


~~TOP SECRET~~



3/O/STY/R39-68
14 February 1968
Dist: O/UT
(SEA SIGSUM 39-68)



THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

3/O/STY/R39-68
14 Feb 68 2115Z
DIST: O/UT

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report is presented in two sections; Section A summarizes significant developments noted throughout Southeast Asia during the period 7 through 13 February 1968; Section B summarizes those developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at the time of publication on 14 February. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Situation Summary	1

(SECTION A)

I. Communist Southeast Asia

A. Military

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam	4
2. DRV Communications	11



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

CONTENTS

PAGE




(SECTION B)

I. Communist Southeast Asia

A. Military

- 1. Vietnamese Communist Communications -
South Vietnam 19
- 2. DRV Communications. 24



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

3/0/STY/R39-68

SITUATION SUMMARY

(SECTION A)

The Central Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi and subordinate Viet Cong (VC) Party elements in South Vietnam were observed exchanging an unusually high volume of messages during the past week. Activity in Military Region (MR) 5 was highlighted by continued maneuvering of Vietnamese Communist units near major cities in the western highlands and the coastal provinces and by indications of impending attacks in western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. Military Intelligence elements in MR 1 reported on Allied activity and results of Communist attacks in Binh Duong and Long Khanh Provinces and the Hq, VC 274th Regiment, VC 5th Light Infantry Division in Bien Hoa Province reactivated communications with two of its battalion subordinates. Two military entities effected major relocations in MR 3, and the deployment of several Communist entities was reflected in the Saigon area of MR 4.

PAVN communications during the past week were highlighted by continued pressure against the garrison at Khe Sanh, continued small-scale assaults by the 27th Independent Battalion and the southward movement of the PAVN 803rd and 812th Regiments. Also the headquarters, elements of the PAVN 304th, 320th and 325C Divisions have been identified as subscribers on a PAVN High Command-controlled traffic-passing group.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

(SECTION B)

Reflections of Allied tactical activity were contained in communications serving a number of Vietnamese Communist military units operating in MR 5's Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. The reidentification of a radio terminal as serving the probable Hq, VC 401st Sapper Regiment and continued reporting by military intelligence elements of the PAVN 1st Division in western Kontum Province were also noted. In MR 1, results of a Communist attack in northwestern Tay Ninh Province were passed to the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN by a subordinate.

In the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri Province, Communist plans for attacks on the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 13 and 14 February were revealed in SIGINT. In the eastern DMZ area, an element of the 27th Independent Battalion was noted complaining that the new men they received were deficient in military training. It was also disclosed that the approximately 150 men had only 90 individual weapons.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

SECTION A

I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Hanoi Communications

During the past week an unusually high volume of messages was noted being passed between the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi and subordinate VC Party elements in South Vietnam.

On 7 February 17 messages were passed between CEC and the secondary station of COSVN; 9 messages were originated by CEC and 8 were passed by COSVN's secondary station. During the past month, an average of one message per day has been observed on these communications.

On 8 February CEC passed six messages to the tentative Tri-Thien-Hue Regional Committee (RC-TTH).


On 9 February CEC passed approximately 33 messages to COSVN's secondary station. On the same day a high-echelon Party element, possibly CEC, was noted in increased message activity with a subordinate tentatively identified as RC-TTH. A total of 45 messages were exchanged between these stations; 31 were passed possibly by CEC and 14 were originated by the tentative RC-TTH. Two of these messages were subsequently passed from CEC to the COSVN secondary station with relay instructions indicating that they were originated by the tentative RC-TTH.

Also on 9 February, RC-5 passed 16 messages to CEC; this is the highest total noted on this link since 4 January.

(3/O/STY/R35-68; R36-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

The 10th and 11th Companies of the probable PAVN 6th Regiment have increased their harassment of Allied boats transporting supplies and troops into Hue on the Huong River. Armed with B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers and located in the vicinity of An Phu, northeast of Hue, the companies have reported firing on and sinking several vessels in their attempt to interdict the river. The companies have also reported striking the La Khe (16-30N 107-33E, YD 752263) area to destroy bunkers and kill Allied troops. In addition, the use of a tactical communications plan by PAVN elements in the Hue and Quang Tri city areas further indicates increased tactical activity in MR Tri-Thien-Hue.

(3/0/STY/R36-68; 2/0/VCM/R85-68, in preparation) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 5

During the past week throughout MR 5, Vietnamese Communist military units associated with major headquarters continued to maneuver near the key cities of Kontum, Dak To, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot in the western highlands; Da Nang and Hoi An in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area; Bong Son and Phu My in Binh Dinh Province; and Quang Ngai in Quang Ngai Province. In other instances military units reported their intent to move. Additionally, Vietnamese Communist communications in the western highlands revealed intentions to conduct additional attacks against Allied positions.

Communist plans for an impending mortar attack on the night of 8 or 9 February, or shortly thereafter, against Chu Boc in northwestern Pleiku Province were disclosed in messages exchanged between the PAVN B3 Front Authority located in the Kontum-Pleiku Province border area and the probable PAVN 1st Division element located in western Pleiku. The messages mentioned "Phase Two" and implied that this was the current phase of Communist offensive operations in the area.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

Further messages passed between these same two entities on 12 February disclosed plan for a mortar attack on Le Thanh in western Pleiku, to be conducted in the near future.

Plans for Communist attacks elsewhere in the western highlands were contained in messages passed between military intelligence (MI) elements of the PAVN 1st Division in Kontum Province. During the period 8-12 February messages passed between the probable forward element of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Hq, 1st Division and a subordinate contained instructions for the subordinate to reconnoiter the areas of Positions One and Two and to prepare a plan of operation against the Allies. The subordinate--located in the Dak To area--was also instructed on 12 February to "open fire if you have arrived at the location", to attack slowly and continuously, and to "control the airfield" (probably the Dak To Airfield). Prior to this activity, the MIS, Hq, 1st Division had instructed a subordinate to determine which of the two airfields at Dak To is used most frequently by the Allies. Elsewhere in Kontum Province, an MI authority associated with the B3 Front instructed a subordinate to maintain surveillance of Allied transportation activity in the vicinity of Kontum city.

Finally, a radio station previously referred to as a suspected artillery unit associated with the B3 Front has been tentatively identified as the Hq, PAVN 40th Artillery Regiment. This unit is currently located in Cambodia near the Kontum Province border.

(3/O/STY/R33-68; R34-68; R35-68; R36-68; R37-68; R38-68)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~


Military Regions 1/10

In MR 10, on 10 February, an unidentified headquarters--subordinate to the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN--was located in Cambodia just north of Phuoc Long Province border. This unidentified headquarters may be associated with an unidentified control authority in northern Phuoc Long suspected to be involved in logistics activities.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

Between 14 January and 4 February, another unidentified control authority--which communicates with a subordinate that may be associated with the possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division--relocated into southern Binh Long Province, approximately 50 km southeast of its former location in northeastern Tay Ninh Province.

In Binh Duong Province, MR 1, a subordinate of a watch group--whose control authority may be associated with the unidentified control authority in southern Binh Long--was located on 8 February in northeastern Binh Duong Province, about 54 km southeast of its 16 January position in northeastern Tay Ninh. Another subordinate of this watch group was initially located on 8 February in west-central Binh Duong. Subordinates on this watch group are associated with the possible Hq, 7th Division; Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 9th Light Infantry Division (LID); the unidentified possible Front Headquarters; and the probable Hq, VC 272nd Regiment.

A new Vietnamese Communist broadcast facility, first observed on 21 November 1967, was isolated in communications during the past week. The unidentified control authority--which has at least 14 subscribers--was located on 17 January to the east of the Michelin Plantation in northern Binh Duong Province, approximately 72 km from its 21 November location in Cambodia, north of Tay Ninh Province. Messages passed on the facility suggest that it serves a military function.

In other activity in the area, on 6 February, the possible Hq, MR 4 (SVN) passed one message to the possible Hq, 7th Division. The only other contact between these two elements occurred on 3 February when the division passed a message to the MR headquarters. This activity may be related to the relocation of the possible Hq, 7th Division to northern Binh Duong Province, where elements of the division may have been involved in tactical activity in the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area.

In military intelligence (MI) activity in Binh Duong, messages sent during the period 8 through 12 February between two MI elements--a control authority and a subordinate--located in central Binh Duong Province on 11 February, have continued to reflect Vietnamese Communist interest in Allied activity in the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area of Binh Duong. In messages of 12 February, the MI control authority

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

and its subordinate discussed Allied troop movements and Vietnamese Communist artillery activity in the area; in earlier messages the subordinate reported the results of two attacks against Allied positions in the area on 8 and 9 February. Messages since 1 February have indicated coordination between these MI elements and the possible Hq, 7th Division as well as the elements' apparent association with a 52nd Battalion. According to collateral there is a 52nd Battalion subordinate to the VC 69th Artillery Regiment.

Meanwhile a radio station serving Detached Element 1 of the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN was located on 8 February in central Binh Duong Province, approximately 57 km south of its 2 February position near the Binh Long-Tay Ninh Province-Cambodia tri-border area.

To the east, reports that the 1st Battalion, ARVN 43rd Regiment had been attacked and destroyed and that the provincial township of Xuan Loc had been attacked and occupied were contained in two messages of 7 February, sent to the MIS, VC 5th LID from a subordinate probably located in Long Khanh Province.

To the south, another subordinate of the MIS, 5th LID was located approximately 18 km east of Bien Hoa on 11 February after having previously been located in southwestern Binh Tuy Province on 12 September 1967.

Hq, VC 274th Regiment, 5th LID, reactivated communications with two of its subordinates. The regimental headquarters attempted to contact the tentative Hq, VC 1st Battalion and the probable Hq, VC 2nd Battalion on 12 and 5 February respectively.

Finally, on 7 February the tentative Hq, COSVN Rear Services Group 84 was observed in a volume of high message activity with three unidentified entities--located in Tay Ninh, Long Khanh, and Bien Hoa Provinces. The suspected Rear Services Headquarters moved from north-central Phuoc Tuy Province to the Phuoc Tuy-Bien Hoa Province border area between 27 January and 2 February.

(3/O/STY/R38-68; R37-68; R36-68; R35-68; R34-68; R33-68)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

Military Region 2

Since 4 February the alternate Hq, MR 2 has not been observed in communications with its subordinate main force units. Preliminary information indicates that a new signal plan may have been introduced in early February on the radio group joining the alternate headquarters with its subordinates.

In other activity, between 27 January and 6 February an unidentified subordinate of the alternate Hq, MR 2 moved approximately 19 km from southeastern Kien Phong Province to northwestern Dinh Tuong Province. The significance of this relocation cannot be determined; however, since late January a number of other MR 2 military entities--including the tentative My Tho and Long An Provincial Units, an element of the alternate Hq, MR 2, and the suspected VC 261st Battalion--have been noted in unusual moves, some of which may be related to recent VC tactical activities, particularly in Dinh Tuong Province.

During the past week SIGINT indicated the relocation of three provincial branches of the Liberation News Agency (LNA) within MR 2.

During the period 1-6 February the station serving the probable My Tho Branch of the LNA relocated to [10-26N 106-11E (XS 307520)] eastern Dinh Tuong Province near the My Tho Provincial Committee. Since 1 February SIGINT has indicated a concentration of VC radio terminals in eastern Dinh Tuong Province.

The Long An Provincial Branch (LAPC) of the LNA moved from its 30 January location in western Hau Nghia Province, Cambodia to central Long An Province. On 7 February the LAPC was located near Highway 4, approximately 3 km west of Binh Chanh at 10-36N 106-31E (XS 661719).

On 4 February the station serving the probable Ben Tre Provincial Branch of the LNA was located at 10-16N 106-25E (XS 560351)

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

approximately 9 km north of its 1 February location in northern Kien Hoa Province.

(3/0/STY/R34-68, R33-68, 2/G10/VCM/R77-68, 110714Z; 2/G10/VCJ/R41-68, 111650Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 4

During the past week, SIGINT reflected the deployment of a number of Vietnamese Communist entities near Saigon. The tentative Long An Provincial Unit (LAPU) was located on 6 February just south of Saigon, approximately 6 km south of its 4 February position near the Cholon sector. This unit moved into the Saigon area between 1 and 2 February and may have been involved in recent Communist tactical activities in that area. In addition, a concentration of unidentified entities which had been located near Saigon--in proximity to the tentative LAPU--through 5 February, also moved southward and as of 7 February were located near the LAPU, the Region 4 Committee, and an unidentified subordinate of the Main Office of the Liberation News Agency.

Two unidentified entities--one of which may be associated with the suspected Hq, PAVN 101st Regiment--were located on 7 February in an area immediately north of Saigon. On 8 February an unidentified control authority, which communicates with two unidentified and unlocated subordinates, was located in the same general area and in proximity to an element of the MIS of Hq, MR 1.

(3/0/STY/R35-68; R34-68; R33-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 3

During the past week, SIGINT revealed that two military entities in MR 3 had relocated at least 80 km since mid-December 1967. On 6 February an unidentified entity which may be associated with the MAS of the Region 3 Committee (RC-3) was located in southern Phong Dinh Province, approximately 80 km northeast of its 16 December location in southern Kien Giang Province; and on 8 February the possible Hq, MR 3 was also located in southern Phong Dinh, approximately 85 km from its 16 December position in the Kien Giang-An Xuyen Province border area. The moves of these two entities

-10-

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

closely paralleled the move of the MAS, RC-3 which occurred during the same time frame.

(3/O/STY/R35-68; R34-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

PAVN artillery communications in the Khe Sanh area reflected reconnaissance of Allied activity, target coordinates and requests for artillery bombardment results. On 9 February it was reported that an unspecified mission would be completed in three days if the weather was favorable.

Unidentified elements of the PAVN 101D Regiment also continue active in reconnaissance of Khe Sanh. On 9 February it was reported that the Khe Sanh Combat Base was being "actively reinforced." One helicopter was reportedly destroyed and fire damaged on 12 February as a result of artillery fire, and the shoot-down of one unspecified type of aircraft was claimed on 13 February.

On 8 February elements of the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment reported on Allied artillery emplacements at Tan Lam (16-46N 106-52E, XD 986552) and suggested artillery be fired on the emplacements from the north.

The PAVN 90th Regiment has been observed in tactical communications since 7 February when it was indicated that all three of its battalions either had recently or were about to relocate to undetermined areas. A message of 7 February provided the initial SIGINT identification of an 8th Independent Battalion, believed to be subordinate to the DMZ Front.

Farther east, communications of the 27th Independent Battalion during the week disclosed plans for tactical activity in coordination with other units in the area along Route 9. A message of 7 February informed the battalion that its mission for

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

8 February was to interdict Route 9 and surround Cam Lo. Detailed instructions included orders to request assistance possibly from the PAVN 320th Division if the battalion's firepower was too weak. A 6 February message revealed plans to use guerrillas and local forces from the Cua area (16-45N 106-58E, YD 0952) to strike popular forces at Cam Chinh Township (16-52N 106-59E, YD 1151) on 8 or 9 February. Messages on 9 February disclosed that the 27th Battalion would receive additional snipers from the PAVN 270th Regiment and that a unit designated "SONG CAU" had sent one battalion to the area of Tho Xuan (16-50N 107-03E, YD 195625), Thien Chanh (16-51N 107-02E, YD 165641) and Quang Xa (16-53N 107-02E, YD 158678). This same "SONG CAU" unit reportedly killed 50 Americans and 20 ARVNs and destroyed 3 tanks on 5 February. A message on 10 February revealed that a man from "the 1st Battalion, 98th Regiment," had been wounded in an attack on Cam Lo. During the week elements of the 27th Battalion struck at Cam Giang (16-51N 107-06E, YD 2464) and Tan Truc (16-48N 107-02E, YD 180615) and the company executive officer was reported killed in another action.

Tactical communications serving the PAVN 803rd Regiment indicate the 3rd Battalion and regimental headquarters followed by the 1st Battalion have crossed the Cua Viet River between 16-50N 107-06E, (YD 267643) and 16-50N 107-07E (YD 272642). On 11 February a message from the 1st Battalion revealed that regimental headquarters was at Gia Do (16-50N 107-07E, YD 275635) and Thanh Liem (16-50N 107-09E, YD 289630), and that the 3rd Battalion, previously located at Gia Do and Phan Xa (16-49N 107-08E, YD 290628) was moving south. Prior to these river crossings, the battalions active immediately north of the Cua Viet River engaged in harassing Allied shipping and reportedly destroyed ten barges and boats between 5 and 8 February. The 3rd Battalion revealed on 7 February that Allied forces would be sweeping the area north of the Cua Viet River between 5 and 22 February and the 3rd Company was ordered to join with local forces in blocking this sweep. On 8 February detailed reconnaissance reports concerning Allied Emplacements in Quan Ngang (16-53N 107-05E, YD 222678) which included strength figures, obstacles, fortifications and locations of weapon emplacements were submitted to the regiment. On 11 February the

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

regiment informed the 1st Battalion that "there will be significant combat during the period to be determined by the Fatherland... maintain absolute secrecy and security," and further mentioned plans for crossing the river during the night.

Communications serving elements possibly of the PAVN 812th Regiment are reflecting reconnaissance and offensive activities in the area of Quang Tri city and to the south along Route 1. In a 6 February message a request was made for men who were familiar with the Tri Buu area (160-45N 107-11E, YD 345535), and on 9 February interest was expressed in a probable "culvert" located at Tan Truong (16-39N 107-17E, YD 450420). Activities appear to include attacks against local villages and camps and active air defense against low flying aircraft. A 9 February message mentioned a mission of cutting routes of communications and the consolidation of local forces. In a message of 11 February to an unidentified Sapper Group 7, it was reported the 6th Battalion had organized to strike Ben Da (unlocated) on the night of 9 February. Group 7 was ordered to organize for strikes in accordance with "orders from the Front."

(3/O/STY/R33-68; R34-68; R35-68; R36-68; R37-68; R38-68)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

PAVN High Command

The headquarters elements of three PAVN divisions--the 304th, 320th and 325C, all of which have been located in the DMZ area--have been identified as the three subscribers on a High Command-controlled traffic passing group. This communications group, observed since 5 February, and a second new High group comprised of Hq, PAVN 29th, 90th and 803rd Regiments provide High Command with direct and regularly scheduled communications with PAVN elements deployed to the DMZ area, as well as the means for coordinated actions.

(2/O/VCM/R08-68, 092135Z; 3/O/STY/R32-68, R36-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

Overland Infiltration

Additional SIGINT had indicated that the probable Hq, 559th Transportation Group passed a total of 90 messages to four subordinates and received a total of 38 messages on 9 February. This message activity is three times the daily average observed between the headquarters and these subordinates. Also involved in high message activity was the A Shau Valley Rear Services Headquarters. This headquarters was noted receiving at least 56 messages from Units 32 and 127 between 2-6 February.

Reflections of activity by unidentified PAVN engineer elements in the A Shau Valley decreased from that of the previous week. Communications indicate, however, that activity continues in the A Luoi (16-16N 107-13E, YD 3800) and A Shau air strip (16-17N 107-20E, YC 5084) areas. Unidentified "Company 645" and a 6th Engineer Battalion have been mentioned operating in the vicinity of the A Shau air strip and the company was to be responsible for "lighting fires on the strip." An unidentified "storehouse 61" has been mentioned several times as located in the A Luoi area.


(3/0/STY/R37-68; R35-68; R33-68 ; R32-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~


3/0/STY/R39-68



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68




~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

2/0/STW/p20-68




~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~



VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

SECTION B

I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

In the Hue area, on 12 February an unidentified battalion of the probable PAVN 6th Regiment reported that all companies would withdraw to An Hoa (possibly Ap An Hoa, 16-27N 107-32E, YD 7120) "the sooner the better". The companies were to be met at An Hoa where they would be met and led to an unspecified assembly area. Additionally B-41 rocket launcher teams were to be positioned in Thanh Phuoc (16-32N 107-32E, YD 752290) to fire at vessels on the Huong River. The 10th Company, 6th Regiment, was later instructed to ignore these instructions and to await further orders.


Military Region 5

Communications serving Vietnamese Communist military units operating in eastern Quang Nam Province continue to reflect Allied tactical activity being conducted in that area. Hq, PAVN 2nd Division, last located on 10 February near 15-54N 108-10E (AT 982589), reported on 13 February that it was in a difficult situation and engaged in combat. On the same date the 2nd Division Forward Element, located near 15-43N 108-11E (AT 990384) on 12 February, indicated that it was in a difficult situation, under attack and about to move. Hq, VC 1st Regiment, PAVN 2nd Division, located on 11 February near 15-55N 108-14E (BT 037595), reported on 13 February that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment, and 43 minutes later, that it was engaged in combat. On 12 February, the probable Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion, located near 15-58N 108-03E (AT 844666) on 7 February, reported that it was on the move.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

Captured Vietnamese Communist signal documents have confirmed the SIGINT identifications of the radio stations serving Hq, VC 1st and PAVN 3rd and 21st Regiments of the PAVN 2nd Division currently operating in Quang Nam Province; the documents also confirmed the identification of the radio station serving the 2nd Division Forward Element.

To the south, the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit, last located on 7 February in eastern Quang Tin Province near 15-29N 108-23E (BT 203128), indicated on 13 February that it was in a difficult situation and surrounded.

A radio terminal, observed in SIGINT since 6 June 1967 and previously identified as a possible rear services element, has been reidentified as the probable Hq, VC 401st Sapper Regiment. This headquarters, last located on 13 February near 15-09N 108-42E (BS 539750), approximately 10 km west of Quang Ngai city in eastern Quang Ngai Province, presently communicates with Hq, MR 5 and two unidentified terminals which appear to be subordinates. Both of these possible subordinates--located on 27 December near 15-22N 108-17E (BS 084983) in southern Quang Tin and on 28 January near 15-05N 108-37E (BS 455681) in central Quang Ngai--also maintain sporadic skip-echelon communications with Hq, MR 5. In addition, the probable Hq, 401st Sapper Regiment communicates with a third unidentified radio terminal, located on 9 February near 15-25N 108-27E (BT 279060) in eastern Quang Tin.

In eastern Binh Dinh Province, an unidentified subordinate of the Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Binh Dinh Province, was located on 13 February near 13-56N 109-09E (CR 008396), about 16 km north-northwest of Qui Nhon, and about 18 km south-southeast of its 3 February location.

In the western highlands, the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element was located on 13 February in western Pleiku Province near 13-53N 107-33E (YA 752370), approximately 16 km north of its 12 February location and about 15 km northwest of Duc Co.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/STY/R39-68

In other activity in the western highlands, available SIGINT and collateral information has allowed a more positive identification of the radio station tentatively thought to be serving Hq, PAVN 24th Regiment, last located on 12 February approximately 12 km north of Kontum city. This unit will in the future be carried as probable Hq, PAVN 24th Regiment. Additionally, an unidentified terminal associated with the PAVN B3 Front was located in the Kontum-Pleiku Province border area near 14-13N 108-10E (AR 942722) on 12 February, reducing the validity of this unit's previously reported 44 km southward move between 9 and 11 February.

In a 13 February message to the MIS, 1st Division, a subordinate located in the Dak To area (near 14-41N 107-48E, ZB 001256 on 3 February) reported that "the enemy is occupying Hills 800 [14-42N 107-43E, YB 980270] and 700 [14-42N 107-45E, YB 977275]." The subordinate further stated that it had to withdraw to "coordinates 26/97 [probably equates to 14-42N 107-45E, YB 9726]" and that it had decided to go to "coordinates 24/97 [probably equates to 14-41N 107-45E, YB 9724] to continue the assignment." The subordinate also indicated that "E3" had completely withdrawn. "E" is the VC designator for regiment.

In another message of 13 February, the MIS instructed a second subordinate, located in Cambodia on 27 January near 14-35N 107-31E (YB 716146), to ascertain the location of an Allied 175-mm artillery piece which "often fires in a westerly direction and on our automobile road." The MIS also inquired whether Allied forces were located north of Ngoc Trinh Trong (14-44N 107-43E, YB 9430).

In activity of 13 February in the Dak To area, the probable forward element of the MIS, 1st Division instructed a subordinate "to send someone back to my location to receive a new assignment" and stated that it was sending a comrade to the subordinate's location "to publicize the new assignment." The probable forward element also reported a change in communications schedules with the

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

subordinate because it had to communicate "with the division." The probable forward element was located on 4 February in central Kontum near 14-34N 107-38E (YB 855136) and the subordinate, on 2 February in the same area near 14-31N 107-42E (YB 922065).

Finally, between 3 and 11 February, an unidentified Party-associated radio station in Darlac Province relocated approximately 15 km southwestward to a position near 12-31N 108-01E (AP 743849). The movements of this station normally coincide with those of the possible 3rd Battalion of the PAVN 33rd Regiment which was located near 12-32N 107-59E (ZU 251861) on 11 February.

(2/G12/VCM/R0467-68, 131520Z; R0466-68, 1315..Z; R0465-68, 131546Z; R0464-68, 131450Z; R0462-68, 130915Z; R0461-68, 131300Z; R0455-68, 130625Z; R0445-68 CHANGE ONE, 122147Z; T375-68, 132230Z; T368-68, 131520Z; T366-68, 131231Z; 2/G12/VCY/R005-68, 120600Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

In a message of 11 February to the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN, a subordinate located in northwestern Tay Ninh Province reported that "we attacked the Xa Nang [unlocated] intersection and bombarded" the outpost at the Lo Go (11-31N 105-53E, WT 9874) intersection. The subordinate further reported killing "more than 85 of the enemy", leveling two bunkers and 15 buildings, seizing a number of weapons, and possibly capturing one American. The Allied forces were reported to have withdrawn "in confusion." This subordinate has been reporting on Allied activity in northwestern Tay Ninh Province since mid-December 1967 and was last located near 11-38N 106-05E (XT 183858).

Since 5 February, an unidentified military radio station has been operating in southern Binh Duong Province within 5 km of Ben Cat. The station--active in communications since November 1967--was located in northern Bien Hoa Province through 19 January, and relocated to its current position near Route 13 in Binh Duong on 5 February; on 11 February it was located in this area at

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

11-08N 106-38E (XT 790300). This station communicates with an unidentified control authority which was located on 12 February in western Bien Hoa at 11-21N 106-48E (XT 960374).

(2/G10/VCM/T260-68, 130245Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 3

During the period 2 through 9 February six messages-- five of which were passed from a station tentatively identified as the Vinh Long Provincial Committee to an unidentified subordinate--reported the status of military operations in Vinh Long Province. The majority of the messages referred to the defeat and surrender of "enemy" troops and the capture of enemy weapons. In a message of 9 February it was reported that the enemy was preparing for an operation and the recipient was directed to prepare for the attacks.

(2/G10/VCM/T263-68, 131641Z; T264-68, 131650Z; T265-68, 131740Z; T267-68, 131838Z; T266-68, 131840Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

COSVN Communications

Between 1 and 12 February an unusually high volume of messages were passed on COSVN communications.

During this period, COSVN originated approximately 235 messages, 145 of which were sent to all subordinates. During January COSVN was noted passing only 280 messages, of which 165 were sent to all subordinates.

During the period 6 through 9 February COSVN passed approximately 77 messages to the tentative Region 10 Committee. During the past month an average of five messages per week has been noted on this link.

(3/O/STY/R37-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

Plans for Vietnamese Communist attacks on the Khe Sanh Combat Base on the night of 13 and 14 February were revealed in PAVN tactical voice communications of 13 February. At 1255Z on 13 February an unidentified PAVN entity was questioned by another unidentified element as to when the "concert" would begin at "Stage One." A reply of "on the nights of 13 and 14" was noted as well as the statement "you are to get ready at the airfield." Subsequently, the latter entity reported, ". . . tonight there will be a concert at A1." A1 is the designator used by the Vietnamese Communist for the Khe Sanh Combat Base. No other tactical communications have reflected PAVN plans for an attack on the dates noted above.

Also in the Khe Sanh area, according to PAVN artillery communications of 13 February the mission of "Ha Long" (an unidentified cover designator) is probably to be restriction of enemy activity and aircraft arrivals and departures.


A PAVN 101D Regiment--associated element reported on 13 February that Americans were located on Hill 903 (16-43N 106-33E, XD 758487), 11 km northwest of the combat base. Another element reported Allied activity including cargo drops and aircraft arrivals and the coordinates of two 105-mm gun emplacements as 41965 84190 (16-42N 106-44E, XD 850409) and 41875 84400 (16-42N 106-44E, XD 852408).

An unidentified element of the 27th Independent Battalion reported on 13 February that it had received 147 of 150 men assigned, and complained that the new men knew nothing at all about the military. The message further revealed that the men had received only two months training, spent two months moving down to the front, and that all of them were from the Cam Pha Mines in Quang Ninh Province. The group reportedly brought two pair of binoculars, 4 compasses, cooking pots, a "71B" radio and a

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

PAVN ELEMENTS IN THE KHE SANH AREA



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

telephone with 4,500 meters of wire but only 90 individual weapons. The unidentified element requested advice on resolving the equipment problem and training in military and political subjects.

Tenuous SIGINT reflects the possible movement by elements of the PAVN 304th Division in the Khe Sanh area. One subordinate was tenuously located near 16-35N 106-30E (XD 603325) on 12 February, indicating a westward move of approximately 22 km from its previous location in the vicinity of 16-28N 106-46E (XD 882231). A second subordinate effected an eastward move of approximately 17 km from its last location on 7 February near 16-43N 106-45E (XD 865404) to the vicinity of 16-37N 106-51E (YD 007390) on 13 February. A third element possibly relocated southward approximately 7 km from 16-34N 106-45E (XD 866318) on 9 February to 16-29N 106-42E (XD 845257) on 13 February. The division headquarters has remained in the area of 16-33N 106-44E (XD 845257) through 12 February.

The Hq, PAVN 325C Division and its three subordinate regiments--the PAVN 101D, 95C, and 29th--were last firmly located in the area of 16-45N 106-37E (XD 719429) on 13 February, 16-40N 106-42E (XD 820337) on 6 February, 16-41N 106-40E (XD 772456) on 27 January, and 16-38N 106-23E (XD 471400) on 11 January, respectively. The division headquarters continues to communicate with the 95C and 101D Regiments and an unidentified subordinate, using a tactical signal plan that has replaced the normal traffic-passing communications plan between the division and the 95C and 101D Regiments since 5 February. The 29th Regiment, last noted in communications with division headquarters on 22 January, currently communicates only with PAVN High Command. The 101D Regiment was also noted in communications on 5 February with an unidentified terminal, possibly of battalion level.

(2/O/VCM/R86-68, 141148Z; 2/G11/VCM/T1247-68, 131625Z)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/O/STY/R39-68

PAVN High Command

An unidentified subordinate of PAVN High Command was initially located on 11 February in the vicinity of 16-36N 106-16E (XD 357369) in Laos. This subordinate was first noted in communications with High Command on 26 January on the group which serves units and personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam.

(2/G11/VCM/R295-68, 11----Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Rear Services Communications

A Rear Services message of 11 February disclosed the movement of an unidentified unit (DOAN) 341. The message was sent to an unspecified relay station commander and stated in part that the unit was carrying out its assignment well, and had entered safely. The message further stated that the enemy had not attacked around the station.


~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~


3/0/STY/R39-68



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Non - Responsive

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~