TOP SECRET TRINE

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 19 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

In Military Region (MR) 5 of South Vietnam, SIGINT suggests that a mortar attack in western Pleiku Province that has been planned since early February may have been conducted. Elsewhere in MR 5, communications of major PAVN elements in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Binh Dinh Provinces continued to reflect contact with Allied forces. To the south in MR 1, military intelligence communications reflected continued interest in Allied activity in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Long Khanh Provinces. Finally, additional SIGINT strengthens the suggestion that the unidentified possible Front headquarters which has historically operated in Binh Long Province may have relocated to southern Binh Duong Province, just north of Saigon.

In the Khe Sanh area, elements associated with the PAVN 304th Division indicated the use of gas masks because of the reported use of gas agents by the enemy. Also a possible fire direction center associated with an unidentified PAVN artillery element in the Khe Sanh area was noted calling for fire on the Khe Sanh Airfield. In addition the reconnaissance element of the PAVN 325C Division reported that 26 rounds fired into the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 16 February had landed on target. In the eastern DMZ area, a message from the 812th Regiment suggested a further southward move of this unit to Hue.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5

QUANG NAM
- Hq, VC 1st Regiment
- Probable VC 402nd Sapper Battalion
- Hq, PAVN 2nd Division
- Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment
- Possible PAVN 3rd Regiment Associate
- Hq, PAVN 21st Regiment

QUANG TIN
- Probable Hq, 401st Sapper Regiment
- Quang Ngai

KONTUM

QUANG NGAI

BINH DINH
- Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element
- Hq, PAVN 3rd Division

PLEIKU
- Probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority
- Probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division Element
- Pleiku
- Lang Beng

- Da Nang
- Hoi An
- Pleiku
- Qui Nhon
- An Khe
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Messages exchanged on 18 February between PAVN B3 Front elements in western Pleiku Province indicated that the mortar attack being planned in that area since early February may have been conducted on 19 February. On 18 February the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element reported on Allied activity in the Lang Beng (13-53N 107-38E, YA 8436) area and stated that, "We are determined to mortar Lang Beng and ambush vehicles. Tonight Comrade MUON will go out to make a detailed assessment of the situation so that tomorrow we can Celebrate-the-Spring." A later message from the probable Hq, B3 Front authority to the probable 1st Division element stated that, "I approve of your plans for the Celebrate-the-Spring mortar attack on Lang Beng. Be sure to fire at the location of the enemy infantry. Do your utmost to use one B-40 [rocket] team, having one or two weapons, to ambush vehicles. You only need [to hit] one vehicle to make doing this worthwhile. Encourage the teams to carry out the mission with the greatest determination. Strike in such a way that you will be victorious. The platoon cadre will be in charge." The probable Hq, B3 Front authority was last located on 16 February near 14-04N 107-20E (YA 524567) and the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element was last located on the same day near 13-54N 107-36E (YA 803386).

Elsewhere in the western highlands, an element of Hq, B3 Front, Kontum Province, was located on 18 February in the Cambodia-Laos-Kontum Province border area near 14-25N 107-22E (YA 558961), about 15 km southwest of its 13 February location.

On 17 February in southern Kontum Province, a military intelligence (MI) control authority, possibly associated with the PAVN B3 Front, instructed a subordinate, last located on 25 December near 14-28N 108-05E (AS 860026), to disarm
Allied mines. The control authority, last located on 17 February near 14-29N 108-04E (AS 842038), stated that "it is necessary to move the mines in order to strike the enemy" and instructed the subordinate to put a pin in the hole of the detonator head of the mine so the mine would not explode. The subordinate was cautioned to be very careful when picking up the mines.

In a second message of the same date, the control authority ordered the subordinate to report to "E-24's reconnaissance [team]" and to "reconnoiter the enemy closely as usual." "E-24" is a probably reference to the PAVN 24th Regiment. The probable Hq, 24th Regiment was located on 12 February near 14-32N 108-00E (ZB 232082). The subordinate was also instructed to "return to E-24 to pick up rice" if it was necessary.

Additionally, on 17 February the control authority ordered this subordinate to "maintain close surveillance of the reactions of the enemy in the township and in the direction of Route 5." According to collateral, Route 5 runs in a northeasterly direction from Kontum city. The subordinate was further instructed to determine the positions of Allied "107.8 mortars, artillerymen and tanks, and the strength of the enemy arriving at the airfield."

In northern MR 5, major elements of the PAVN 2nd Division continue to maneuver in eastern Quang Nam and northeastern Quang Tin Provinces, and communications of the elements continue to reflect contact with Allied forces. On 18 February Hq, PAVN 2nd Division Main Force Unit Control reported that it was in a difficult situation and under attack. This headquarters, which has been moving generally northeastward since 14 February, was located on 18 February near 15-43N 108-09E (AT 965405). In the same area, Hq, PAVN 21st Regiment, 2nd Division, was located on 18 February near 15-43N 108-10E (AT 968392), about 18 km south of its 10 February location and approximately 26 km south-southwest of Hoi An. In northeastern Quang Tin Province a possible associate of the PAVN 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division,
was located on 18 February near 15-41N 108-20E (BT 153338), about 12 km southeast of its 14 February location and approximately 14 km north-northeast of Cam Y. The Hq, 3rd Regiment was last located on 10 February in eastern Quang Nam Province near 15-52N 108-10E (AT 984569).

The Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element was last located on 18 February near 15-42N 108-09E (AT 956395), and Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 1st Regiment, 2nd Division, was last located on 14 February near 15-51N 108-10E (AT 971540). In other activity in this area, the probable Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion was located on 16 February near 15-56N 108-01E (AT 807637) about 13 km southeast of its 9 February location in eastern Quang Nam Province.

To the south in central Quang Ngai Province, the probable Hq, VC 401st Sapper Regiment was located on 18 February near 15-10N 108-40E (BS 504756), approximately 19 km northeast of its 16 February position and about 18 km northwest of Quang Ngai city.

In central Binh Dinh Province the Hq, PAVN 3rd Division, last located on 15 February near 14-09N 108-54E (BR 733630) about 33 km northeast of An Khe, reported that it was in a difficult situation and under bombardment at 0200Z on 17 February. In this same area, Hq, MR 5 Forward Tactical Element, Binh Dinh Province, was last located on 18 February near 14-09N 108-51E (BR 678641), about 28 km northeast of An Khe and approximately 36 km west-northwest of its 17 February location.
Military Region 1

On 17 February, an unidentified terminal tentatively associated with the possible PAVN 7th Division and located near 11-13N 106-45E (XT 907393) in eastern Binh Duong Province, passed a message to a possible tactical control authority discussing Allied activity in the area of Inter-provincial Highway 1A and Provincial Highway 2A, and in the vicinity of Bong Trang (11-11N 106-39E, XT 8137).

On 18 February, another unidentified control terminal was located in eastern Binh Duong Province at 11-09N 106-46E (XT 919320), about 20 km east-southeast of its 2 February position. A subordinate of this control was also located on 18 February in northern Bien Hoa Province at 11-07N 106-47E (XT 951288), approximately 30 km southeast of its 13 February location in Binh Duong. Additionally, on 16 February, an unidentified station subordinate to a control authority -- located in Tay Ninh Province -- was located in eastern Binh Duong at 11-11N 106-48E (XT 959359), approximately 26 km southeast of its 11 February position. The control of this entity communicates on a watch group with stations possibly associated with the possible 7th Division and VC 9th Light Infantry Division (LID).

Elsewhere, on 16 February, Hq, VC 274th Regiment relocated 5 km west-northwest of its 15 February location at 10-58N 107-05E (YT 287144) in southwestern Long Khanh Province to a new position along the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province border, approximately 25 km east northeast of Bien Hoa Airbase, at 11-00N 107-03E (YT 244167).

Additional SIGINT information further suggests that the unidentified possible Front Headquarters, which has historically operated in Binh Long Province, may have relocated to an area just north of Saigon. On 15 February, the Front Headquarters was located in southern Binh Duong Province, approximately 90 km south of its 9 February position in Binh Long Province. A tentative location obtained on 17 February placed the
unidentified Front Headquarters in the general area of its 15 February position.

Vietnamese Communist military intelligence (MI) communications in MR 1 continue to reflect interest in Allied activity in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Long Khanh Provinces.

A Vietnamese Communist attack on Tay Ninh city (11-18N 106-05E, XT 1948) was reported in a message of 18 February from the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) of COSVN to a subordinate located on 27 January near 11-29N 106-13E (XT 330698), approximately 23 km northeast of Tay Ninh city. MIB COSVN directed all "groups" to maintain close surveillance of Allied reactions to the attack. According to collateral a Communist attack on Tay Ninh city was conducted on 16 February.

In a congratulatory message of 17 February to the same subordinate, MIB COSVN praised the "victories" that "contributed meritoriously toward the common victory," and called for "greater victories." MIB COSVN reported that "the chief of the Party committee of the bureau [COSVN]" had directed the comrades "to endeavor to struggle with even more enthusiasm, being unafraid of sacrifice or hardship." MIB COSVN conveyed to the subordinate a commendation from the Chief of the Party committee for the subordinate's successes.

In a message of 18 February, a Vietnamese Communist MI element reported to its unidentified control authority that on the previous night it had fired on "five predetermined targets at Lai Khe [11-12N 106-39E, XT 7737]." The element further stated that "the comrades" were continuing to observe and report on "new enemy activities." This element had reported to the control authority on 17 February that "eight artillery pieces and vehicles are concentrated on the hill at coordinates XT 7590036500 [11-11N 106-37E]." This subordinate has been reporting on the Lai Khe-Ben Cat (11-09N 106-35E, XT 7433) area since early February, and had indicated an association with the PAVN 7th Division. Both the subordinate and the control authority were located in central Binh Duong Province.
at 11-10N 106-37E (XT 753343) on 11 February and 11-15N 106-37E (XT 658437) on 14 February, respectively.

Intensive interest in Allied air and ground activities at Xuan Loc (10-56N 107-15E, YT 4609) in Long Khanh Province, was revealed in a series of message on 16, 17, and 18 February to the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 5th LID, from a subordinate.

In a message of 16 February, the subordinate reported on Allied construction and transportation in the vicinity of Xuan Loc and mentioned troops of the ARVN 18th Division and the ARVN 52nd Ranger Battalion. According to collateral both of these units maintain headquarters in Xuan Loc.

In a later message of 18 February, the subordinate reported that "80 to 100 laborers go down each day to dig trenches" and indicated that bulldozers were widening a field.

The MIS and its subordinate were located on 17 February in central Long Khanh at 11-06N 107-15E (YT 452280) and southern Long Khanh at 10-49N 107-29E (YS 729969), respectively.

Finally, it has become apparent that MI elements of the VC 275th Regiment, VC 5th LID -- namely, the MI element of the regimental headquarters and a subordinate (both unlocated) -- reappeared in communications since at least 2 February after being inactive since October 1967; however, these elements apparently have not resumed reporting.

Military Region 3

On 18 February the radio station serving the probable Vinh Long Provincial Branch (VLPB) of the Liberation News Agency was located at 10-05N 105-56E (XS 058 158) in eastern
Vinh Long Province near the probable Vinh Long Provincial Committee. The probable VLPB had been located in the same vicinity on 13 February. A previously reported relocation of this station to western Phong Dinh Province was found to be invalid.

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

In the Khe Sanh area, PAVN tactical voice communications of 17 February reflected the use of gas masks by elements tentatively associated with the PAVN 304th Division. On that date, one of these elements directed a 12th and 14th Battalion to distribute gas masks to their units, because gas agents are reportedly being used by "the enemy". On 16 February a possible fire direction center associated with unidentified PAVN artillery elements -- in the vicinity of Khe Sanh -- was noted calling fire on helicopters landing at the Khe Sanh Airfield. It was revealed that 12 helicopters and "one big guest" -- a possible reference to fixed wing aircraft -- were the targets to be fired on. Additionally, a possible reconnaissance element of the PAVN 325C Division reported on 16 February that 26 rounds had landed on target in the radar, command post, runway and helicopter areas of Khe Sanh Combat Base.

In the central DMZ, an element of the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment on 19 February mentioned attacking 241 (Camp Carroll, 16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543), stating a "mountain cannon" (probable reference to 75-mm howitzer) would occasionally fire one round to "create tension."

In a message on 18 February, the 27th Independent Battalion reported achievements of the battalion from 19 January to 15 February. The battalion claimed 208 Allied troops -- including 164 Americans -- and 25 possible government officials killed;
14 vehicles and 1 bridge destroyed on Route 9 and various types of equipment captured. Other messages indicate the 5th Company will probably be the company attached to BACH DANG (possibly the PAVN 320th Division) for an unspecified battle.

In the eastern DMZ area, on 18 February the 1st Battalion, PAVN 803rd Regiment, was ordered to have two reconnaissance men coordinate with a local resident to examine the terrain of unidentified area "T3." The 1st Battalion is believed to be operating in the general vicinity of Quang Tri city. Also on 18 February, in a message from the PAVN 812th Regiment probable further southward movement by the regiment was indicated when mention was made of the regimental headquarters and possible subordinate regiment support Companies 14, 15, 16, and 17 "going to Hue," moving during the day without stopping.

(2/G11/VCM/T1337-68, Change One, 181640Z, T1347-68, 182210Z)

PAVN High Command

On 15 February eight messages of an unusual type, all of a "very high" precedence, were sent from PAVN High Command to the unidentified and unlocated station which is associated with the major unidentified High Command complex. This is the second significant increase in volume of these unusual messages since the activity was first noted on 3 December 1967. On 4 February, a total of 10 messages, were noted, after which an average volume of from 3 to 4 messages per day was resumed. This unidentified station continues to be the only subordinate of High Command receiving the unusual messages, since they previously had been noted only between High Command and the PAVN 320th Division headquarters prior to that unit's deployment in mid-November.

An unidentified subordinate of PAVN High Command on the group serving units and personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam has relocated in a south-easterly direction to the area of 16-11N 107-05E (YC 217924). This new location,
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noted on 18 February, represents a move of approximately 18 km from the former location in the area of 16-14N 106-58E (YC 055 979), also in Laos near the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, South Vietnam.

(3/0/STY/R40-68; R26-68) (SECRET SAVIN)

DRV Naval Activity

An apparent interest in an aircraft carrier transporting A6A-type aircraft and three additional aircraft carriers transporting an undetermined type of aircraft was exhibited in a fragmentary North Vietnamese Naval message of 17 February. In addition, the Bai Chay Forward Area Command Post on Cac Ba Island warned all units to avoid mines and delayed-action bombs and to take precautions against enemy strikes at night.

(2/Q1/VCN/T006-68, 170824Z) (SECRET SAVIN)

Overland Infiltration

Communications of a possible A Shau Valley engineer element on 18 February mentioned road construction which would enable GAZ-63 trucks to travel from Route 12 to Ta Luong (16-18N 107-23E, YD 5503) on 20 February. (SECRET SAVIN)