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3/O/STY/R28-68  
01 February 1968  
DIST: O/UT  
SEA SIGSUM 28-68



# SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 01 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY


In South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5, a radio station in eastern Quang Nam Province has been identified as serving the 2nd Battalion, PAVN 368B Artillery Regiment, while to the south, contacts with Allied forces have been reflected in communications serving Communist units in Quang Tin Province. Results of Communist attacks and preparations for further offensive activity were discussed by military intelligence elements in western Kontum Province. In MR 1 a 28 January message from the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN to the probable 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion mentioned designators of Allied units located in the Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border area.

In the area northwest of Khe Sanh the major PAVN headquarters in Laos has been identified as a Front headquarters and has been arbitrarily designated as the Khe Sanh Area Front. This front serves as the immediate senior authority over PAVN Forces in the Khe Sanh and Laotian border area.

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On 31 January SIGINT indicated that Vinh Airfield probably would resume operational status within the next several days. Laborers reportedly were repairing the airfield and still had two craters to fill.

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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Hanoi Communications

On 27 and 28 January, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi was noted passing possibly 19 messages to the COSVN secondary station. At least six of these messages were relayed by the CEC from the Region 5 Committee (RC-5) secondary station. In addition to the six messages being relayed, five other messages were passed from RC-5 to the CEC during the same time frame. Throughout the month of January the CEC seldom passed more than one message per day to the COSVN.

(2/G12/VCJ/R09-68, 291600Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 5

In the eastern Quang Nam Province area the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment, PAVN 2nd Division, indicated on 30 January that it was about to move. This unit was last located on 30 January near 15-52N 108-14E (BT 033544), about 12 km west of Hoi An city. In this same general area, the probable Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion -- located on 30 January near 15-57N 108-02E (AT 814633) -- reported on 31 January that it was on the move.

Additionally, a radio station in the eastern Quang Nam area has been identified as probably serving the Hq, 2nd Battalion, PAVN 368B Artillery Regiment. This unit was located on 3 January near 15-56N 108-02E (AT 808619) and is currently believed to be operating with the probable 402nd Sapper Battalion.

In south-central Quang Nam an unidentified subordinate of Hq, Rear Services Group 44 -- located on 29 January near 15-43N 107-57E (ZC 168400) -- reported that it was on the move, in a

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difficult situation and under attack.

SIGINT indicates that the Region 5 Committee (RC-5) main station may be utilizing split communications facilities. A radio station serving RC-5 was located in east-central Quang Nam on 29 January near 15-50N 108-10E (AT 968523), in the vicinity of the Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element. On 30 January two other stations serving RC-5 were located in south-central Quang Nam, the main station near 15-43N 107-54E (ZC 121411) and the secondary station near 15-44N 108-02E (AT 816419). The main stations location is in the vicinity of Hq MR 5 Provincial Unit Control.

To the south, in eastern Quang Tin the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit indicated on 30 January that it was in combat and requested an unidentified subordinate to pay attention to maintaining close communications. This unit was last located on 30 January near 15-29N 108-25E (BT 230132), approximately 10 km southwest of Tam Ky.

In central Quang Ngai Province, the Quang Ngai Provincial Unit -- located on 31 January near 15-05N 108-49E (BS 498676) -- reported on 31 January that it was engaged in combat and requested that Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control maintain close communications. Later on the same day, this provincial unit again indicated that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment. In this same area a possible rear services element -- located on 30 January near 15-05N 108-48E (BS 485678) -- reported on 31 January that it was in a difficult situation, under bombardment and engaged in combat.

In the western highlands, Hq, PAVN 32nd Regiment, PAVN 1st Division, was located on 31 January in western Kontum Province near 14-38N 107-42E (YB 914208), about 10 km southwest of Dak To and approximately 9 km southeast of its 29 January position. Additionally, the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 1st Division on 31 January instructed a subordinate in the Dak To area to "take advantage of the opportunity and launch an attack" so that the opportunity would "not be wasted." The

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subordinate was told to pay attention when firing to avoid hitting "friendly troops." The MIS indicated that communications would not be maintained "after K5 enters the city." According to collateral K5 is a cover designator for the 5th Battalion, 32nd Regiment, PAVN 1st Division. The MIS also reported that it had attacked A1 and A5 (both unlocated) and Had "conducted a paralyzing raid on the area of the radion station and the administrative area of Kontum Province." According to collateral, on 30 January Allied forces engaged an estimated two Communist battalions in Kontum City (14-21N 108-02E, AR 790890). The MIS further reported that on the night of 30 January "we raided Tan Canh [14-40N 107-46E, YB 999221] and took control of Tan Canh city." The MIS stated that Allied forces had possibly withdrawn after having been "attacked at numerous places." Collateral reports that on 30 January Tan Canh was attacked by mortar fire, and two-thirds of the city was destroyed in the ensuing fires.

The MIS has recently established communications with two new unlocated subordinates -- one in mid-January, and the other on 31 January. On 31 January the newest subordinate reported to the MIS in detail concerning air and ground transport at Tan Canh.

To the south, the probable Hq, 1st Division element which has recently been exchanging messages with a Hq, B3 Front authority discussing attack preparations in western Pleiku Province, was located on 31 January near 13-57N 107-28E (YA 675432) in the Pleiku-Kontum-Cambodia tri-border area, approximately 13 km northwest of its 30 January location. In north-central Pleiku, the possible 1st Battalion, PAVN 95B Regiment, was located on 31 January near 13-53N 107-56E (ZA 182385), approximately 12 km south-southwest of Pleiku City and about 12 km southeast of its 27 January location. In this same area another unidentified B3 Front associated element was located on 31 January near 13-57N 107-54E (ZA 140430), about 12 km west southwest of Pleiku City and approximately 13 km northeast of its 27 January location. Additionally, a subordinate of the MIS, Hq, B3 Front relocated between 28 and 30 January 14 km northeast to a position near 13-56N 107-56E (ZA 161419), about 19 km southwest of Pleiku city.

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To the south in Darlac Province an unidentified B3 Front associate was located on 30 January near 12-36N 108-02E (AP 763940), approximately 12 km south-southwest of Ban Me Thuot and about 31 km northeast of its 23 January location. Finally, a new subordinate of the MIS, Hq, B3 Front -- first noted in communications on 25 January -- was initially located on 30 January in central Darlac near 12-39N 108-04E (AQ 820000), about 4 km southeast of Ban Me Thuot. This element is located in the vicinity of at least 13 other Vietnamese Communist radio terminals clustered around Ban Me Thuot.

Finally, on 29 and 30 January, an unusually high volume of messages was observed being passed by RC-5 to all subordinates. A total of 24 messages were sent on 29 January 48 messages on 30 January, and 46 messages on 31 January. Since 15 January, a total of about 11 messages per day have been observed on these communications.

(2/G12/VCY/R003-68, 301800Z; 2/G12/VCJ/R029-68, 291600Z; R030-68, 301500Z; R031-68, 311650Z; 2/O/VCM/R52-68, 312304Z; R49-68, 311740Z; 2/G12/VCM/R0307-68, 311845Z; R0306-68, 311846Z; R0305-68, 311848Z; R0303-68, 311650Z; R302-68, 311635Z; R0301-68, 311632Z; R0299-68, 311430Z; R0296-68, 311245Z; R0294-68, 311018Z; R0293-68, 310843Z; R0292-68, 310302Z; R0291-68, 310300Z; T251-68, 312305Z; T245-68, 311355Z) (~~SECRET SAVIN~~)

#### Military Region 1

In a message of 28 January to the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) of COSVN, a subordinate -- located on 21 January in northern Tay Ninh Province at 11-37N 106-05E (XT 183858) -- reported that Allied forces struck an unspecified Communist base camp. The subordinate also reported that helicopters "circles many times" and that "helicopters and artillery were active in the district." According to collateral, Allied Operation YELLOWSTONE is currently under way in northern Tay Ninh Province.

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In other activity, a message of 28 January from MIB COSVN to the probable 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion, located on 8 January near the Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border, contained designations of Allied units located in the Tay Ninh-Binh Duong border area. The message mentioned the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Regiment; the possible 2nd Battalion, 12th Regiment; and a possible 2nd Battalion, 22nd Artillery Regiment. According to collateral, the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Regiment are subordinate to the 3rd Brigade, U.S. 25th Infantry Division, located at Dau Tieng (11-17N 106-21E, XT 4846). Collateral further indicates that there is an ARVN 2nd Battalion, 22nd Mechanized Infantry Regiment also located at Dau Tieng.

Additionally MIB COSVN instructed the probable 46th Battalion to maintain close surveillance of transportation on the air routes from the direction of Binh Duong (possibly a reference to Phu Cuong [10-58N 106-40E, XT 8113], the capital of Binh Duong Province).

(2/G10/VCM/T196-68, 310826; T194-68, 280556Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

#### Military Region 2

SIGINT indicates that an unidentified Party-associated station in Dinh Tuong Province continues to move. The station was located in central Dinh Tuong at 10-26N 106-12E (XS 3053), approximately 15 km east of its location on 29 January. This unidentified terminal was previously reported moving eastward between 26 and 29 January.

(3/0/STY/R26-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

#### Liberation News Agency

On 31 January the Main Office of the Liberation News Agency (MOLNA) broadcast news of the current VC offensive, enumerating the victories of the Communist forces. The broadcast announced

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victories of the Communists throughout MR's 1, 2, 3 and 4 and reported that the Liberation Armed Forces had "killed many Americans'" "annihilated" several ARVN Regiments; had "paralyzed enemy communications" between Saigon and the ARVN IV Corps Area; and were continuing to ambush Allied convoys attempting to reenforce Chau Doc City in An Giang Province.

In a separate broadcast transmitted at urgent precedence and accredited to a special LNA correspondent in Saigon, MOLNA reported on the battle in the city of Saigon. The broadcast stated that the attack on Allied installations had destroyed the Independence Palace, the ARVN General Staff Headquarters, the Saigon English Radio Station and "all the military and civilian agencies of the Saigon Puppet authorities." MOLNA reported that the suburbs of Saigon were under Communist control and that citizens in the suburb were imploring the ARVN soldiers to "join the Revolution." The broadcast went on to say that at several posts the entire contingency of ARVN troops "followed the Revolution."

(2/0/VCY/T18-68, T19-68, in preparation) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

## 2. DRV Communications

### DMZ Area

The major PAVN Headquarters in Laos, just northwest of Khe Sanh, has been identified as a front headquarters. Communications serving this entity have evolved into a structure indicative of a front organization, arbitrarily designated the Khe Sanh Area Front (KSAF) and serving as the immediate senior authority over PAVN forces in the Khe Sanh and Laos border area immediately west of Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province. PAVN forces in the area include elements of the PAVN 304th and 325C Divisions.

Most recently, the Hq, KSAF was unobserved in communications with its subscribers for approximately 40 hours; it was last noted active on 29 January at 2018Z and reappeared

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in communications at 1234Z on 31 January. During this period, PAVN High Command almost continually tried to contact the headquarters, both directly and via relay requests to other units.

PAVN tactical voice communications continue to reflect PAVN elements reconnoitering Allied positions in the general Khe Sanh area with possible unit reliefs also noted on 31 January.

A possible battalion in contact with a possible regimental command post (CP) reported on 31 January the movement of 80 Americans toward Hill 423 (16-35N 106-42E, XD 813355) and suggested that a team flank the "enemy". The possible regimental CP directed the battalion to continue following the enemy and to maintain continuous communications. The on-line relief of an 8th Battalion by a 2nd Battalion was suggested in an exchange of information between the possible regiment and the unidentified possible battalion on 31 January. Messages indicated the 2nd Battalion would relieve the 8th Battalion and that two companies, the 6th and 17th, would assist. Additionally, cadre from the 8th Battalion reportedly would remain with those of the 2nd Battalion to jointly control the "situation." The "8th Battalion" may be the 8th Battalion subordinate to the 29th Regiment, PAVN 325C Division, known to be active north of Khe Sanh. The "2nd Battalion" may be the 2nd Battalion of the 101D Regiment.

An element of the PAVN 101D Regiment reported a C130 aircraft had landed at the Khe Sanh airfield, that one "OV10A" aircraft had circled overhead, and that Allied forces were still digging fortifications at 595 (16-39N 106-41E, XD 825425). An unidentified artillery/rocket unit reported continuous supply activity was being carried out at the airfield.

In the central DMZ area, a PAVN 90th Regiment element reported it was continuing to transport ammunition and, according to plan, would be finished on 31 January. The

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same element reported the instances of influenza within the companies. Counterbattery fire by PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment elements continued against Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) artillery emplacements. In a message on 31 January a 164th Regiment element informed a possible forward observer that on the night of 31 January when Hill 241 (Camp Carroll) guns were spotted firing "we on the north bank [probably of the Ben Hai River] and our rockets will fire on the enemy." An earlier message suggested an artillery forward observer may be located on Hill 544 (16-48N 106-54E, YD 019592).

East of Camp Carroll, a 27th Battalion element reported lying in ambush all night at Tan Truc (16-48N 107-01E, YD 155585) on Route 9 without encountering the enemy. The same unit reported that the Americans had utilized 16 vehicles to transport probable local troops from the Cua area (vicinity of 16-45N 106-58E, YD 0952) to Khe Sanh.

Elements of the 164th Artillery Regiment a reported coordinates of four probable Allied guns at Doc Mieu (Hill 46, 16-56N 107-05E, YD 215743), and that their range extended to Ky Lam (16-53N 107-06E, YD 247669) and Mai Xa (16-52N 107-09E, YD 280665).

Elements of the PAVN 803rd Regiment were informed on 31 January of PAVN activities throughout the country. Messages alleged that the Da Nang airfield had been struck during the night of 30 January and that ARVN troops fleeing toward the Americans were prevented from entering. The "THIEU-KY" group also was reported to have fled during the Saigon attack. A later message reported the seizure of Quang Tri city, the Saigon and Hue radio stations, and that ARVN troops had clashed with Americans at Quan Chang (unlocated) before fleeing.

(2/0/VCM/R50-68, 311948Z; 2/G11/VCM/R221-68, 300734Z; R226-68, 310645Z; R228-68, 010345Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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PAVN Rear Services

A probable reflection of the halt to the Tet truce by United States forces was noted in a 30 January message from an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element. This message, addressed to the 936th Transport Battalion and Company 10 of the 871st Transport Battalion, disclosed that "the enemy is cheating in regard to the order for a cease-fire." The message further revealed that the units were to increase vigilance and to take precautions against enemy air strikes. In addition, any convoys whose operations would extend into the daylight hours were required to have weather conditions in their favor, probably referring to fog, rain or cloud cover.

Also on 30 January, a message was sent to warehouse/storage areas 102, 165 and K3 advising them to take positive steps to camouflage truck parks having cargo, as well as the roads leading to the warehouses. ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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
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


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