This report is presented in two sections; Section A summarizes significant developments noted throughout Southeast Asia during the period 23 - 30 January 1968; Section B summarizes those developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at the time of publication on 31 January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

(SECTION A)

Indications that the Vietnamese Communists were planning coordinated attacks in several areas of Military Region (MR) 5, highlighted activity in South Vietnam during the past week. Repeated references to "N-Day," implementation of communications alerts, increased military intelligence reporting and numerous relocations suggested that the offensives would be conducted in the western areas of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces and in eastern Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Binh Dinh Provinces. In MR's 1 and 10 the Military Affairs Section of COSVN exchanged several urgent precedence messages with a number of entities, the Viet Cong (VC) 9th Light Infantry Division resumed communications with its three regimental subordinates, and military intelligence reporting reflected Communist interest in Tay Ninh, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Long Provinces.

In the western DMZ, PAVN tactical communications continued to reflect movement of units and supplies into the Khe Sanh area. SIGINT indicates that the 101D, 95C and 29th Regiments of the PAVN 325C Division and elements of the 304th Division are presently north, west and south of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. PAVN antiaircraft capability in this area has steadily increased and at least two aircraft have reportedly been shot down.

In the central DMZ, activity has included close surveillance of the general area surrounding Camp Carroll by reconnaissance elements of the 164th Artillery Regiment and an unidentified artillery/rocket unit, the presence of 320th Division elements, continued supply movement by the 90th Regiment and increased tactical/political activity by the 27th Independent Battalion.
Non-Responsive
Non - Responsive

(SECTION B)

The Vietnamese Communists may be planning decoy maneuvers against Allied forces in the western highlands of South Vietnam's MR 5, according to SIGINT. In the Dak To area of western Kontum Province, military intelligence elements of the PAVN 1st Division discussed attack preparations.

The reported objective of the attacks on Danang and in Pleiku Province was an attempt to destroy the Command Advisory Section One and to disrupt the command of the Americans in the Pleiku Sector, according to SAM-associated communications.
SECTION A

I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

The renewed interest in the Hue area, as shown by the movement of both the Hq, Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH) and its tentative forward element, has been strengthened by the location of Hq, MR TTH on 28 January near 16-30N 107-26E (YD 598149), approximately 13 km southwest of Hue. Concurrently, the Hq, PAVN 6th Regiment has relocated approximately 10 km from its 29 November 1967 location to a location on 29 January near 16-25N 107-26E (YD 603158), approximately 13 km southeast of Hue. The current location of the tentative forward element, Hq, MR TTH near 16-26N 107-26E (YD 612176) indicates no major movement by this headquarters.

An unidentified MR TTH associated terminal that apparently ceased all communications on 23 January was observed in communications with the forward element and Hq, MR TTH on 27 January and was located near 16-12N 107-31E (YC 710933). This represented a southeasterly move of approximately 15 km from its 23 January location. Another unidentified MR TTH terminal, was located on 29 January near 16-12N 107-20E (YC 510931).

(2/G11/VCJ/R29-68, 291244Z) (SECRET CAVIN)
Military Region 5

Preparations for Vietnamese Communist offensives in western Kontum, Pleiku, eastern Quang Nam-Quang Tin, and eastern Binh Dinh Province areas, possibly commencing on 29 January or shortly thereafter, were reflected in the communications activity of MR 5 during the past week.

In the western highlands Vietnamese Communist main force units may be repositioning, since communications activity of most main force units in this area has been limited—a condition which in the past has been indicative of relocations by the units involved. The probable Hq, B3 Front authority and a probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element—both located in the western Pleiku Province-Cambodia border area—continued to outline attack plans for "N-Day", emphasizing the necessity to seek advice from B3 before undertaking any major tactical maneuver. In western Kontum Province, communications of Vietnamese Communist elements also revealed preparations for the impending offensive.

Military intelligence (MI) communications reflected an increased interest of PAVN 1st Division MI elements in the Dak To area. Messages exchanged during the period 24-26 January between the MIS and a subordinate—located on 27 January approximately 12 km southwest of Dak To—indicated that a movement of communist troops and artillery was under way. A 28 January message from the MIS instructed this same subordinate to commence its attack no later than 0050 hours (GOLF) on 30 January. A later message from the subordinate requested that the MIS inform the subordinate of any changes regarding the time to open fire.

Other evidence of an impending attack was provided by a move of another subordinate from Cambodia into Kontum Province to a point 20 km northwest of Dak To sometime between 14 and 28 January.
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN THE TAY NINH - BINH LONG - CAMBODIAN TRI-BORDER AREA

THAILAND

LAOS

CAMBODIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

SECRET SAVIN

CAMBODIA

LOC NINH

HQ, VC 271st Regt
HQ, VC 273rd Regt
HQ, U/I Front
MIS, HQ U/I Front

TAY NINH

BINH LONG

SECRET SAVIN
In the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border area, activity during the past week was highlighted by moves or impending moves of military units. Finally, on 27 January the Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control instructed the major military units operating in the coastal provinces in MR 5 to commence communications on additional schedules beginning 29 January. In the past communications alerts of this nature have been noted prior to Vietnamese Communist offensives.

During the past week, the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN was involved in the exchange of messages of an urgent nature with a number of entities--including Hq, MR's 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10; Hq, PAVN B3 Front; a possible element of Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) in Bien Hoa Province; an unidentified military station in northern Phuoc Long Province; and Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control. Prior to 18 January, it was unusual to observe more than one message of this type per day. Additionally, on 27 and 28 January, MAS COSVN passed an unusually high volume of messages to the possible Hq, 5th LID.

In MR 10 on 24 January, three messages labeled "decrypt immediately" were passed from the unidentified possible Front Headquarters--located in western Binh Long Province on 29 January--to the possible Hq, MR 10. The Front also attempted to establish communications with Hq, VC 5th and 9th LIDs for the first time since 29 November and 26 September, respectively.

Elsewhere in MR 10, on 19 January Hq, 9th LID resumed communications with its subordinates--the probable Hq, VC 271st, 272nd, and 273rd Regiments--using the same signal plan that it had used prior to the last observed communications between these entities on 25 November. Subsequently, messages passed to the
probable Hq, 271st Regiment were similar to a type which in the past has often been an indicator of tactical activity by the units involved. On 28 January, Hq, 9th LID was located in northern Phuoc Long Province, in the same area in which it was previously located on 3 December, and within 5 km of the 28 January location of the probable Hq, 271st Regiment. On 23 January, the probable Hq, 273rd Regiment and a station tentatively identified as serving the probable Hq, 272nd Regiment were located in Cambodia near the Binh Long-Tay Ninh Province border.

In military intelligence (MI) activity, tactical intelligence elements of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Hq, 9th LID--the possible Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company and two subordinates--continued to report on Allied activity in northeastern Tay Ninh Province. The subordinates--one of which moved 20 km southward to within 5 km of the Michelin Plantation in western Binh Duong Province between 20 and 22 January--are reporting on the same general area as is the possible Hq, VC 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion, located in northeastern Tay Ninh.

Recent information indicates that the MIS, Hq, 5th LID, and at least two subordinates--which have been noted in sporadic communications during January--reappeared in communications as early as 29 December, after being inactive since September 1967. One of these subordinates--located in southern Phuoc Long Province--resumed reporting on about 6 January, and made references to probably both the VC 274th and 275th Regiments.

Meanwhile, between 10 and 24 January, the MI element of Hq, VC 274th Regiment moved about 35 km north into the Long Khanh-Bien Hoa Province border area, approximately 25 km east of Bien Hoa city. This element communicates with two subordinates located in central and eastern Bien Hoa Province, respectively.

In other activity in the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh area, the MIS, MR 1 and two subordinates continued to report on Allied forces and operations, and to reflect clashes between Communist and
Allied forces. A 23 January message indicated that at least one subordinate may be associated with—and possibly supporting—elements of the Hq, 274th Regiment, and in a message of 25 January to the MIS, MR 1, a subordinate reported an attack by "the battalion."

Between 19 and 26 January, the possible MIS of the unidentified possible Front Headquarters located in Binh Long Province moved about 30 km south from the Binh Long-Cambodian border area to west-central Binh Long.

Finally, a subordinate of a new MI control authority was located on 25 January in the Binh Quang-Binh Long Province border area about 80 km southwest of its 8 November 1967 position. This MI subordinate is one of a group of at least six subordinates formerly controlled by the possible MIS of the unidentified possible Front Headquarters located in Binh Long, but which are now subordinate to the new MI control authority.

(3/0/STY/R26-68; R25-68; R24-68; R23-68; R22-68; R21-68)

Military Region 2

The alternate Hq, MR 2 continued to pass an unusually high volume of messages to its subordinates through 29 January. Between 26 and 29 January, the largest volumes were passed to the tentative My Tho Provincial Unit and the tentative Hq, VC 261st Battalion, both of which are located in western Dinh Tuong Province. Collateral indicates that an Allied operation in the CORONADO series is currently being conducted in this area.

In other developments, the tentative VC 516th Battalion was located on 23 January in southeastern Kien Phong Province; approximately 10 km southwest of its 22 January position.
Finally, the tentative VC 261st Battalion was located on 29 January in western Dinh Tuong, approximately 11 km east of its 24 January position.

(3/0/STY/R26-68; R25-68; R21-68) (SECRET SAVII)
2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

The PAVN 304th Infantry Division and its associated elements continue active in the area immediately south of Khe Sanh. Since 21 January traffic-passing communications serving the Hq, 304th Division and two unidentified regimental subordinates have been isolated. However, messages passed between the division headquarters and the two regimental subordinates continue to be characteristic of DRV MR 3 South, which was the garrison area of the division prior to its deployment to the western DMZ area. Hq, 304th Division was last located on 28 January at 16-34N 106-45E (XD 872337), and its associated elements have been located as follows:

Unidentified regimental subordinate - 16-28N 106-36E (XD 717222) - 23 Jan

Unidentified regimental subordinate - 16-34N 106-51E (XD 987320) - 27 Jan

Suspect infantry regiment - 16-40N 106-33E (XD 651434) - 29 Jan

Suspect infantry regiment - 16-34N 106-44E (XD 860327) - 26 Jan

Suspect artillery regiment - 16-36N 106-44E (XD 853368) - 26 Jan

Unidentified associated entity - 16-31N 106-43E (XD 832263) - 29 Jan

Unidentified associated entity - 16-23N 106-35E (XD 691132) - 22 Jan

Detached element, Hq, 304th Div - 16-29N 106-44E (XD 842229) - 23 Jan
Since late December 1967, SIGINT has revealed the resubordination of possible Hq, PAVN 325C Division from the DMZ Front to the unidentified major PAVN headquarters located in Laos. Concurrent with this resubordination was the consolidation of the possible Hq, 325C Division (previously located in the Dong Hoi area) with its detached element located in Laos immediately west of Khe Sanh. Hq, 325C Division currently maintains communications with PAVN High Command; Hq, MR 4 (NVN); the new major PAVN headquarters; the three subordinate regiments--101D, 95C, and 29th; the 5th Battalion, 95C Regiment and one unidentified element. In addition, SIGINT has revealed since 21 January the use of tactical signal operations instructions between Hq, 325C Division and three subordinate elements--95C and 101D Regiments, and one unidentified element. The only previous observation of tactical SOI on high-level communications was between the DMZ Front and two subordinate regiments of Hq, 324B Division--90th and 812th--from 28 August to 8 September 1967 when these elements were tactically deployed in the Con Thien area. Hq, 325C Division was last located on 27 January at 16-38N 106-36E (XD 710410). In the past the use of these procedures on command and control radio facilities has been associated with increased tactical activities by units concerned.

29th Regiment

Elements of the 8th Battalion, PAVN 29th Regiment, reported on 27 January that a detachment located on Dong A Hai Ridge (16-40N 106-35E, XD 715445) had fired on and damaged one F4H aircraft. The 1st Company, associated with the 29th Regiment, reported it would move into Ta Tuc (16-39N 106-41E, XD 802421) at 1300G on 29 January with the mission of attacking probable local forces when Al (Khe Sanh Combat Base Airfield) was struck.

101D Regiment

Probable reconnaissance units serving the PAVN 101D Regiment reported the arrival of an unidentified 4th Battalion in the area of Hill 519 (16-37N 106-41E, XD 789382). Communications of these units have also reflected Allied aircraft movements and fortification construction.
90th Regiment

Tactical communications of the PAVN 90th Regiment continue to reflect the movement of rice and ammunition into the west-central DMZ area. Elements of the 75th Battalion, associated with the 90th Regiment in this supply activity, may have been tasked with care of the dead and wounded, according to a 26 January message. The 8th Battalion has not been observed since 25 January when the regiment informed it that "the plan had not changed" and requested a report on transportation assignment results. On 28 January the 9th Battalion, previously unobserved in communications since 27 December, received instructions for the transportation of various types of ammunition, including 20 rounds of 122.4-mm rockets and 9,000 rounds of 12.7-mm machinegun ammunition.

164th Artillery Regiment

Reconnaissance elements of the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment began reporting on Allied activity in the Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) area on 29 January, although communications of an unidentified artillery element were reflecting reconnaissance activity in this area as early as 15 January. These latter reports have included coordinates and hill numbers in both the Camp Carroll and Khe Sanh areas. A 30 January message from a company of the 164th Artillery Regiment requested that headquarters relay to all the "Bach Dang" artillery units the company's wish to compete in artillery accuracy and ammunition economy. The covername "Bach Dang", first mentioned in communications of the 27th Battalion, may equate to the 320th Division, newly arrived in the central DMZ area.

Traffic-passing communications serving the PAVN 320th Division with three probable regimental subordinates and four unidentified entities--one of which is a suspect infantry regiment of the 320th--have remained active to date. In addition, traffic-passing communications between Hq, 320th Division and the
DMZ Front have been isolated since 17 January. The latest SIGINT locations of 320th elements are: Hq, 320th Division, 16-50N 106-54E (YD 033616) on 22 January; and one unidentified possible subordinate entity, 16-56N 106-55E (YD 042652) on 17 January.

27th Independent Battalion

During the past week the 27th Independent Battalion increased its offensive actions along Routes 1 and 9 in the central and eastern DMZ. The 7th Company continued to plant mines on Route 1, and on 21 January coordinated with local forces to attack popular force units at an unspecified river crossing. Allied ambushes frustrated the 7th Company's attempts to destroy Phu Lai Bridge (unlocated) on 25 January. The 5th and 6th Companies were reportedly engaged during this period in reconnoitering prospective targets. Battalion communications also reported attacks would be made by PAVN forces on 30 January against Ta Con (16-39N 106-42E, XD 829422) (Khe Sanh Combat Base) and Camp Carroll.

In addition to coordination with local forces, references to the 27th Battalion with "Bach Dang" (possible 320th Division) and the possible 52nd Regiment, 320th Division, were noted. The battalion reported on 27 January that "Bach Dang" would possibly send down one additional battalion. On 26 January elements of the battalion reported that "demoralized" Allied forces were evacuating Khe Sanh and that PAVN forces were liberating Huong Hoa District (in which Khe Sanh is located). A 28 January message reported "demoralized" local defense forces had withdrawn from Doc Kinh (16-44N 106-57E, YD 100524), that the Cua area (vicinity of 16-40N 106-58E, YD 0952) situation was good and that only 241 (Camp Carroll) remained.

In addition to tactical activities the battalion has instructed its subordinates to politically indoctrinate the local populace. References to "centralize the people" have been noted.
and one message outlined village project responsibilities for certain personnel in the field of military affairs, discipline, and economics.

803rd Regiment

Activity of the PAVN 803rd Regiment north and east of Con Thien and east of Gio Linh continue to be reflected in tactical communications. The 1st Battalion, previously engaged in logistical operations, was instructed on 27 January to return to Vinh Chap (17-06N 106-59E, YD 100908) to be instructed in a new mission. The 2nd Battalion on 23 January requested artillery fire on Doc Soi (16-26N 107-32E, YD 180720) and reported sending men to Xuan Hai (16-56N 107-00E, YD 135735). The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 3rd Battalion, east of Gio Linh, reportedly engaged the enemy at Village 9 (16-57N 107-09E, YD 282762) on 27 January, killing 20 Americans. On 28 January the 3rd Company reported it was under attack and requested artillery support.

(3/0/STY/R21-68; R22-68; R23-68; R24-68; R25-68; R26-68)

(SECRET SAVIN)

Overland Infiltration

Message activity on the A Shau Valley Rear Services Complex, 559th Transportation Group, which had reverted back to
normal levels from 14 to 21 January, has resumed the high level of message activity observed in the early part of January.

The existence of communications between the possible Hq, B3 Front Forward Element One and the tentative Hq, 71st Transportation Regiment was indicated on 17 January, when the Hq, 71st Regiment relayed seven messages from the possible forward element to Unit 30, located in the vicinity of 16-52N 106-24E (XD 509665).

Finally, as of 21 January SIGINT has revealed the location of three unidentified 559th terminals—Units 21, 74, and 102—in an area adjacent to Route 9 in Laos.

(3/0/STY/R21-68; R23-68; R25-68) (SECRET CANTIN)
Non-Responsive

TOP SECRET TRINE

3/0/STY/R27-68
Non - Responsive

3/0/STY/R27-68

-21-

TOP SECRET TRINE
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Indications of possible future attempts to decoy Allied forces in the western highlands were noted in communications between the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front authority located near the southwestern Kontum Province-Cambodia border and the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element in western Pleiku Province.

On 30 January the probable B3 Front authority directed the probable 1st Division element to "send out teams as a feinting maneuver," and to "light fires one hour's distance away in order to attract enemy artillery or L19 and helicopter fire." The probable Hq, 1st Division element was also instructed to "maneuver the assault teams to fire at the aircraft and enemy commandos and confuse him into thinking we have him surrounded. This will compel him to send reinforcements or to launch heavy air and artillery strikes." Earlier on 30 January the probable Hq, 1st Division Element reported to the probable Hq, B3 Front authority on the tactical situation in the Chu Ba (13-53N 107-35E, YA 8036) and Chu Ngot (13-50N 107-33E, YA 7632) areas and stated that "tomorrow [31 January] we will send forces to probe the summits of Chu Ngot and Chu Ba to determine the enemy situation and to open fire on the enemy mortars . . ." The probable Hq, B3 Front authority was located on 30 January near 14-03N 107-21E (YA 538555). SIGINT last located the probable Hq, 1st Division element in western Pleiku on 30 January near 13-52N 107-32E (YA 740347), about 13 km northwest of Duc Co and 11 km northeast of its 25 January position.
Elsewhere in Pleiku Province, the probable Hq, PAVN 95B Regiment, PAVN 10th Division was located on 30 January near 14-01N 108-19E (BR 100504), about 11 km south-southeast of its 24 January location and about 33 km east-northeast of Pleiku City.

To the south in Darlac Province, an unidentified B3 Front-associated element was located on 30 January near 12-39N 108-03E (AP 793998), approximately 6 km south of Ban Me Thuot and about 15 km north-northeast of its 28 January location.

In military intelligence (MI) activity in the western highlands, the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 1st Division on 30 January instructed a subordinate--located on 27 January in the Dak To area near 14-34N 107-47E (YB 996120)--to "strike with determination" if there were aircraft or artillery activity in the vicinity of B-3 (unlocated). The selection of the time for firing was left to the subordinate; however, the MIS said "the sooner, the better." The subordinate was told to take precautions to avoid firing on Communist troops "as the enemy withdraws" and "to coordinate communiques from the higher echelons with observations and estimates" made by the subordinate in order to "bring off a faultless strike against the enemy."

In eastern Quang Nam Province, Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Quang Nam Province; Hq, PAVN 2nd Division; and Hq, Rear Services Group 44 all indicated on 30 January that they were about to move. These units, which comprise the major elements of a Vietnamese Communist concentration approximately 15 km southwest of Hoi An City, were last located on 29 January near 15-48N 108-09E (AT 954497), 15-51N 108-14E (BT 022533), and 15-52N 108-14E (BT 036542), respectively. On 30 January elements of the 2nd Division implemented a tactical communications plan, which, in the past, has been associated with offensive activity on the part of the units involved.

To the south in Quang Tin Province, the probable Quang
Nam Provincial Unit indicated on 30 January that it was following orders from higher headquarters and was on the move. This unit was last located on 27 January near 15-34N 108-23E (BT 213145).

Finally, in central Quang Ngai Province a possible Rear Services element was located on 30 January near 15-05N 108-39E (BS 485678), approximately 18 km west-southwest of Quang Ngai City and about 17 km southeast of its 26 January location. In this same area, the Quang Ngai Provincial Unit--located on 29 January near 15-04N 108-39E (BS 483667)--reported on 30 January that it was about to move.

(2/0/VCM/R47-68, 302155Z; 2/G12/VCM/R290-68, 301755Z; R286-68, 301640Z; R285-68, 301700Z; R284-68, 301446Z; R281-68, 301235Z; R280-68, 300820Z; R279-68, 300737Z; T234-68, 301414Z)

Military Region 1

The unidentified control authority of a link which has been active since 3 January--and possibly as early as 23 October 1967--was located on 29 January in eastern Binh Duong Province at 11-18N 106-45E (XT 914495), approximately 18 km northwest of its 17 January position on the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province border. This control authority communicates with an unidentified subordinate located on 20 January in northern Bien Hoa Province at 11-07N 106-50E (YT 039298), about 20 km southwest of its 23 October position in western Long Khanh Province.

Another unidentified element effected a move which paralleled that made by the above-mentioned unidentified control authority, suggesting that the two may be colocated. Between 19 and 26 January, this unidentified element moved from the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh border area into eastern Binh Duong Province at 11-16N 106-44E (XT 895460), and has been active on a radio group first noted in October 1967. This element currently communicates with a control authority located on 28 January in eastern Binh Duong at 11-11N 106-49E (XT 985374). On 28 January, this control
authority activated communications with a new subordinate which was located on that date in central Binh Duong Province at 11-16N 106-43E (XT X885460). On the same day, this control authority passed a message to an unidentified entity located in northern Tay Ninh Province--within the base area of the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN--bearing instructions to "decrypt immediately." The message may have been originated by the new subordinate activated on 28 January.

Additionally, MAS COSVN conducted relatively normal communications on 30 January. A high volume of 36 messages was passed from Hq, B3 Front to MAS COSVN and a normal volume were passed from MAS COSVN to the possible Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) element in Bien Hoa Province. High volumes of messages have been exchanged sporadically between MAS COSVN and Hq, B3 Front during the past few months, with the front's previous high of 25 messages being sent on 20 January. The possible Hq, 5th LID element has been involved in a high level of messages activity with MAS COSVN since 27 January.

In other activity, on 30 January the possible Tay Ninh Provincial Unit was located in western Tay Ninh Province at 11-20N 105-59E (XT 072514), approximately 5 km northwest of the Ben Soi Special Forces Camp and approximately 15 km north of its 29 January location near 11-11N 105-59E (XT 068368).

Finally, in a message dated 24 January but sent on 29 January, the MIS, MR 1, ordered a subordinate--located on 30 January in southern Bien Hoa Province near 10-39N 106-59E (YS 179786)--to "take advantage of the New Year's celebration" in order to "investigate the results of our attacks on the blockhouses" at Cong Bon Tru (unlocated) and around an undetermined township.

In another message passed to the MIS, MR 1, on 27 January,
the subordinate reported that "we shelled Vinh Quan [unlocated]" and burned a vehicle belonging to a major.


2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

On 30 January two unidentified elements--possibly associated with the PAVN 101D Regiment--reported on the reconnaissance of L19 aircraft, the heavy air strike by F4H aircraft and the circling of a C123 aircraft in the area of Nguon Rao (16-45N 106-39E, XD 7853) and Hill 1022 (16-47N 106-40E, XD 7858). Also revealed in the message was that a troop drop zone was possibly being prepared in an unspecified area.

Elements of the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment are increasing their reconnaissance reports of Allied activity in the Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) area and engaging in counterbattery fire against Allied positions.

The 27th Independent Battalion reported on 29 January that Route 9 could be easily crossed. This battalion previously had experienced considerable difficulty in resupplying its subordinate units in this area.

(2/G11/VCM/T878-68, 301526Z) (SECRET CAVIN)

Military Region 4

A marked decrease has been noted in the communications activity of the MR 4 Air Defense Command Post (ADCP) since 21 January. Five of the approximately 15 entities directly subordinate to the Hq, ADCP, located in the Vinh area, have not been observed in communications for at least one week. Also
since 21 January, three of the four entities which communicate with both Hq, ADCP and ADCP Forward Headquarters have not been observed in communications. The ADCP Forward Headquarters is colocated with the DMZ Front, and all three subordinates are located in the DMZ area. The reason for this unusually low level of communications on the MR 4 ADCP complex is now known.

(2/0/VCM/R33-68, 261726Z) [SECRET CAVIN]

3. South Vietnam Attacks Referenced in SAM-Associated Communications

The objective of the attacks on Danang and the Pleiku area was to destroy the Command Advisory Section One and to [disrupt] the command of the Americans in the Pleiku Sector, according to SIGINT of 30 January. In addition, it was disclosed that both the offense and defense of Pleiku were "very heavy." An unidentified force was reported to be striking "hard" at Danang, Central Vietnam, and in the south.

The foregoing, which was noted in North Vietnamese SAM-associated communications, was apparently in reference to at least the attack against Danang Air Base during the late evening of 29 January and early morning of the 30th.

(2/H3/VCK/R18-68, 302229Z) [SECRET CAVIN]

4. Possible Impending DRV Air Offensive

At least two and possibly as many as five North Vietnamese tactical AN-2 light transports, at least one of which participated in the 12 January bombing of Phou Pha Thi (20-26N 103-44E) have been forecast to conduct an unidentified activity early on the morning of 1 February, according to SIGINT.

Phou Pha Thi was attacked by four North Vietnamese AN-2's on 12 January.

(2/02/VCA/R14-68, 300510Z and Follow-ups thereto; 2/G2/LSA/R01-68, 301446Z; 2/02/VCA/R05-68, 130437Z and Follow-ups thereto) [SECRET CAVIN]
Non-Responsive

TOP SECRET TRINE

3/0/STY/R27-68

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TOP SECRET TRINE