This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 30 January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

CONTENTS

I. Communist Southeast Asia
   A. Military
      1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam
      2. DRV Communications
SITUATION SUMMARY

Indications of attack preparations continue to appear in communications serving Vietnamese Communist elements in northwestern Pleiku and western Kontum Provinces of South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5. Relocations were completed by several units in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area and by an unidentified terminal tentatively associated with the PAVN B3 Front in Binh Dinh Province. The move of the unidentified possible Front Headquarters in Binh Long Province highlighted activity in MR 10.

Tactical communications of PAVN elements around Khe Sanh have not mentioned any future plans for a large-scale attack; however, some elements have made reference to landlines, indicating a consolidation of PAVN positions.
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Messages passed from a probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front authority to a probable PAVN 1st Division element in northwestern Pleiku Province have continued to mention attack preparations. On 29 January the probable 1st Division element was reminded to "be careful and maintain vigilance... scare and kill the dogs and personnel right away. Do not let them search further... This is a good opportunity to score achievements... You must discuss the combat plan carefully, democratically, and in great detail." Other messages exchanged by these two elements on 29 January also revealed an interest in the location of Allied artillery positions: "... we estimate there are no 105's at Chu Ba [13-53N 107-53E, YA 8036] at all. It is possible that all they will do is bring 175's up to Sung Le [13-54N 107-40E, YA 8939] and fire them. If Chu Ba has 105's for certain, then it will be necessary to investigate some enemy battalions there and, therefore, you comrades will have to conduct reconnaissance, stay close and [C val slip] approximately one squad into Chu Kram [13-49N 107-40E, YA 8930]."

Additionally, the probable 1st Division element informed the probable Hq, B3 Front authority that "you can rest assured, we vow to complete the mission. The problems continuously nourish us and give us additional strength with which to confidently carry out the mission."

Elsewhere in the western highlands, the Hq, PAVN 66th Regiment may be divided into two separate elements. SIGINT located one of the elements in the Laos-Cambodia-western
Kontum border area near 14-44N 107-32E (YB 736302) on 29 January; the other headquarters element was located on 28 January about 10 km to the east, at 14-44N 107-38E (YB 861298). Other indications of a split involving this headquarters were noted as early as 12 and 13 January.

On 29 January, the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), PAVN 1st Division informed a subordinate -- last located on 27 January in western Kontum Province near 14-33N 107-46E (YB 996120) -- that "an element of K5 will also control B3 along with you." According to collateral, K5 is a cover designator for the 5th Battalion, 32nd Regiment, 1st Division. The subordinate then informed the MIS that "the enemy here has not had a cease-fire. They are continuing to search and fire. I am worried that we will not enter in time to open fire. We are determined to enter on time. The troops continue to move by night."

On 30 January, the MIS instructed the subordinate to "contact K5 to determine the enemy situation." The subordinate was further instructed to "observe B3" (not located) and to "go ahead and strike if the enemy is still there." The subordinate was told that it could determine the time for the strike. Additionally, this subordinate reported to the MIS that it was in a difficult situation and requested that messages be sent blind.

In the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, several Vietnamese Communist units have conducted minor movements and have reported combat situations. On 29 January the probable Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element was located in southeastern Quang Nam Province near 15-49N 108-06E (AT 954497), about 39 km northwest of its 28 January location and 20 km southwest of Hoi An. The Hq, PAVN 2nd Division was located in this same area on 29 January, near 15-51N 108-13E (BT 022533), 15 km northwest of its 28 January position. On 30 January Hq, 2nd Division reported that it was engaged in combat. Also on 30 January, the Hq, Rear Services Group 44 reported that it was on the move and engaged in combat. This headquarters
was located in eastern Quang Nam Province near 15-51N 108-14E (BT 042537) on 29 January.

To the south, in central Binh Dinh Province, the Hq, PAVN 3rd Division moved 12 km northwestward between 27 and 29 January, and was located near 14-12N 108-58E (BR 810697).

In Quang Ngai Province, a radio terminal suspected to be associated with rear services moved about 19 km to the southeast between 27 and 29 January, to a position near 15-04N 108-40E (BS 503661), about 17 km west-southwest of Quang Ngai city.

To the south, an unidentified terminal tentatively associated with the B3 Front was located on 29 January at 13-52N 108-27E (BR 248338) in southwestern Binh Dinh Province, near the Hq, PAVN 10th Division. The same entity had been located 33 km to the northwest on 19 January in Pleiku Province, in the vicinity of the probable Hq, PAVN 95B Regiment. Since at least 8 January this terminal has passed messages to two unidentified and unlocated subordinates, discussing plans for tactical activity, presumably in eastern Pleiku Province.

(2/0/VCM/R44-68, 300726Z; R43-68, 292320Z; R42-68, 292147Z; 2/G12/VCM/R278-68, 300422Z; R277-68, 300350Z; R276-68, 300235Z; R274-68, 291930Z; R273-68, 291622Z; R272-68, 291540Z; R269-68, 291435Z; R267-68, 291250Z; R265-68, 291230Z; T229-68, 300133Z; T222-68, 290941Z) (SECRET SVN)

Military Region 1

Preliminary information indicates that the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN passed a total of 14 messages of an urgent nature on 28 January. Six messages were sent to a possible element of Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) in Bien Hoa Province: five to Hq, MR 6; and one each to Hq, MR 2, the possible Hq, MR 3 (SVN) and Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control. MAS COSVN has been noted exchanging messages of this nature with various subordinates since 18 January.
In other message activity, on 29 January MAS COSVN received 11 messages from the possible Hq, VC 5th LID element in Bien Hoa and 9 messages from Hq, PAVN B3 Front. On 27 and 28 January, MAS COSVN sent a total of 17 messages to the possible Hq, VC 5th LID element in Bien Hoa Province rather than to the headquarters element in Phuoc Long Province as previously reported.


Military Region 10

The unidentified possible Front Headquarters was located on 29 January in western Binh Long Province near 11-45N 106-26E (XT 564977), approximately 22 km southwest of its 22 January position in northwestern Binh Long Province near 11-55N 106-30E (XU 632174). The latest location places the Front within 7 km of its possible MIS -- which relocated between 19 and 26 January to a position near 11-41N 106-27E (XT 574917).


Military Region 2

The tentatively identified VC 261st Battalion was located in western Dinh Tuong Province on 29 January at 10-27N 106-03E (XS 168547), approximately 11 km east of its position on 24 January.

The alternate Hq, MR 2 exchanged a high volume of 69 messages with its subordinates on 29 January, with the most significant activity occurring on the links joining the alternate headquarters with the tentative My Tho, Kien Tuong, and An Giang Provincial Units.
On 29 January, an unidentified, Party-associated station was located in central Dinh Tuong Province at 10-27N 106-09E (XS 2555), approximately 14 km east of its 26 January location.

Also on 29 January, the My Tho Provincial Committee (MIPC) was located outside its normal operating area in western Dinh Tuong Province, at 10-25N 106-05E (XS 1855), 27 km northeast of its position on 27 January. This is the first time that the MTPC has been noted relocating.

(2/G10/VCJ/R029-68, 291645Z) (SECRET SAVIN)

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

PAVN activity around Khe Sanh continues to be reflected in tactical communications; however, no mention of a future large-scale attack has been noted. A message from the probable 1st Company to 8th Battalion -- PAVN 29th Regiment 325C Division -- disclosed that the company would move into Ta Tue (16-39N 106-41E, YD 802421) on 29 January with the mission of striking the probable local forces whenever A-1 (Khe Sanh Combat Base airfield) was struck. Tactical voice communications have been noted in the Khe Sanh area since 21 January reflecting close reconnaissance of Allied positions, routine tactical movements and requests for mortar fire. Unidentified PAVN elements utilizing these voice communications have mentioned landline, indicating further consolidation of PAVN positions.

PAVN High Command

Commencing on 3 December 1967 and extending through at least 27 January an unusual type of message has been noted being sent from PAVN High Command to an unidentified and unlocated station, which has been associated with the unidentified PAVN High Command complex. This is the only station currently receiving this particular type of message.

-6-
This type of message has been noted only once before -- in communications between High Command and the Hq, 320th Division immediately prior to and during the initial phase of that division's deployment into South Vietnam. This message activity continued until the division headquarters ceased communications on the High Command internal network on 17 November 1967.

Through December PAVN High Command communications averaged less than one such message per day; but since 15 January an average of at least three has been noted daily, with as many as five sent to the unidentified station on 21 January. Most of the messages have been of "urgent" precedence, although messages of "most urgent" precedence have been noted sporadically since 14 January.


Military Region 4

On 29 January the tentatively identified 66th Battalion received a message from an unidentified unlocated subordinate stating that the "friendly unit" did not arrive on the "night of the 28th." Previous messages had indicated that the 238B Regiment was going to move on the night of the 28th. The 66th Battalion and its Third Company were located by SIGINT on 25 January in the vicinity of 17-18N 106-30E (XE 6012) and 18-14N 105-43E (WF 7580) in Military Region 4.

Correction to 3/O/STY/R25-68 IA, 2. - Military Region 4 Para 2:

Change "235th Sub-regiment" to "238th sub-regiment".

Non-Responsive