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SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 11 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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
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SITUATION SUMMARY

In Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue of South Vietnam, tactical activity of Communist elements, as evidenced by the use of a tactical signal plan, continues to be limited to the general areas of Quang Tri city and Hue city. A company subordinate to the PAVN 6th Regiment has been charged with blocking the resupply and reinforcement of Hue by boat. Allied activity in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area of MR 5 was reflected in reports of difficult situations and relocations by various PAVN 2nd Division, Quang Nam Provincial Unit and Rear Services elements. Farther south, indications of an impending attack against Allied positions in the Dak To area of Kontum Province were evidenced in communications of PAVN 1st Division military intelligence elements.

In the northernmost corner of Quang Tri Province, near the Allied position at Khe Sanh, an unidentified artillery element reported on 3 February that three days would be required to complete the mission. Although the nature of the mission was not disclosed it was revealed that the required three days would only be sufficient if the weather remains favorable. A later message disclosed that significant combat would take place as determined by the "Fatherland" and also encouraged units to strive in gaining greater accomplishment.

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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Hanoi Communications

On 9 February SIGINT again revealed an increase in message activity from the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to the secondary station of COSVN. Some of this activity involved messages relayed by the CEC from the tentative MR Tri-Thien-Hue Committee (RC TTH).

On 9 February the highest volume of messages noted since 4 January was passed from the Region 5 Committee (RC-5) to CEC. However, no messages have been observed on the RC-5 broadcast since 7 February when 21 messages were sent.


In other possibly related Party communications, an unidentified high-echelon Party entity and its subordinate were observed in increased message activity also on 9 February. One of the messages passed by the subordinate contained relay instructions which indicated that the message was to be relayed from the tentative RC-TTH to the COSVN secondary station via a third party.

Another unidentified high-echelon Party entity, possibly located in MR TTH, was also involved in increased message activity on 9 February. Instructions sent by the station indicate that these messages were also for relay to COSVN.

(2/G12/VCJ/R40-68, 091705Z; 3/O/STY/R35-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



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Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

Elements of Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MR TTH) currently utilizing a tactical signal plan include the tentative forward element of Hq, MR TTH, the possible Hue Municipal Unit, an unidentified battalion of the PAVN 6th Regiment, and an unidentified controlling authority located near--and suspected of serving--the possible PAVN 9th Regiment. The geographical limitations of this tactical activity thus far are the general Quang Tri City area--possibly the area of responsibility of the PAVN 9th Regiment--and the general Hue city area--where all other units are located.

On 10 February, communications of an unidentified battalion of the PAVN 6th Regiment indicated the 11th company's position to be The Lai Ha (16-30N 107-35E, YD 745256). The company was instructed to block "enemy" forces moving up from Bao Vinh (16-30N 107-35E, YD 752252) but most important, to block resupply and reinforcement of Hue by boat. Company 10 reported it had been unable to cross the La Khe (16-30N 107-35E, YD 750268) because the people had all fled and because there was no cover between the company and the enemy.

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 5

Allied tactical activity in eastern Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province continuing to be reflected in Vietnamese Communist military communications in that area. The Hq, PAVN 2nd Division was located on 9 February near 15-50N 108-10E (AT 967503), about 10 km southwest of its 7 February location. The probable Hq, PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element--located near 15-55N 108-11E (AT 999606)--reported on 8 February that it was about to move. By 10 February this unit had relocated approximately 16 km to the southwest near 15-49N 108-04E (AT 873493). Later in the same day the probable forward element again indicated that it was about to move. The possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment, 2nd Division, was located on 8 February near 16-00N 108-13E (BT 025690), about 8 km south of Da Nang and approximately

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14 km north of its 1 February location. Later on the same date this headquarters indicated that it was about to move and on 10 February reported that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment. The possible Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division--last located on 30 January in southeastern Quang Nam Province near 15-49N 108-12E (BT 038490)--indicated on 9 February that it was about to move. A terminal which may also serve the possible Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment was located on 9 February near 15-44N 108-10E (AT 972406). This terminal indicated on 9 February that it was in a difficult situation, and under bombardment. In this same general area Hq, Rear Services Group 44--located on 7 February near 15-58N 108-12E (BT 032655)--indicated on 8 February that it was engaged in combat. On 10 February this unit possibly reported to Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control that it had "opened fire." Meanwhile, an unidentified subordinate of the Quang Nam Provincial Unit reported on 10 February that it was in a difficult situation and surrounded. This entity was located on 10 February near 15-51N 108-20E (BT 146512), about 5 km south of Hoi An and approximately 11 km northwest of its 30 January location. Another unidentified element--located on 8 February near 15-51N 108-23E (BT 200529)--reported on 10 February that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment. Finally, a possible rear services element was located on 9 February near 15-25N 108-27E (BT 279060), about 13 km west of its 7 February location and about 27 km west-southwest of Chu Lai city in southeastern Quang Tin Province.

In eastern Quang Ngai Province an unidentified military element was located on 10 February near 15-02N 108-52E (BS 719634), approximately 25 km north-northwest of its 4 February location and about 8 km east of Quang Ngai city. On 9 February this unidentified element indicated that it was in a difficult situation.

In the western highlands an unidentified PAVN B3 Front associate was located on 9 February near 12-31N 108-01E (AP 749858), approximately 18 km south of Ban Me Thuot in southern Darlac Province and about 14 km south-southwest of its

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
30 January location. In the Pleiku city area of central Pleiku Province an unidentified B3 Front associate was located on 9 February near 13-32N 107-48E (ZA 068358) about 23 km southwest of Pleiku city and about 13 km southwest of its 8 February location. Another unidentified B3 Front-associated entity was located on 10 February near 13-59N 107-48E (ZA 076480), approximately 21 km west of Pleiku city and about 13 km northeast of its 8 February location.

Indications of an attack by Vietnamese Communist elements on Allied positions in the Dak To area were contained in three messages of 10 February. In the first of these messages, the probable forward element of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Hq, PAVN 1st Division was informed by a subordinate-- located on 31 January near 14-33N 107-48E (ZB 021109)--that the rocket position and "LUAN's detachment [unidentified]" had fired their weapons. The subordinate also reported that it had arrived at the foot of Ngoc Bo Bieng (14-36N 107-46E, YB 9715).

In two later messages, the forward element of the MIS-- located on 4 February near 14-34N 107-38E (YB 855136)--informed the subordinate that the enemy was located at "position one [unlocated]." The MIS then instructed the subordinate to stay close to the enemy and attempt to infiltrate "position two [unlocated]." The subordinate was also instructed to reconnoiter the area of position two thoroughly, to prepare a plan of operation, to take precautions against Allied air and artillery attacks, and to attack only during the day.

(2/G12/VCM/R0431-68, 101730Z; R0430-68, 101530Z; R0428-68, 101255; R0427-68, 101215Z; R0426-68, 101030Z; R0425-68, 101015Z; R0423-68, 100820Z; R0422-68, 100714Z; R0421-68, 100705Z; R0420-68, 092015Z; R0419-68, 091835Z; R0417-68, 091510Z; R0416-68, 091454Z; R0414-68, 091432Z; R0412-68, 091300Z; R0410-68, 090948Z; R0408-68, 090650Z; R0407-68, 090644Z; R0406-68, 090630Z; R0400-68, 081712Z; R0399-68, 081710Z; T344-68, 101935Z; T341-68, 101430Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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Military Region 10

On 10 February, an unidentified headquarters subordinate to the Military Affairs Section of COSVN was located in Cambodian territory at 12-08N 106-56E (YU 115421), approximately 6 km north of the Phuoc Long Province border. This location places the unidentified headquarters about 8 km northeast of its 9 February location in the Cambodian-Phuoc Long Province border area near 12-04N 106-54E (YU 076346). Previous locations have suggested that this headquarters may be located with or near an unidentified control authority suspected to be involved in logistics activity which was last located on 27 January in the vicinity of 12-01N 106-54E (YU 060308).

(2/G10/VCM/R076-68, 101334Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 3

SIGINT has indicated the relocation of the Western Nam Bo Branch of the Liberation News Agency. On 10 February this station was located at 09-46N 104-50E (VR 825809) in Kien Giang Province, approximately 25 km northwest of its 8 January location in Kien Giang Province.

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2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

In the Khe Sanh area, a probable artillery forward observer reported that the station bunker had been collapsed by bombs but that "all was secure." On 9 February an unidentified artillery element reported that three days would be required to complete the mission if weather conditions were favorable. Numbered targets for possible registration fire have now reached 55, each with a probable target description and an unknown type of ten-digit coordinates.

The 27th Independent Battalion continues harassment and small-scale attacks along Route 9 in coordination with other PAVN units. The 7th Company reported that Route 9 was blocked on 9 February after Companies 5 and 8 had struck Allied units on the road, killing 25, wounding 4 and destroying one tank. The company later reported killing 10 more Americans and wounding 4 the night of 9 February. Coordination with other PAVN units in the battalion's tactical area of responsibility continues to be reflected in 27th Battalion communications. On 9 February a battalion element mentioned 21 snipers from the 270th Regiment. In a message on 10 February an element of the battalion requested that "Bach Dang," possibly the 320th Division, be informed that one man of the 1st Battalion, 98th Regiment had been wounded in the attack against Cam Lo and requested stretcher bearers be sent for him. In a message on 9 February signed by the Chief of Staff, Song Cau (unidentified cover designator) the same element stated that the unit had stationed one battalion in the area of Tho Zuan (16-51N 107-02E, YD 160639), Thien Chanh (16-51N 107-02E, YD 165641) and Quang Xa (16-53N 107-02E, YD 158678) but had not yet crossed south of Route 9 as had been previously discussed.

Communications of the PAVN 803rd Regiment on 8 February included detailed reconnaissance reporting of Allied positions at Quan Ngang (16-53N 107-05E, YD 222678) including strength figures, obstacles, fortifications and locations of weapon emplacements. On 9 February the 3rd Battalion reported it had

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sent a team with two B-41 rocket launchers to a point 1.5 km from the Cua Viet channel entrance (probably near 16-54N 107-11E, YD 695325) to fire at vessels. In a possible counter-sweep operation, Company 1 of the 3rd Battalion was ordered by the battalion to attack and block Allied forces from Hoang Ha (16-54N 107-10E, YD 300685) to Lam Xuan (16-54N 107-09E, YD 285688) and to bombard the "enemy" north of Hill 17 (16-55N 107-09E, YD 276727). Three hours later an element of the 3rd Battalion reported that Company 1 had become lost and suffered four dead and seven wounded because of mines. A message from the 3rd Battalion to the 803rd Regiment reported forces present as 270 men. An 11 February message indicated possible plans for the 1st Battalion to move south of the river during the night. This message further revealed that "significant" combat would take place during a period of time to be "determined by the Fatherland." The regiment continued to admonish the battalion to strive in gaining "great accomplishments."

(2/G11/VCM/T1185-68, 111123Z; T1159-68, 100421Z; R288-68, 100700Z)
~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

PAVN Rear Services

The receipt of aviation fuel by an unlocated PAVN Rear Services element designated N10 was indicated in SIGINT of 8 February. On that date messages from N10 to an unidentified Rear Services Element revealed the receipt of 159 barrels-- (100-liter type)--of aviation fuel weighing 14,310 kilograms. The ultimate destination or the specific type of fuel were not disclosed in the messages.

This is the first reference to aviation fuel seen in PAVN Rear Services communications and may be related to the recent SIGINT reflections of DRV air activity into the southern area of North Vietnam.

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PAVN High Command

Hq, PAVN 304th Infantry Division has been identified as the third subscriber on the new High Command traffic-passing group first noted on 5 February. The other two subscribers were previously identified as Hqs, PAVN 320th and 325C Divisions. The identification of the Hq, 304th along with the two other division headquarters means that High Command now has direct and regularly scheduled communications with the three PAVN divisions identified in SIGINT as deployed in the DMZ area.

(2/0/VCM/R80-68, 092135Z; 2/C11/VGJ/R040-68, 091339Z)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~3. DRV Transport Activity Over Northern South Vietnam

Additional analysis of SIGINT data relating to the 8 February flight of two North Vietnamese probable IL-14 transports to the northern area of South Vietnam indicates these aircraft were attempting to carry out a bombing mission. The two aircraft departed Hanoi Gia Lam during the evening hours and were apparently "covered" by at least two North Vietnamese MiG-21's as far south as the Thanh Hoa area. The two transports continued southward and approximately an hour after passing over the Vinh area were on an easterly heading. Adverse weather conditions apparently precluded the completion of the mission and both aircraft returned to Hanoi Gia Lam Airfield. Before landing both aircraft jettisoned their bomb loads; one in an undisclosed area and one in the Hoa Lac area.


Available SIGINT suggests that these aircraft flew in the same general area as the six North Vietnamese IL-14's which conducted probable resupply missions over northern South Vietnam on 7 February.

(2/02/VCA/R035-68, 070743Z and Follow-ups Thereof;
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