


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3/O/STY/R46-68
22 February 1968
DIST: O/UT
SEA SIGSUM 46-68

SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 22 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY


Recent messages exchanged between military intelligence elements of the PAVN 1st Division and PAVN B3 Front have indicated impending Communist attacks in two areas of Kontum Province in South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5. Activity in MR 1 was highlighted by the relocations of the possible Hq, 165th Regiment, PAVN 7th Division and the division's suspected forward element in southern Binh Duong Province, while in MR 4, the probable Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 273rd Regiment, VC 9th Light Infantry Division, has moved southward to a position near the city limits of Saigon.

In the western DMZ area, Communist artillery fire continued to be called on helicopter landing zones at the Khe Sanh airstrip. To the east, the PAVN 803rd Regiment is maintaining its pressure against Allied forces near Quang Tri city and its interdiction of shipping in the Cua Viet channel. SIGINT indicates that the Hq, 812th Regiment has remained in the same general area since 12 February.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5



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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

Communications serving PAVN engineer elements in the A Shau Valley indicate the possible introduction of new engineer elements into that area. On 21 February messages mentioned an unidentified 520th Battalion with two tons of explosives being sent to Ta Luong (16-18N 107-23E, YD 5503) and one company of an unidentified 512th Battalion being sent to assist in road construction at Lang Ngot (unlocated).

Military Region 5

In east-central Quang Tin Province, the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit informed an unidentified subordinate on 20 February that it was in a difficult situation. This unit was located on 18 February near 15-31N 108-22E (BT 176163), 15 km southwest of Tam Ky.

In central Quang Ngai Province, a possible rear services element was located near 15-02N 108-43E (BS 551621), 58 km southeast of its 27 December location and 15 km southwest of Quang Ngai city.

In Darlac Province, a PAVN B3 Front-Associated element was located on 20 February in the vicinity of 12-30N 107-55E (ZU 181820), 25 km southwest of Ban Me Thuot and 12 km north-northeast of its position four days earlier. An unidentified subordinate of the Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control was located near 12-03N 108-18E (BQ 072057) on 21 February, 31 km northeast of this terminal's position on 17 February and 27 km east of Ban Me Thuot.

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In Kontum Province, recent messages exchanged between military intelligence (MI) elements of the PAVN 1st Division and MI elements possibly associated with the PAVN B3 Front have indicated impending Communist attacks against Allied positions near the Dak To area and Kontum city. In a 21 February message to the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 1st Division, an unlocated subordinate reported that "now the opportunity to strike is very good because at present the enemy has moved" to the east of "PL," possibly Plei Lang Lo (14-40N 107-41E, YB 902223). The subordinate stated that a reconnaissance team had arrived in "PL" and was observing "the ground situation there and the enemy situation west of PL." The subordinate further indicated that there was one Allied squad and one 81-mm mortar there.

On 22 February the MIS told this subordinate that "the directives of the political commissar of the division were for the comrades to fight for the completion," probably of the mission, "the sooner, the better." The MIS further stated that "there is much that is favorable" and that it was a "good opportunity." The subordinate was instructed to "guarantee victory." The MIS also directed the subordinate to send someone to meet the detachment which had arrived on 20 February bringing medicine. In another message of 21 February, the MIS instructed a second subordinate, located on 15 February near 14-39N 107-42E (YB 921229), to report in detail on the Allied position at Dak Ro Keng (14-41N 107-42E, YB 920264), approximately 3 km north of this subordinate's location. The MIS requested information about the number of artillery pieces, bunkers, tents, sheet metal houses, and rows of barbed wire as well as the Allied strength there. In an earlier message of the same date, the subordinate reported to the MIS on Allied ground and air transportation in the vicinity of Dak Ro Keng and Hill 751 (14-43N 107-39E, YB 874290 or 14-42N 107-40E, YB 880273).

Messages passed during the period 17 to 21 February between B3 Front-associated elements have indicated possible plans to attack Kontum city and have discussed plans for appraising Allied

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reaction capability and determining the locations of Allied mortars, artillery, and tanks. The attacks possibly will involve elements of the PAVN 24th Regiment the headquarters of which was located on 15 February near 14-28N 108-01E (AS 794020) and the probable Kontum Provincial Unit, located on 18 February near 14-26N 108-08E (AR 901984).

To the south, the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority and the probable 1st Division element have continued to discuss plans to attack Le Thanh (13-50N 107-40E, YA 8930) in western Pleiku Province. A message of 20 February cautioned the 1st Division element not to strike any position where there are no people. On the following day, the 1st Division element reported that orders had been followed, and that every means had been explored to determine a means of penetrating the Le Thanh area. This report also suggested that villagers were to be urged to enter Le Thanh at 1300 (0600Z) on 21 February, and mentioned at "new Le Thanh." Less than two hours later, the B3 Front Authority reprimanded the 1st Division element for being "too slow in carrying out your orders . . ." and indicated that it was necessary to find a way to make contact with the people to destroy the post. Shortly thereafter, the 1st Division element reported that "we are determined to carry out the mission," and indicated that a detachment had gone to inspect for accuracy at the "new Le Thanh". This message also reported that if the enemy were to withdraw from the "old Le Thanh", "Comrade NGHIA will urge the people to go in and strike with heavy weapons." A final message from the B3 Front authority, on 21 February, requested that special emphasis be placed on determining how the enemy is dealing with the situation, and whether additional mortar attacks would be necessary. The 1st Division element was informed that it could move closer to Le Thanh to facilitate the "leadership of the task." The probable, Hq, B3 Front Authority was located by SIGINT near 14-04N 107-20E (YA 524567) on 16 February, and the probable 1st Division element near 13-53N 107-34E (YA 787363) on 21 February.

Finally, in Binh Dinh Province a subordinate of the MIS, MR 5

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was located by SIGINT on 21 February near 13-52N 108-38E (BR 453335), approximately 11 km south of An Khe and about 15 km north of this element's 8 February position.

(2/G12/VCM/R549-68, 211922Z; R548-68, 211905Z; R547-68, 211710Z; R546-68, 211511Z; 2/G12/VCM/T456-68, 212145Z; T451-68, 210920Z; T445-68, 211030Z; T437-68, 200238Z; T444-68, 210720Z; T459-68, 220655Z; T454-68, 212025Z; T447-68, 211235Z; T446-68, 211237Z; 2/O/VCM/R100-68, 212214Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

Between 7 and 22 February, the tentatively identified Hq, PAVN 165th Regiment, PAVN 7th Division moved about 21 km south-eastward to a position in southern Binh Duong Province near 11-18N 106-40E (XT 818499), approximately 14 km west of Phuoc Vinh.

On 21 February the suspected 7th Division Forward Element was located in the same general area near 11-13N 106-45E (XT 906396), approximately 12 km southeast of its 4 February position. This new location places the possible forward element about 18 km east-northeast of Ben Cat (11-10N 106-36E, XT 750340) and 14 km east of Lai Khe (11-11N 106-34E, XT 720370).

Recently, messages passed on a communications group suspected to be associated with the 7th Division have discussed tactical operations being conducted by elements of that division in the area. Military Intelligence messages since 2 February have reported on Communist tactical activity in the vicinity of Lai Khe, mentioning coordinated operations with elements of the PAVN 7th Division.

(2/G10/VCM/R115-68, 220049Z; R117-68; 2/O/VCM/R99-68, 212206Z)
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Military Region 4

The probable Hq, VC 273rd Regiment, VC 9th Light Infantry Division, has effected a major southward move to a position near the city limits of Saigon. The probable regimental headquarters was located on 22 February approximately 2 km east of Tan Son Nhut Airfield in the vicinity of 10-49N 106-42E (XS 853962), about 107 km south of its last firm SIGINT location in western Binh Long Province near 11-45N 106-24E (XT 538982) on 23 January.

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

PAVN tactical voice communications in the Khe Sanh vicinity continue to reveal Communist artillery fire being called on helicopter landing zones at the Khe Sanh airstrip. On 21 February, a possible fire direction center in communications with a possible artillery position indicated fog was hindering observation of the airfield from at least 0200Z until 0600Z. Nevertheless, the fire direction center directed the guns to prepare to fire into the helicopter area using 16 rounds.

In other voice communications of 21 February, a possible 14th Battalion--recently noted in these communications--reported air-strikes on the position held by "the first platoon, first company." Reportedly, three personnel were killed, including a squad leader.

SIGINT indicates that, since late January, a suspect infantry regiment of the PAVN 304th Division has been divided into two elements, both of which utilize identical signal plans. One element, which communicated with both Hq, Khe Sanh Area Front (KSAF) and Hq, PAVN 304th Division in January, has been noted in communications only with Hq, KSAF in February and is believed to be the suspect infantry regiment, PAVN 304th Division. It has remained in the same general area since mid-January, and was last located on 20 February at 16-41N 106-30E (XD 600444). The other element was

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initially observed in SIGINT on 7 February when it was located at 16-36N 106-39E (XD 770370). This element, which communicates only with Hq, PAVN 304th Division, was subsequently located at 16-34N 106-42E (XD 806314) and 16-31N 106-45E (XD 861269) on 17 and 20 February, respectively, indicating continued south-eastward movement.

Communications of the PAVN 803rd Regiment on 21 February reflected continuing pressure against Allied forces near Quang Tri city. The possible 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion reported it had sunk a large boat transporting ammunition on the Cua Viet channel near Thanh Xuan (16-51N 107-08E, YD 287648) with B-41 rocket fire. The company reported its location as Giao Liem (16-50N 107-08E, YD 286641), and was engaged in ammunition replenishment from across the river at Vinh Quang (16-52N 107-08E, YD 268660). Another 3rd Battalion subordinate reportedly struck an ARVN unit at 1000 (GOLF) 20 February, killing 70 while suffering casualties of one dead and one wounded. Companies 1 and 2 of the 3rd Battalion were indicated to have withdrawn at daybreak after attacking an American company at Phu Luu (16-48N 107-10E, YD 324588) the night of 20 February.


SIGINT indicated the Hq, 812th Regiment was located on 21 February near 16-40N 107-20E (YD 478437), the same general location of this unit since 12 February.

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


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