This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 4 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

CONTENTS

Situation Summary .................................... 1

I. Communist Southeast Asia

   A. Military

      1. Vietnamese Communist Communications-
         South Vietnam .................................. 3

      2. DRV Communications ............................. 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOP SECRET TRINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/0/STY/R30-63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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Non-Responsive
SITUATION SUMMARY

Relocations of Vietnamese Communist military units, the most significant involving units associated with the PAVN II Corps Front, highlighted activity in Military Region (MR) 5, South Vietnam. In MR 1/10, messages discussing an imminent Viet Cong (VC) artillery attack, probably on or near the Bien Hoa Airbase, were observed. To the south, in MR 4, a concentration of unidentified terminals have been located near the Cholon sector of Saigon.

Communications of unidentified artillery elements located in the Binh Thanh area reflected increased artillery bombardments by PAVN forces, while a 164th Artillery Regiment element, located in the central DNZ, continued its counterbattery fire against Camp Carroll. The dual mission of the 27 Independent Battalion for the night of 2 February—to surround the self-defense forces of Can Thai township and to take over administration of the area—was also reported.
TOP SECRET TRINE

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-2-

TOP SECRET TRINE
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

In the western highlands there has been a series of minor movements on the part of Vietnamese Communist units operating in the area. The most significant involved the probable Hq, PAVN E3 Front Authority, which moved 14 km eastward between 1 and 3 February to a position near 14-03N 107-26E (YA 66567) in southwestern Kontum Province. In this same area, an entity subordinate to the PAVN 1st Division was located near 14-30N 107-43E (YB 722196) on 2 February, 2 km northeast of its last location and 8 km west of Dak To. The Hq, PAVN 32nd Regiment, 1st Division, was located by SIGINT on 3 February near 14-30N 107-42E (YB 216207), 7 km west of Dak To. Two radio stations associated with the E3 Front also were noted in movements. One of these, was located in the area of 14-38N 107-44E (ZB 902250) on 2 February, 16 km northwest of its position of 28 January and 12 km southwest of Dak To. The other was located in Cambodia at 14-35N 107-26E (YB 620155) on 3 February, about 10 km north of its 31 January location. An unidentified subordinate of the E3 Front was located in the Cambodia-Kontum Province border area near 14-30N 107-34E (YB 771222) on 3 February, about 70 km north of its position in early November 1967.

In other developments, a new subordinate of the Hq, Hq, 1st Division--first heard on 31 January--was initially located on 1 February about 5 km north of Dak To and subsequently positioned near 14-40N 107-48E (ZB 001256) on 3 February. This subordinate has been reporting sporadically on Allied convoy activity in the vicinity of Tan Canh.

In a message of 1 February to a subordinate, the probable forward element of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), PAVN 1st Division reported Communist activities in several locations.
in southern MR 5. The probable forward element reported that "at 030C [Golf] we took control" of Tan Canh (14-40N 107-40E, YE 999221) and indicated that the troops in Tan Canh were preparing to fight the counter-attacking forces. In addition, this element stated that a sapper unit had struck "the administrative area," apparently in Tan Canh, and also that "we occupied the radio station at Qui Nhon and attacked Nha Trang." The probable forward element concluded by saying that "on 31 January 41 towns arose to wrest complete political power and take control."

In north-central Pleiku Province, two B3 Front associated entities moved between 1 and 3 February. One of these units was located near 14-08N 106-07E (AR 887548), 21 km north-northeast of Pleiku city and 13 km north of its 1 February position. The other unit was located near 14-06N 106-03E (AR 816595), 13 km north-northeast of Pleiku city and 7 km south-southwest of the 1 February location of this unit.

To the south in Darlac Province, the probable Darlac Provincial Unit was located in the vicinity of 12-38N 106-05E (AP 821981) on 3 February, 11 km southeast of Ban Me Thout and 15 km northeast of the 20 January location of this unit. The possible 3rd Battalion, PAVN 23rd Regiment, was located nearby at 12-35N 106-04E (AP 811934) on 3 February, about 55 km east of this unit’s last location on 9 January. On 3 February SIGINT indicated that an unidentified Lao Dong Party-associated radio station relocated approximately 13 km north of its 24 January location to a position near 12-37N 106-06E (AP322 952). The movements of this station normally coincide with those of the possible 3rd Battalion.

In the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area, there were several minor moves on the part of Vietnamese Communist units and the reported intent to move by others. In addition, some units reported that they were in combat. Between 1 and 3 February, the possible Hq, PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element reported on four separate occasions that it was about to move. The last location of this unit on 31 January placed it in eastern Quang Nam
Province near 15-52N 10C-12E (BT 026535). Additionally, this forward element has communicated with the possible VC 1st and PAVN 3rd Regiments since 2 February by means of voice facilities--a departure from normal procedures. Other 2nd Division elements that have reported their intent to move during this period are the Hq, 2nd Division--last located near 15-55N 103-12E (BT 017520) on 2 February--and the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment--last located near 15-51N 108-14E (BT 030544).

The Hq, Rear Services Group 44, which is apparently using split terminals located in east-central and south-central Quang Nam Province, respectively, reported at 1053Z on 2 February that it was about to move. One headquarters terminal was last located in the vicinity of 15-44N 107-50E (ZC 154420) on 24 January, and the other headquarters terminal near 15-40N 108-09E (AT 953550) on 1 February. On 2 February, the Hq, KR 5 Main Force Unit Control was located near 15-38N 107-58E (ZC 104216), 11 km southeast of this unit's 1 February location in south-central Quang Nam Province.

In northeastern Quang Tin Province, the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit was located in the area of 15-36N 106-17E (BT 030244) on 2 February, 11 km northwest of its 1 February location. At 0012Z on 4 February, this unit reported that it was engaged in combat, and at 0100Z on the same date indicated that it was on the move. A subordinate of this probable provincial unit--last located near 15-46N 108-25E (BT 227441) in northeastern Quang Tin--informed the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit at 0041Z on 3 February that it was in combat and requested that the provincial unit pay attention to maintaining close communications.

In Binh Dinh Province, a radio terminal associated with the PAVN 3rd Division was initially located on 2 February near 14-03N 106-05E (BR 222544), in the central portion of the province. At 0755Z on 1 February, this terminal had indicated that it was about to move. In this same area, the Hq, KR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Binh Dinh Province--located on 3 February near 14-07N 106-53E (BR 704633)--reported at 0302Z on 3 February that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment.
On 2 February, the Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) was located in Bien Hoa Province at 11-00N 106-59E (YT 123174). A possible element of the VC 5th LID--located at 10-59N 106-58E (YT 145168) on 3 February--passed a message on 4 February discussing an imminent VC artillery attack, probably on or near Bien Hoa Airbase. Possibly related to this activity was the transmission of a plaintext message by an unidentified radio station--located on 2 February at 11-00N 106-54E (YT 092189)--discussing the arrival of an unidentified entity at "two base locations", and referring to a 1st Battalion being at "the township".

At unidentified military element associated with the PAVN B3 Front was located on 2 February in Binh Duong Province near the Michelin Plantation at 11-18N 106-30E (XT 644491). This element was last located in northern Tay Ninh Province on 21 January. A concentration of units in the Michelin Plantation area has been developing since late 1967, and includes the tentative Hq, PAVN 101st Regiment, and an unidentified element possibly associated with the possible PAVN 88th Regiment. In southern Binh Duong, an unidentified terminal--noted in communications since 4 Dec 1967, when it was located in central Binh Duong--was located on 1 February at 10-57N 106-39E (XT 801123).

The tentative Hq, PAVN 165th Regiment, 7th Division, was located on 3 February at 11-28N 106-33E (XT 697671) in southern Binh Long Province, approximately 7 km to the east-southeast of its 2 February position.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE

VC 261st Bn
2 February

Alternate Hq, MR 2 Ele
2 February

SECRET CAVIN
Elsewhere, communications activity on 2 and 3 February of the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN was characterized by non-scheduled activity. MAS COSVN was the recipient of messages from PAVN High Command and the Hq, PAVN D3 Front on 2 February. The messages were passed on the watch facility which may indicate that they were of an urgent nature. On 2 February, MAS COSVN originated at least eight circular type messages to the Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control and Hq, MR's 1, 6 and 10. On 3 February MAS COSVN attempted unsuccessfully to contact the probable Hq, VC 271st, 272nd and 273rd Regiments—all subordinate to the VC 9th LID.

An unidentified control authority of a watch group located in the Binh Long-Tay Ninh-Cambodia border area, was in communications with MAS COSVN, the probable VC 272nd Regiment, and four unidentified subordinates on 2 and 3 February. The control of this watch group, which includes the possible Hq, Unidentified Front and terminals associated with the possible PAVN 7th Division and VC 9th LID, was observed only sporadically through January, principally in communications with the probable 272nd Regiment. MAS COSVN had not been previously noted in communications on this watch group.


Military Region 2

Between 29 January and 2 February, an element of the Alternate Hq, MR 2—located on 2 February at 10-27N 106-24E (XS 538511)—and the suspected VC 261st Battalion—located on 1 February at 10-29N 106-25E (XS 541592)—relocated from western to eastern Dinh Tuong Province. Collateral indicates that the 261st Battalion was one of the VC units involved in the recent attack on My Tho city.

High message volumes continue to be observed on radio groups serving alternate Hq, MR 2. On 1 February, 11 messages were passed from the alternate headquarters to the suspected VC 261st and 267th Battalions, while the tentative Kien Tuong and An Giang
Provincial Units received 7 and 22 messages, respectively.

(2/G10/VCM/R33-68, 031720Z; 2/G10/VCM/R51-68, 030333Z)

On 2 February a radio station serving the probable Long An Provincial Committee was located near 10-33N 106-36E (XS 668715), approximately 50 km southeast of its last known location on 24 January at 10-52N 106-09E (XT 256025).

(2/G10/VCM/R047-68, 021725Z) (SECRET SAVIN)

Military Region 4

On 3 February the possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division passed a message to the possible Hq, MR 4. This represents the first message activity observed on these communications although Hq, MR 4 has been previously noted in attempted contacts with Hq, 7th Division, Hq, VC 5th LID, and Hq, VC 9th LID.

The tentative Long An Provincial Unit was located on 2 February southwest of Saigon at 10-43N 106-38E (XS 786635) approximately 18 km east-northeast of its 1 February position.

The radio station serving the Region 4 Committee (RC-4) was located on 3 February southwest of Saigon in Gia Dinh Province near 10-41N 106-39E (XS 796811), approximately 56 km southeast of its 27 January location at 10-54N 106-10E (XT 276054).

A radio station serving the Liberation News Agency was located on 3 February southwest of Saigon in Gia Dinh Province near 10-42N 106-38E (XS 785836), approximately 62 km southeast of its last known location on 11 September 1967 near 11-14N 106-23E (XT 515417).

In addition, a concentration of unidentified terminals have been located near the Cholon sector of Saigon as of 2 February; the concentration being located near 10-32N 106-38E (XS 7878).

(2/G10/VCM/R49-68, 022223Z; R46-68, 021700Z) (SECRET SAVIN)
2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

SIGINT has indicated increased Tactical activity in the General DMZ area, from Khe Sanh to the coast. At Khe Sanh, communications of unidentified artillery units reflect increasing artillery bombardments by PAVN forces. An artillery observer was informed on 2 February that there would be much firing into an unidentified position during the night. On 3 February this same observer was queried concerning Allied strength on Hill 595 (16-39N 106-41E, XD 825425), and on 4 February the day's firing plan was transmitted. The plan indicated that during the afternoon, 20 rounds of 140 mm rocket fire were to be fired into "enemy" positions at "Ul, coordinates X41745Y84430" (XD833425); suppressing fire was to be carried out with 122.4mm rockets.

An element of the 164th Artillery Regiment in the central DMZ has continued its counterbattery fire against Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) emplacements. Seven rounds were reportedly fired during the night of 2 February and the unit reported 173 rounds remained of an originally supplied 248.

A 90th Regiment element, unobserved in communications since 11 January, began submitting reconnaissance reports on 2 February, reflecting helicopter flights from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh and allied road traffic in the general Rockpile area (16-46N 106-52E, XD 280552). Mentions of Hill 380 (16-43N 106-50E, XD 960500) indicate the reconnaissance team may be located in that area. On 4 February the team was told to submit detailed reports concerning defenses of an unspecified Allied position, including type and disposition of barbed wire, blockhouses, protective minefields, and daily guard and movement habits. Communications of the 9th Battalion, 90th Regiment, continue to reflect movement of supplies despite previous mentions of completing this mission about 1 February.
The 27th Independent Battalion reported it had two missions for the night of 2 February; to surround the self-defense forces of Cam Thai Township (16-48N 107-01E, YD 1452) and, in coordination with a political detachment, to take over administration of the area. On 2 February elements of the battalion reported suffering light casualties before withdrawing to Thach Dau (16-49N 107-01E, Yd 163608). The 7th Company reported killing 6 Americans while attacking a bridge. On 3 February subordinate units were instructed to rest their troops and to "make preparations." On 4 February one element reported "enemy" dead were everywhere.

Communications of the 803rd Regiment reflect continued southward movement by subordinate units in the area immediately north of Cua Viet (16-52N 107-10E, YD 340700). On 2 February the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, reportedly succeeded in repulsing Allied forces after being delayed by artillery and mortar fire and being surrounded. Plans for a three-pronged regimental sized attack against the area southeast of Lam Xuan (16-54N 107-02E, YD 205 688) were mentioned in communications but only reconnaissance, blocking and sniper activities were reported on 3 February. Late in the afternoon the 1st Company reported receiving fire from Allied forces near an unspecified bridge. (SECRET GIVN)

PAVN High Command

The PAVN High Command on 3 February sent 52 messages to the Khe Sanh Area Front (KSAF). Fourteen of the messages were designated with a precedence of "most urgent" while 36 were designated as "urgent." Twelve of the "urgent" messages were originated by the Hq, 325C Division which has not been observed communicating with the KSAF since 30 January. The normal message volume to KSAF from the PAVN High Command is approximately 5 messages per day.

(2/G11/VCM/R243-68, 040638Z) (SECRET GIVN)
Non - Responsive