



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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report is presented in two sections; Section A summarizes significant developments noted throughout Southeast Asia during the period 31 January - 6 February 1968; Section B summarizes those developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at the time of publication on 7 February. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Situation Summary	1
	<u>(SECTION A)</u>
I. Communist Southeast Asia	
A. Military	
1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam	5
2. DRV Communications.	12

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CONTENTS

PAGE



(SECTION B)

I. Communist Southeast Asia

A. Military

- 1. Vietnamese Communist Communications -
South Vietnam 21
- 2. DRV Communications. 27



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CONTENTS

PAGE

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SITUATION SUMMARY

(SECTION A)

During the past week, Vietnamese Communist elements in Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue have been employing tactical signal plans, a practice which, in the past, has been indicative of offensive activity on the part of the units involved. Indications that the Communists are now entering a second phase of offensive operations and the relocation of several military units toward major cities in the western highlands and minor repositioning by units concentrated near Hoi An in Quang Nam Province, highlighted events in MR 5. To the south in MR 1, two elements possibly associated with the PAVN 7th Division have moved southward from Tay Ninh into Binh Duong Province and a 3 February message passed by a possible element of the Viet Cong (VC) 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) revealed plans for an artillery attack on Bien Hoa Airbase. The reappearance of messages between Hq, 5th LID and its subordinate Hq, VC 274th Regiment and continued Communist military intelligence reporting throughout the region were also noted. SIGINT has also located the tentative Long An Provincial Unit and several unidentified radio terminals in the immediate vicinity of Saigon in MR 4.

Identification of the major PAVN headquarters northwest of Khe Sanh as a front headquarters--arbitrarily designated the Khe Sanh Area Front--highlighted SIGINT in the DMZ area during the past week. Major subordinates of this front include the PAVN 304th and 325C Divisions.

In other developments, increased reconnaissance, artillery, and ground combat activity was reflected in communications of PAVN elements deployed along the DMZ from Khe Sanh to the coast.


DRV "piston-engine" aircraft were to fly to the A Shau Valley on 6 February, according to communications of an unidentified PAVN element associated with the 559th Transportation Group. Warning was given against firing at the planes.

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(SECTION B)

Plans for an impending mortar attack in western Pleiku Province of South Vietnam's MR 5 on the night of 8 or 9 February have been revealed in SIGINT. Military intelligence elements continue to report on Allied activity in western Kontum Province and Communist units near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border are reacting to Allied tactical activity in that area. Finally, an unidentified Vietnamese Communist military intelligence element has moved from northern Binh Duong Province to a position just north of Saigon.

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Tactical activity continues to be reflected in the DMZ area, highlighted by reconnaissance in the vicinity of Lang Vei, scheduled artillery firing by a 74th Battalion near Khe Sanh, and a threatened attack against Cam Chinh Township by elements of the 27th Independent Battalion in conjunction with local forces. Farther east, elements of the 803rd Regiment have advanced to the Cua Viet Channel.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



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SECTION A

I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

The use of tactical signal plans by Vietnamese Communist elements in Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MR TTH) since approximately 26 January may be indicative of the recent increase in offensive activity in populated areas of that military region. All units utilizing these procedures--including the possible Hue Municipal Unit and the tentative forward element of Hq, MR TTH--are located in the general Hue area, and the institution of these procedures is concurrent with increased offensives in that vicinity.

(2/G11/VCM/R253-68, 050709Z; 3/0/STY/R32-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 5

Evidence of a new phase of Vietnamese Communist offensive operations has coincided with the movement of military units during the week to areas close to major cities in the western highlands. This new phase may have been scheduled to begin on "N-plus 4 day," according to an 8 January message passed between elements suspected to be associated with the PAVN 95B Regiment, PAVN 10th Division. In addition, on 1 February the probable PAVN 1st Division reported to the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority that his men and cadre have a higher regard for "this phase" than the previous phase. Additionally, numerous B3 Front-associated radio terminals have recently located close to Duc Co, Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To, and Ban Me Thuot.

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In military intelligence (MI) activity during the past week, the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Hq, 1st Division has split into two elements since 26 January. The first element, since designated as the probable forward element of the MIS, moved back into Kontum Province from Laos and now controls the subordinate that has done most of the reporting on the Dak To area. The second element of the MIS, which controls the other five subordinates, is still located in Laos opposite Kontum Province.

During the week, the probable forward element of the MIS and its subordinate exchanged numerous messages on Allied and Communist activities and operations in the Dak To area. These messages include instructions for the subordinate regarding attacks on Allied positions, and reports of numerous Communist attacks on cities in MR 5.

Additionally, the MIS discussed attack plans in the Dak To area with a subordinate and reported to this subordinate on 1 February the Communist attacks on Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Kontum.

Another subordinate of the MIS reported on 5 February that B-52's had bombed its position. This subordinate was located on 3 February in the Tan Canh area north-northwest of Dak To.

To the north, minor repositioning of units concentrated in the Hoi An city area and reflections of Allied tactical action against these units highlighted activity in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area. In other developments, elements of the PAVN 2nd Division implemented a tactical communications plan on 30 January. Such activity has previously indicated impending offensive operations on the part of the units involved. Additionally, since 2 February, the probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element has communicated with the possible Viet Cong (VC) 1st and PAVN 3rd Regiments by means of voice facilities.


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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN MR 1



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SIGINT of 29 and 30 January indicated that the Region 5 Committee (RC-5) main station may be utilizing split communications facilities. A radio station serving the RC-5 was located in east-central Quang Nam Province on 29 January near 15-50N 108-10E (AT 968523), in the vicinity of the Hq MR-5 Forward Tactical Element. On 30 January the RC-5 main station was located near 15-43N 107-54E (ZC 121411) and the secondary station was located near 15-44N 108-02E (AT 816419). The main station is in the vicinity of Hq MR-5 Provincial Unit Control.

To the south, the Hq, PAVN 3rd Division Forward Element One was located--for the first time since its reactivation in January--in eastern Binh Dinh Province.

Finally in MR 5 from 29 through 31 January a total of 118 messages were passed by RC-5 to all subordinates. Since 11 January approximately 10 messages per day have been observed on these communications. Currently, a normal level of message activity is being passed on RC-5 communications. RC-5 was noted transmitting plaintext messages to all of its subordinates on 2 and 4 February. These messages reportedly contained propaganda directed against the Allies and the Government of South Vietnam.

(3/O/STY/R27-68; R28-68; R30-68; R31-68; R32-68;
2/G12/VCJ/R033-68, 021700Z; 2/O/VCM/R53-68, 010736Z; R54-68,
012022Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

In Tay Ninh Province during the past week, the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN continued to send high priority messages to a number of military authorities, including Hq, PAVN B3 Front; Hq, MRs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10; and the probable Hq, VC 271st Regiment. Additionally, on 5 February, MAS COSVN passed an extremely high volume of messages to the tentative Long An Provincial Unit and on 30 January and 4 February, MAS COSVN received a high volume of messages from Hq, B3 Front. Other communications activity involved at least eight circular-type

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messages sent by MAS COSVN to Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control and Hq, MRs 1, 6 and 10. Also, preliminary information indicates that the possible PAVN Headquarters, Tchepone, Laos, attempted to contact MAS COSVN on 1 and 2 February. No previous communications between these two headquarters have been observed.

On 2 and 3 February an unidentified control authority of a watch group located in the Binh Long-Tay Ninh-Cambodia border area was noted in communications with MAS COSVN, the probable VC 272nd Regiment, and four unidentified subordinates.

On 4 February the possible Tay Ninh Provincial Unit was located in southwestern Tay Ninh Province, approximately 20 km southeast of its 30 January position near Tay Ninh city.

In Binh Duong Province, on 4 February, the tentatively identified Hq, PAVN 7th Division Forward Element and an unidentified control station, possible associated with the tentative Hq, 7th Division, were located in central and north-eastern Binh Duong Province respectively, approximately 50 km southeast of their previous locations in northeastern Tay Ninh Province. Two unidentified terminals of a communications link--historically located near the tentative 7th Division and its forward element--also redeployed into the same area of Binh Duong between early December and 4 February.

On 2 February an unidentified military element--associated with the PAVN B3 Front--was located in northwestern Binh Duong Province near the Michelin plantation. A concentration of units in the Michelin plantation area has been developing since late 1967, and includes the tentative Hq, PAVN 101st Regiment, and an unidentified element possibly associated with the possible PAVN 88th Regiment.

Another unidentified control authority was located on 29 January in eastern Binh Duong Province. This authority may be colocated with another unidentified terminal which made a parallel move between 19 and 26 January.

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To the south, messages passed on 3 February by a possible element of the VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID)--which has not been noted in communications since 0832Z on 3 February--discussed an imminent VC artillery attack, probably on or near Bien Hoa Airbase. Other messages of the same day referred to the transportation of ammunition and the movement of personnel.

By 31 January an unidentified element moved from its 17 October position in northern Phuoc Tuy Province into west-central Bien Hoa Province.

In the same area, on 5 February, Hq, VC 274th Regiment--last located on 8 January near the Bien Hoa-Phuoc Tuy border--was noted sending six messages to Hq, VC 5th LID--the first message activity between these two entities noted since 16 January.

Between 13 and 31 January a control authority tentatively identified as Hq, COSVN Rear Services Group 84 relocated from northern Phuoc Tuy Province to the Phuoc Tuy-Bien Hoa Province border area. An unidentified associated terminal--active since early October--also relocated into the same general area between 14 December and 4 February.

Reporting on Allied and Vietnamese Communist tactical activity in northern MR 1 highlighted military intelligence (MI) communications during the past week.

In a 28 January message sent to the MI Bureau (MIB) of COSVN, a subordinate--located on 21 January in northern Tay Ninh Province--reported that the Allies had attacked an unspecified Communist base camp.

In other activity, the MIB COSVN sent a message on 28 January to the probable 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion--located on 8 January near the Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border--which contained designations of Allied units located in this area and instructions for maintaining surveillance of Allied air activity from the direction of Binh Duong Province.

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In the Binh Duong area, a 1 February message passed to a possible Vietnamese Communist MI control authority from a subordinate contained indications of Vietnamese Communist plans to attack in the Ben Cat and Lai Khe areas.

Finally, the results of a Vietnamese Communist attack on Vinh Quan (unlocated) and an order to investigate the results of an attack on Cong Bon Tru (unlocated), were contained in messages exchanged between the MIS, MR 1 and a subordinate, located in southern Bien Hoa Province on 30 January.

(3/O/STY/R32-68; R31-68; R30-68; R29-68; R28-68; R27-68; 2/O/VCM/R58-68, 021724Z; R58-68, Change 1, 022126Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Regions 2 and 4

On 2 February, the tentative Long An Provincial Unit was located in Military Region (MR) 4 southwest of Saigon, approximately 18 km east-northeast of its 1 February location in central Long An Province.

On 2 and 3 February two VC Party authorities and one Liberation News Agency subordinate were located in the vicinity of Saigon for the first time.

On 2 February a radio station serving the probable Long An Provincial Committee was located near 10-33N 106-34E (XS 668715), approximately 50 km southeast of its 24 January location.

The radio station serving the Region 4 Committee was located on 3 February southwest of Saigon in Gia Dinh Province near 10-41N 106-39E (XS 796811), approximately 56 km southeast of its 27 January location.

A subordinate of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Branch of the Liberation News Agency (LNA) was located on 3 February within the Saigon city limits near 10-42N 106-38E (XS 785836), approximately 62 km southeast of its last known location on 11 September 1967.

-10-

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On 31 January the Main Office of the LNA broadcast timely reports on the fighting in the city of Saigon. These reports were transmitted at URGENT precedence and were accredited to a special LNA correspondent in Saigon.

Additionally, during the week, several unidentified radio terminals have been located in or near Saigon.

On 3 February the possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division passed a message to the possible Hq, MR 4. This represents the first message activity observed on these communications, although Hq, MR 4 has previously been noted in attempted contacts with the possible Hq, 7th Division and with Hq, VC 5th and 9th LIDs.

Through at least 3 February, message activity between the alternate Hq, MR 2 and its main force unit subordinates remained high; however, no activity between these entities was observed on 4 and 5 February. This decrease in activity, together with the relocation of an element of the alternate Hq, MR 2 and the suspected Hq, VC 261st Battalion--both into eastern Dinh Tuong Province on 2 and 1 February respectively--could be related to the recent Vietnamese Communist tactical activities in Dinh Tuong. Message activity between alternate Hq, MR 2 and its provincial unit subordinates has decreased since 2 February.

The tentative My Tho Provincial Unit was located on 4 February in north-central Dinh Tuong Province, approximately 12 km east of its 28 January location.

Finally, an unidentified military station--active since October 1967--was located on 4 February in southeastern Hau Nghia Province, approximately 25 km east of its 26 January location in extreme western Hau Nghia near the Cambodian border.

(3/O/STY/R28-68; R29-68; R30-68; R31-68; R32-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

SIGINT has indicated that a front organization has been established in the western DMZ. The major PAVN Headquarters northwest of Khe Sanh--now arbitrarily designated the Hq, Khe Sanh Area Front (KSAF)--is the senior communications authority in control of this front. Hq, KSAF was last located in the vicinity of 16-53N 106-25E (XD 509665) on 29 January. Major units appearing as subordinates of KSAF include the 304th and 325C Infantry Divisions.

Recent SIGINT reflected an apparent communications stand-down of approximately 40 hours on radio facilities serving Hq, KSAF. This headquarters was reported as inactive from 29 January at 2018Z through 1234Z on 31 January. Most recent yet tenuous information suggests that communications were re-established between High Command Hanoi and KSAF on the latter's watch facilities on 30 January at 0013Z. Nevertheless, KSAF's traffic-passing communications have been unobserved in contact with all of its subscribers--except Hanoi. However, since 29 January, traffic-passing communications between KSAF and all of its communications subscribers, except Hanoi, have been unobserved.

The PAVN 304th Division communications remain normal to date. The headquarters and associated elements continue active in the area west and south of Khe Sanh.

Since early February, Hq, 320th Division has only been observed in communications with the DMZ Front, one unidentified subordinate of the 320th and the Hq, KSAF. Previously, the division headquarters maintained communications with three subordinates and four associated entities. Hq, 320th Division was last located on 2 February at 16-51N 106-55E (YD 047635).

Increased reconnaissance and artillery activities from Khe Sanh to the coast have been reflected in PAVN communications during the week.

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Reconnaissance units of the PAVN 29th and 101D Regiments, 325C Division, reported on aircraft flights, troop movements and fortification construction in and around the Khe Sanh combat base. PAVN artillery communications in the Khe Sanh area reflected increased reconnaissance and artillery bombardment. Observation difficulties due to fog, the use of both 122.4-mm and 140-mm rockets and the probable adjustment of fire against landing C-130 aircraft were also reflected during the week.

Tactical communications of the PAVN 90th Regiment indicated movement of possibly all three battalions to unspecified destinations. The 7th and 8th Battalions reportedly relocated on 5 and 6 February respectively, while the 9th Battalion continued its supply and transportation activity. Since 2 February a 90th Regiment reconnaissance team has been reporting on Allied road traffic in the Rockpile area (16-46N 106-52E, XD 980559) and on helicopter flights between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. In addition, the team was instructed to submit detailed reports on an unspecified Allied position, possibly in the Rockpile or Camp Carroll (16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) area.

In the central DMZ, PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment communications reflected reconnaissance of and counterbattery fire against Allied artillery at Camp Carroll. On 31 January the planned use of rockets and fire from "the northern bank" against Camp Carroll emplacements was also indicated. On 4 February an element of the 164th Regiment was told to follow communication schedules because "we are about to strike heavily."

In a 5 February summary to all companies, the 27th Independent Battalion reported that their recent tactical activity had resulted in a total of 48 Americans killed, 11 vehicles destroyed and many government and self-defense personnel killed or captured. Elements of the battalion during the week reported attacking along Route 1 and engaging Allied forces at Vinh An (16-49N 107-01E, YD 158604), Tach Dau (16-49N 107-01E, YD 163608), and Tam Hiep (16-49N 107-01E, YD 150605). Battalion elements were also instructed to occupy the area from Cam Lo (16-49N 107-00E, YD 140600) to Bich Giang (16-49N 107-02E, YD 179601). New Year's messages indicated the propaganda theme

-13-

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of victory on the "Route 9 Front" and appeals for a "winter-spring victory."

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, PAVN 803rd Regiment, continued their offensive in the area immediately north of Cua Viet (16-52N 107-10E, YD 340700). On 1 February the 1st Battalion was ordered to strike Hoang Ha (16-54N 107-10E, YD 299686) and Bach Cau (16-52N 107-09E, YD 285677) and plans for a three-pronged regimental-sized attack against the area southeast of Lam Xuan (16-54N 107-09E, YD 285688) were mentioned, but only sniper and blocking activity were subsequently reflected. On 4 February, the 3rd Battalion was engaged in reconnaissance of Hoang Ha and Bach Cau and preparing for the arrival of regimental headquarters near Lam Xuan west (16-54N 107-07E, YD 270700).

(3/O/STY/R27-68; R28-68; R29-68; R30-68; R31-68; R32-68; 2/G11/VCM/R247-67, 041403Z; R221-68, 300734Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

On 6 February, an unidentified PAVN element associated with the PAVN 559th Transportation Group and active in the A Shau Valley area reported that "our piston-engine aircraft" would fly from Song Chon (unlocated) to the A Shau Valley between the hours of 1200G to 2400G on 6 February. The same message warned against firing at the planes, and a later message mentioned picking up firewood and possibly lighting fires at the A Shau airfield.

In possibly related activity, the tentative 66th Battalion, 275th Regiment--believed to be in Nghe An Province, North Vietnam--also mentioned "our piston-engine aircraft" and stated that the aircraft will be active on the way from Hanoi possibly to Quang Binh, from 1700G on 6 February to 0500G on 7 February.


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


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
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


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


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
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SECTION B

I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

According to recently available information, an element of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH) was located on 30 January near 16-48N 107-06E (YD 248599) in northeastern Quang Tri Province. This position represents a relocation of approximately 35 km north-northwest from its 21 October location in Thua Thien Province near 16-27N 107-13E (YD 367208). Additionally, on 5 February an unusually high volume of 12 messages were exchanged between this element of the MIS and its unlocated subordinate. Normally, only about one message per day is passed between these two entities.

Subordinates of the probable PAVN 6th Regiment have been isolated in low-level communications reflecting tactical activity in the Hue area. Units involved have been the 10th and 11th Companies of an unspecified battalion of the 6th Regiment. Communications have mentioned combat at La Khe (16-30N 107-35E, YD 752263), including the sinking of one boat and damage to another with B-40 rocket fire, and a claim on 6 February of great success within and south of Hue.


Hq, MR TTH continues to be located near 16-24N 107-24E (YD 568148), approximately 20 km southwest of Hue, as of 6 February.

(2/G11/VCM/R261-68, 060630Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



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Military Region 5

Plans for an impending mortar attack, possibly against Chu Boc (13-52N 107-41E, YA 8833) on the night of either 8 or 9 February, have been disclosed in messages passed on 6 February between the PAVN B3 Front Authority near the Pleiku-Kontum Province-Cambodia border and the probable PAVN 1st Division element currently located in western Pleiku Province. These messages also mentioned "Phase Two," and implied that this is the current phase of Communist operations in the area. The mortar attack was first mentioned in a message passed at 0532Z on 6 February from the B3 Front Authority, located on that date near 14-03N 107-21E (YA 543547), to the probable 1st Division element, which was then located near 14-53N 107-34E (YA 782371). This message stated, "Your main element is to withdraw to your former location. On the night of 8 February, you are to be present at Comrade PHAT's area to carry out the assignments, or to set aside a day for washing. One squad with yourself [QUANG] in command is to stay close in the Chu Boc or Sung Le [13-54N 107-40E, YA 8939] area to prepare a weapons position. I will take the 82-mm mortars across to conduct a mortar attack. When preparations are completed, turn around and go back to PHAT's old position. Hand over the position to Comrades TRUONG and MUON who will come across for the mortar attack."

At 0942Z on 6 February, the probable 1st Division element inquired "On what day will you hand over the additional instructions and the request for preparations? We realize that we must set up an ambush in order to strictly execute your orders." Then, at 1432Z the probable 1st Division element reported, "My element will remain along with the squad. When we turn around to go back to the river to hand over [the assignment], do we have to select someone to (C val guide) the units of Comrades MUON and AN KHOI? Will our unit have to turn around and come back in again? . . . the squad that returned from Chu Kram [13-50N 107-36E, YA 8131] told us that the weapons position southeast of Chu Kram did not have helicopters landing and taking off."

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At 1532Z, the B3 Front Authority stated in part, "Thus on 8 or 9 February, Comrade QUANG's element is to be at the present location in order to report on the enemy at Chu Boc for Comrades MUON and TRUONG who are coming to conduct a mortar attack. Since this is an attack order, you must be accurate (the positions, ranges, enemy situations, and terrain in detail)."

Earlier on 6 February, at 0231Z, the probable 1st Division element had reported, "One squad is still conducting ambushes and firing at aircraft southeast of Chu Kram. We are still setting fires and feinting as per your instructions . . . We are also very much afraid that the enemy intends to withdraw, but we do not know."

In western Kontum Province, the Hq, PAVN 66th Regiment, PAVN 1st Division, was located on 6 February near 14-43N 107-46E (YB 990278) approximately 5 km northwest of Dak To and about 11 km east-southeast of its 2 February position.

Indications of continued Vietnamese Communist hostilities in the Kontum area were noted in two messages of 6 February from a B3 Front-associated MI control authority to a subordinate located northeast of Kontum city near 14-28N 108-05E (AS 860026). The authority told the subordinate that it was very important to "zealously assess" the Allied transportation situation. The authority further instructed the subordinate "to wait in order to go on the upcoming phase." The control authority was last located on 15 January in central Kontum near 14-32N 108-02E (AS 806091). These elements have been reporting on Allied transportation activity around Kontum city since early December 1967.

Additionally, plans to prevent aircraft from landing at a site designated as "A1" (unlocated) were disclosed in 6 February messages exchanged between unlocated possible MI elements associated with the 1st Division. The messages indicated that recoilless rifles--possibly located at "82/0" (unlocated)--will be used against aircraft attempting to land. The messages also mentioned movements of Communist infantry elements.

-23-

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3/O/STY/R33-68

In east-central Binh Dinh Province, Hq, PAVN 3rd Division, last located on 3 February near 14-14N 108-59E (BR 838740), reported on 6 February that it was on the move. In this same general area Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Binh Dinh Province, was located near 14-06N 109-01E (BR 865582) on 5 February, about 16 km east-southeast of its 3 February location.

Communications serving Vietnamese Communist military units in the eastern Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area on 6 February included reports of tactical activity, moves and indications of impending relocations. The Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element--last located on 2 February near 15-47N 108-07E (AT 918461)--and the possible Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment, PAVN 2nd Division--last located on 30 January near 15-49N 108-14E (BT 038490)--both reported that they were in difficult situations on 6 February. In this same area the Hq, Rear Services Group 44--located on 6 February near 15-51N 108-12E (BT 025539)--and the tentative 1st or 3rd Battalion, PAVN 68th Artillery Regiment--located on 2 February near 15-42N 108-01E (AT 809386)--both reported on 6 February that they were about to move. Meanwhile, an unidentified subordinate of Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control was located on 6 February near 15-32N 108-23E (BT 195180), about 15 km southwest of Tam Ky city in eastern Quang Tin, approximately 65 km northwest of its 11 January location. Finally, an unidentified military entity was initially located on 6 February in southern Quang Nam near 15-36N 107-51E (ZC 055286).

(2/G12/VCM/R381-68, 062040Z; R380-68, 061850Z; R378-68, 061827Z; R376-68, 061310Z; R375-68, 061310Z; R374-68, 061138Z; R373-68, 061136Z; R372-68, 061134Z; R370-68, 060320Z; R369-68, 060030Z)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

On 6 February, an unidentified Vietnamese Communist MI element was located just north of Saigon at 10-52N 106-40E (XT 816028), about 43 km southwest of its 4 February position in northern Binh Duong Province.

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3/O/STY/R33-68

On 6 February an unidentified radio station associated with the Liberation News Agency (LNA) was located in west-central Binh Duong at 11-08N 106-30E (XT 628303), approximately 69 km southeast of its location on 22 January in the north-central Tay Ninh Province-Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia area. This relocation suggests that this station may be associated with the possibly Hq, PAVN 7th Division, which recently relocated to central Binh Duong Province from north-eastern Ray Ninh Province.

(3/O/STY/R31-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 2

On 6 February the radio station serving the probable Long An provincial branch of the LNA was located in central Long An Province at 10-41N 106-26E (XS 586800), approximately 39 km southeast of its 30 January location in the western Hau Nghia Province-Cambodia area. This location is in proximity to the Long An Provincial Committee.

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

On 4 February the radio station serving the probable Ben Tre Provincial Branch of the LNA was located at 10-16N 106-25E (XS 560351), approximately 9 km north of its location on 1 February in northern Kien Hoa Province.

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

On 6 February the radio station serving the probable My Tho Provincial Branch of the LNA was located at 10-26N 106-11E (XS 307520) in eastern Dinh Tuong Province, approximately 27 km east of its location on 1 February in western Dinh Tuong Province. This station is now located in the vicinity of the My Tho Provincial Committee.

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3/O/STY/R33-68

Since 1 February SIGINT has indicated a concentration of VC radio terminals in eastern Dinh Tuong Province.

(3/O/STY/R26-68; R32-68; R31-68; R30-68; 2/G10/VCJ/R036-68, 061701Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 3

SIGINT has indicated the relocation of the Military Affairs Section of MR 3. On 6 February this station was located at 09-39N 105-22E (WR 409688) in VC Can Tho Province, approximately 41 km northeast of its 16 December 1967 location in VC Rach Gia Province.

This is the first time this station has been located by SIGINT in VC Can Tho Province.

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 4

Between 4 and 6 February, the tentatively identified Long An Provincial Unit (LAPU)--located on 4 February near the Cholon Sector of Saigon--moved about 6 km southward within Gia Dinh Province to a position near 10-38N 106-37E (XS 769758).

In the same general area, SIGINT indicated that the concentration of unidentified radio stations--located from 1 through 5 February south of Saigon at 10-41N 106-30E (XS 7882)--had shifted approximately 5 km to the south by 6 February to the area near 10-39N 106-38E (XS 7877). Collateral of 5 February indicates that Allied forces involved in Operation TRAN HUNG DAO made contact with Vietnamese Communist units in the area south of Cholon. The new concentration of unidentified stations is just south of the southern boundary of the Allied operation.

(2/G10/VCM/R066-68, 061630Z; 3/O/STY/R32-68, 062125Z)

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3/O/STY/R33-68

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

Since 1 February SIGINT has reflected communications between Hq, DMZ Front and three unidentified and unlocated 320th Division-associated elements. Previously, Hq, DMZ Front maintained communications only with the division headquarters.

On 7 February a terminal serving Hq, Khe Sanh Area Front was located near 16-56N 106-22E (XD 463718), approximately 7 km northwest of its 29 January location in the vicinity of 16-53N 106-25E (XD 509665).

PAVN tactical voice communications of 6 February reflected intelligence reporting by an unidentified unit in the vicinity of Lang Vei (16-36N 106-40E, XD 793364). A possible reconnaissance element reported to an unidentified entity that a helicopter had offloaded troops at Hill 383 (possibly 16-36N 106-42E, XD 804364) and carried construction material to Lang Vei. Additionally, this same reconnaissance element reported communist mortar fire on "A2" (unlocated) and "enemy" counter-battery fire toward the possible Sepone River.

Several mentions of an unidentified 74th Battalion were made in Khe Sanh area artillery communications on 6 February. A 74th Battalion subordinate to the PAVN 270th Regiment was last noted in the northeastern DMZ area in July 1967 in an antiaircraft role. The Khe Sanh area 74th Battalion, however, appears to be ground artillery related. On 6 February the artillery forward observer was informed that firing would commence at 1700G and that he was to report possible results of the 74th Battalion and the 122.4-mm rocket rounds.

Elements of the 27th Independent Battalion reported on 6 February that one platoon of the battalion, with guerrillas and local forces of the Cua area (vicinity 16-45N 106-58E, YD 0952) would annihilate the government personnel and self-defense

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3/0/STY/R33-68

force of Cam Chinh Township (16-52N 106-59E, YD 1151). Estimated time of the attack was indicated as 8 or 9 February. Further east, the 7th Company reported attacking in coordination with local forces and an unidentified "SONG CAU" in the Cam Giang Township (16-51N 107-06E, YD 2464) area. After "SONG CAU" had reportedly destroyed three tanks and killed 50 Americans and 20 ARVN soldiers, Company 7 pursued the "enemy" south to the Dong Ha bridge.

Southeast of Gio Linh, elements of the PAVN 803rd Regiment have advanced to the Cua Viet channel. On 6 February the possible 3rd Battalion headquarters was reported to be at Binh Quang Ha (16-52N 107-08E, YD 268660) and a request was made for 40 rounds of 82-mm recoilless gun ammunition to fire on boats and tanks. A 7 February message mentioned reconnaissance of the Allied situation at Quan Ngang (16-53N 107-05E, YD 222678) indicating the regiment may now shift to the west toward Route 1.

(2/G11/VCM/R273-68, 070523Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

PAVN High Command

The increase in circular message activity of PAVN High Command which began on 10 January is continuing into February. On 3 February six consecutive messages were noted being sent to Hq, MR 3 South. Four of these were circular messages--the type believed to be sent to all subscribers on the High Command internal network--and were of "very urgent" precedence, which is unusually high for this type of circular. On 4 February five consecutive circular messages of the same type were sent to Hq, MR 3 North and South, Hq MR Northwest and an unidentified, unlocated station associated with the unidentified High Command complex. All messages noted on 4 February were of "urgent" precedence. The normal volume of these messages from High Command is less than one per day.

(2/0/VCM/R34-68, 261725Z JAN; 2/0/VCM/R12-68, 162119Z JAN; 2/0/VCM/R187-67, 101804Z OCT) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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3/O/STY/R33-68

On 4 February 10 unusual messages were sent from Hanoi to the unidentified and unlocated station which is associated with the unidentified High Command complex. This is a major increase in activity, since the average since 15 January had been three such messages per day. Messages with "most urgent" precedence have continued to be noted into February. The unidentified station is at present the only one receiving such messages from High Command, although similar messages were sent from High Command to Hq, PAVN 320th Division just prior to that unit's deployment from North Vietnam. The unidentified station has been noted receiving the unusual messages since 3 December 1967.

(3/O/STY/R26-68; 2/O/VCM/R12-68, 162119Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Overland Infiltration

There has been a sharp increase in message activity on the A Shau Valley Rear Services Complex during the period 2-6 February. Units 32 and 127, which are possibly colocated, were observed sending a total of 38 and 18 messages respectively to the A Shau Valley Rear Services Headquarters. Unit 32 was located by SIGINT in the vicinity of 16-00N 107-25E (YC 610669) on 5 February and Unit 127 was located in the vicinity of 15-58N 107-36E (YC 528760) on 12 January.


(3/O/STY/R32-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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


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


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


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


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