784125 on 31 December) concerning the movement of a mortar team, and instructed the subordinate's detachment to remain at its location and to report on "the enemy" on Hill 1030 [14-32N 107-37E, YB 819073]"; however, in another message of 2 January, this subordinate was ordered to "return" on 7 January and to report as usual through 4 January.

The MIS, 1st Division was located on 31 December in the Cambodia-Laos-Kontum Province border area near 14-35N 107-27E (YB 640125).

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In other activity in the highlands, the control of a radio group which communicates with Hq, PAVN 10th Division and an unidentified station, has been identified in SIGINT as serving the probable Gia Lia Provincial Unit. The activation of this communications facility--as early as 8 September 1967--represents the initial appearance of radio activity between a main force unit of the PAVN B3 Front and a provincial unit in MR 5. These developments may have been initiated to coordinate activities between the provincial unit and the 10th Division, which had moved into eastern Pleiku Province between 24 and 30 July 1967, and which was located near 13-51N 108-23E (BR 183313) on 28 December. The probable Gia Lia Provincial Unit was located on 31 December in east-central Pleiku near 14-10N 108-10E (AR 957690) and the unidentified terminal, near the provincial unit at 14-14N 108-11E (AR 973689) on 29 December.

On 3 January an unidentified subordinate of Hq, B3 Front was located in southwestern Kontum Province near 14-19N 107-34E (YA 775859), approximately 24 km north-northeast of its 23 November position.

(2/G12/VCM/R037-68, 040107Z; R035-68, 032340Z; R034-68, 032112Z; R032-68, 031958Z; R030-68, 031609Z; R028-68, 031414Z; R026-68, 031200Z; T036-68, 031950Z; T032-68, 031648Z; T031-68, 031539Z; T027-68, 031337Z; T024-68, 030920Z; T019-78, 030205Z; T016-68, 021540Z; 3/O/STY/R03-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

Reports of Communist attacks on Allied personnel on 20 December were contained in a 31 December message passed to the MIS, MR 1 by a subordinate--located on 3 January in eastern Bien Hoa Province near 10-41N 106-58E (YS 168823). The subordinate reported destroying two vehicles, one carrying ten Americans and the other carrying six Americans. This subordinate further reported the results of two additional attacks, one of which resulted in the obstruction of vehicular traffic for three hours, and a second in which ten people were killed.

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The subordinate appeared in communications as early as 25 December; it cannot be determined, however, if this is a new element or a previously active subordinate which has not noted in communications since October 1967.

Reflections of a B-52 strike in northern Tay Ninh Province were noted in messages passed on 3 January between detached elements One and Two of the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) COSVN. On 2 January these two elements appeared in communications with each other for the first time since May 1967. One message passed by detached element One, reported that at 0500 hours (G) "B-52s struck in two waves making six passes. They dropped [bombs] 500 meters from the base camp." The element further stated that artillery then fired near the area but the "personnel were unaffected." Detached element One was located on 1 January in eastern Tay Ninh near 11-31N 106-21E (XT 481729). According to collateral a B-52 strike was scheduled in this area on the morning of 3 January.

A second message, also sent to element Two--located on 2 January in northeastern Tay Ninh near 11-39N 106-20E (XT 448881)--reported that the 46th and 43rd Battalions had not been able to communicate with each other for several days because their locations were not suited to good communications. SIGINT indicates that a 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion is subordinate to MIB COSVN. The message further stated that "D81 [possibly the 81st Battalion, not further identified] asked the section [not further identified] to furnish four detachments for the purpose of countering the seep operation. According to collateral, Operation YELLOWSTONE has been conducted in this area since 8 December.

On 2 January the Military Affairs Section (MAS) COSVN passed a relatively high volume of 101 messages to Hq, MR's 2, 3 and 6; during periods of normal activity the collective volume to these entities approximates 50 messages. Thirty messages were sent to Hq, MR 3, of which 29 were transmitted simultaneously to Hq, MR 2. (On 18 December MAS COSVN had

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sent 13 messages simultaneously, to Hq, MR's 2 and 3.) Preliminary information suggests that 42 of the 101 messages were passed to Hq, MR 6.

In other developments, the tentatively identified Hq, PAVN 7th Division Forward Element was located on 2 January in northeastern Tay Ninh Province near 11-34N 106-19E (XT 431781), approximately 21 km southwest of its units 12 December location near the Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border. The Hq, 7th Division was located near 11-42N 106-33E (XT 681922) in northeastern Tay Ninh on 6 December.


On 2 January a possible element of the Tay Ninh Provincial Committee was located in northern Binh Duong Province at 11-17N 106-44E (XT 887475), 20 km southeast of its 19 December location.

On 31 December a radio station serving COSVN was located in Cambodia at 11-45N 106-08E (XT 222991), 8 km northwest of its 28 December location in northern Tay Ninh Province. This station was previously located in Cambodia on 26 and 27 December. (2/G10/VCJ/R003-68, 031630Z; 2/G10/VCM/R02-68, 030749Z; R04-68, 031448Z; T06-68, C12018Z; T14-68, 030526Z; T18-68, 031300Z; 3/O/STY/R03-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 2

On 3 January, a message passed between two unidentified VC Party elements in central Dinh Tuong Province forewarned of "enemy sweep" operations reportedly scheduled for 4 and 5 January. The 4 January sweep was reportedly scheduled to take place "above highway 4 and CAI BE" (10-20N 106-02E, XS 1242); the 5 January operation, would be conducted in the areas of "southern Long Dinh (10-24N 106-16E, XS 3850), north of highway 4, Nhi Dinh (10-24N 106-13E, XS 3465), Tam Hiep Long (10-24N 106-18E, XS 4250), Binh Trung (10-22N 106-15E, XS 3646) Huu Dao (10-22N 106-11E, XS 3147) and Kim Son (10-19N 106-14E, XS 3541)." Collateral reports that Operation CORANADO IX is currently being conducted in

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Dinh Tuong Province.

(2/G10/VCM/T026-68, 040155Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~2. DRV CommunicationsDMZ Area

Communications on 1 January from the 9th Battalion possibly to the PAVN 29th Regiment indicated that the battalion may have been in the general Khe Sanh (16-38N 106-42E, XD 8438) area on that date. No tactical activity has been reported, but elements of the probable 7th Battalion, 29th Regiment continue extensive reconnaissance of Allied activity north of Khe Sanh.

PAVN 304th - 320th Infantry Divisions

Communications serving the probable PAVN 304th Infantry Division and its subordinates have continued the decline which began in mid-December 1967.

The probable Hq 304th Infantry Division was last noted in traffic-passing communications on 1 January when the headquarters contacted an unidentified subordinate. The division subordinates were last noted in communications on the following dates:

17 December	Unidentified Regimental- echelon Subordinate	17-10N 106-05E (XD 1697) 12 December
21 December	Suspect Infantry Regiment	17-15N 106-25E (XE 5108) 21 December
27 December	Suspect Infantry Regiment (deployed to MR 4 in July 1967)	18-20N 105-40E (WF 7127) 24 December
29 December	Suspect Artillery Regiment	17-30N 106-05 (XE 1535) 15 December
31 December	Unidentified Regimental- echelon Subordinate	16-29N 106-46E (XD 8724) 30 December

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The broadcast facility serving the probable Hq, 304th Division was noted active through 3 January.

On 3 January probable Hq, 320th Infantry Division was noted in communication with an entity subordinate to or associated with the division. This headquarters controlled communications group was last observed on 11 December.

The probable Hq, 320th Division was last noted in communications with the unidentified entity suspected to be associated with Hq, MR 5 on 31 December.
(2/O/VCM/R241-67, 131907 Nov; 3/O/STY/R308-67) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region Northwest

SIGINT indicates an increase in message activity between the PAVN High Command and Hq, Military Region Northwest (Son La area) primarily from High Command, which began on 29 November 1967 and continued through December.

Normal message activity between these two headquarters has averaged approximately 150 messages per month, whereas during the past month approximately 190 messages were observed.

Most of these messages have been of "urgent" or "very urgent" precedence. None have been observed with a higher precedence than "very urgent" during this activity. The significance of this increased activity has not been determined. ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~



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
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Overland Infiltration

Further SIGINT indication of usage of voice communications was evidenced on 30 December when a terminal serving the probable Hq, PAVN 559th Transportation Group instructed an unidentified 559th-associated entity to establish contact utilizing voice communications. This is the second time references to the use of voice communications have been noted in 559th communications. (3/O/STY/R288-67) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~




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