This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 28 January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

In Military Region (MR) 5 in South Vietnam, Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit directed several subordinates located in the coastal provinces to begin a communications alert on 29 January; since similar instructions in the past have often preceded offensive actions by the units involved, it is possible that the indicated communications alert is to occur just prior to, or on, the impending "N-Day" which has been mentioned in recent MR 5 communications. Completed relocations or indications of impending moves highlighted activity in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area. To the south in MR's 1 and 10, the Military Affairs Section of COSVN was again noted passing urgent-precedence messages to the possible Hq, MR 10.

In the DMZ area SIGINT has reflected the continued PAVN reconnaissance and anti-aircraft activity in the eastern DMZ while increasing pressure is applied to Allied positions and lines of communications in the east.
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

On 27 January, Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control instructed Hq, PAVN 2nd and 3rd Divisions; the probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element; Hq, PAVN 21st Regiment, 2nd Division; and Hq, Rear Services Group 44, to commence communications on additional schedules beginning on 29 January. Communications alerts of this nature have been noted in the past prior to Vietnamese Communist offensive operations. Since the recipients of these instructions are major military units operating in the coastal provinces of MR 5, it is possible that the indicated communications alert is to occur just prior to the impending "N-day" mentioned in recent MR 5 communications.

Additionally, SIGINT reflections of Vietnamese Communist military activity in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area on 26 and 27 January included moves or impending moves of military units. The Hq, 2nd Division--located on 25 January near 15-45N 108-08E (AT 938414)--and Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control--located on the same date near 15-41N 107-52E (ZC 082375)--indicated on 26 January that they were about to move. Hq, 2nd Division again reported that it was about to move on 28 January. On 27 January the possible Hq, 21st Regiment, 2nd Division--located on 26 January near 15-31N 108-25E (BT 242156)--indicated that it too was about to move; on the same day, Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Quang Nam Province (not specifically located) and Hq, Rear Services Group 44--located on 26 January near 15-51N 108-10E (AT 985519)--reported that they were on the move. Also on 27 January, the probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element was located near 15-53N 108-15E (BT 038553), about 23 km northeast of its 23 January position and approximately 16 km west of Hoa An City. Additionally, on the same date, an
unidentified subordinate of the Quang Nam Provincial Unit was located in eastern Quang Tin Province near 15-48N 108-24E (BT 203453) about 27 km north-northwest of Tam Ky and approximately 34 km north of its 17 January position.

In this same area, the Quang Nam Provincial Unit--located on 27 January near 15-31N 108-19E (BT 118168)--indicated on 27 January that it was in a difficult situation.

Communications serving Vietnamese Communist military units operating in east-central Binh Dinh Province have reflected Allied tactical activity in that area since 26 January. On that date, Hq, 3rd Division reported that it was in a difficult situation under attack. On 27 January, Hq, 3rd Division was located near 14-07E 108-53N (BR 716621), about 15 km south-southwest of its 25 January position. On 28 January in the same area, Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Binh Dinh Province, reported that it was in a difficult situation, under bombardment and that its radio receiver was not functioning properly. This unit was located on 27 January in central Binh Dinh near 14-09N 108-53E (BR 719640).

In central Quang Ngai Province, an unidentified subordinate of Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control Associate--located on 24 January near 14-58N 108-33E (BS 379553)--reported on 26 January that it was about to move.

SIGINT in the western highlands continues to be highlighted by reflections of preparations for an impending Vietnamese Communist offensive. Messages of 26 January passed from the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority--located on 24 January in the Pleiku Province-Cambodia border area near 14-03N 107-23E (YA 573539)--to the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division Element--located on 25 January in the same general area near 13-51N 107-27E (YA 641312)--stated in part "everything for victory. Hq, will reinforce Farmsite 1 [probably Hq, 1st Division] with three recoilless rifles and sixty rounds of ammunition. You are to do your
utmost to prepare the weapons positions and the firing elements... and to attack the routes of communications in R2 and R3," and "in my opinion, you should cross the river tonight. Tomorrow morning, 27 January 1968, rest on that side of the river. On 28 January 1968, after bathing and washing clothes, advance to positions 1 and 2...." Another message passed on 27 January by an unidentified Vietnamese Communist element--located in northeastern Pleiku Province near 14-10N 108-21E (BR 126649) on 19 January--discussed firing instructions for "N-day" against convoy vehicles in an unspecified location, presumably in the northeastern Pleiku Province area.

A message of 26 January from the probable 1st Division Element to the probable B3 Front Authority stated "helicopters flew over the Chu Ngot and Chu Ba areas throughout the day and dropped bombs. Artillery fired near the river bank and in the Chu Ba area. From 0800-[GOLF] helicopters fired 20-mm guns at the ferry station. At 1000 [GOLF] hours aircraft sprayed chemicals on the river bank near the ferry station. The unit is still ready--have not yet washed--request that we cross the river tomorrow night so that the men can wash." Another message from this element on 27 January stated "On [C val 27] January the unit crossed the river safely and reached a point two hours away from it. We are making combat readiness preparations and are preparing dry provisions so that we can move the troops in on 28 January."

In military intelligence activity, messages of 25 and 26 January exchanged between the Military Intelligence Section, Hq, 1st Division and a subordinate discussed a skirmish between the subordinate and Allied forces. The subordinate reported that the skirmish occurred on 17 January, while it was enroute to "E2" to transfer responsibility to "E2". ("E" is a Vietnamese Communist designator for regiment). The subordinate further stated that "generally speaking the men are weak and food and medical supplies have been exhausted." The subordinate was located on 25 January near 14-35N 107-30E (YB 708152) in the Kontum Province-Cambodian border area.
Other recent activity in the western highlands suggests that Vietnamese Communist main force units may be repositioning. Recent communications activity of most main force units operating in this area has been very limited; a condition which in the past has been indicative of relocations by units involved. Additional evidence indicates that some elements of the 1st Division may have recently moved into northwestern Pleiku.

To the north, Hq, B3 Front, Kontum Province, was located on 27 January in western Kontum near 14-31N 107-31E (YB 725080), about 13 km east of its 26 January position and about 38 km southwest of Dak To.

Available SIGINT indicates that an unidentified Lao Dong Party-associated radio station, previously located in Quang Duc Province, relocated about 60 km eastward to a position in Southern Darlac Province near 12-27N 108-04E (AP 810775) by 24 January. The movements of this station have usually coincided with those of the possible 3rd Battalion, PAVN 33rd Regiment; however, SIGINT has not indicated a recent move by the 3rd Battalion.

Military Region 1/10

Urgent messages bearing "decrypt immediately" designators were again passed to the possible Hq, MR 10 by the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN on 26 January. Activity of this nature was first noted in MAS COSVN communications on 19 January; since that date, Hq, B3 Front and Hq, MR's 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 10 have been the recipients of such messages. On 25 January the possible Hq, MR 10 apparently relayed one urgent message to an unidentified subordinate.
In other activity, Hq, VC 9th Light Infantry Division—which resumed communications with its subordinates (the probable 271st, 272nd, and 273rd Regiments) on 19 January—has been passing messages to the probable Hq, 271st Regiment since 25 January, utilizing a new crypto-system. In the past, the use of a system of this type has been an indicator of tactical activity by the units involved.

(SECRET SAVIN) (2/G10/VCJ/R027-68, 271537Z; R026-68, 261630Z)

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

On 28 January two unidentified elements—possibly associated with the PAVN 101D Regiment—reported on Allied helicopter movements west and southwest of the marine combat base near Khe Sanh. An element associated with the 8th Battalion, PAVN 29th Regiment reported that a detachment located on Dong A Hai Ridge (16-40N 106-35E, XD 715445) had damaged one F4H aircraft. This element also reported that B52 aircraft had bombed the unit's formation but only minor damage was suffered.

Messages passed between Companies 1 and 3 and the PAVN 803rd Battalion revealed continued offensive activity east of Gio Linh (16-56N 107-05E, YD 213732) on 28 January and also reported the repulsing of an Allied attack. Subsequent messages instructed Company 1 to wait for the "enemy" to approach the area northeast of Lam Xuan (16-54N 107-07E, XD 270700) before opening fire. Company 2 was informed at the same time that artillery support would be provided.

Since 15 January an unidentified artillery or rocket associated unit has been reconnoitering and reporting probable target coordinates at Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) and west of Route 9 in the general vicinity of 16-39N 106-50E (XD 9652). Allied artillery emplacements and the arrival and departure of C130 aircraft at an unidentified airfield have also been included in these reconnaissance reports.
SIGINT now indicates that the two radio terminals identified as being associated with the possible PAVN 95C Regiment are colocated and serve the 5th Battalion, 95C Regiment for communications with the regiment and 325C Division Headquarters. The 5th Battalion was located on 26 January approximately 5 km northwest of Khe Sanh at 16-40N 106-44E (XD 847432).

On 27 January, an unidentified subordinate of both the Hq, probable 304th Division and the new major PAVN Headquarters northwest of Khe Sanh was located near 16-34N 106-46E (XD 887320), approximately 7 km southeast of Khe Sanh. On 26 January, a second unidentified subordinate of the 304th Division was located near Route 9, approximately 15 km west of Khe Sanh at 16-37N 106-36E (XD 712395).

On 21 January, traffic-passing communications were initially noted between the Hq, probable PAVN 304th Division and two regimental subordinates. However, the messages being passed between the division headquarters and the two regimental subordinates—a suspect infantry regiment and the suspect artillery regiment—are characteristic of DRV MR 3 South, which was the garrison area of the probable 304th Division prior to its deployment.

PAVN High Command

The unusual increase in the number of circular messages passed by the PAVN High Command on the internal DRV network has continued through at least 25 January. On that date, six circular messages were sent from PAVN High Command to Hqs, Military Region 3 North. Two of these messages were also sent to Hqs, MR 3 South, and three to MR Northwest. Two of the latter three messages were of "very urgent" precedence—an unusually high precedence for this type circular message. The other four messages were of "urgent" precedence, usually the highest precedence observed with these type circulars.
The PAVN High Command now has 10 additional "broadcast" schedules with all major Headquarters in South Vietnam. Prior to 25 January, this "broadcast" maintained only 11 daily schedules with subscribers. (SECRET CAVIN) (2/G11/VCM/R192-68, 262249Z)