TOP SECRET

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 26 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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References to PAVN artillery and tanks were contained in communications serving PAVN engineer elements operating along Route 547 in the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue. In MR 5, SIGINT continues to indicate impending attacks by Vietnamese Communist forces against Allied positions in western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, while in MR 1, Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 5th Light Infantry Division has moved to a position near the 9th Light Infantry Division Headquarters in Bien Hoa Province.

PAVN activity in the DMZ area has been concerned with impending attacks on Allied positions. Mentioned in communications was an unspecified type of attack scheduled for 27 February in the Khe Sanh area. Farther east, plans for an attack against An Lac--in the Dong Ha area--were indicated by an element of the PAVN 27th Independent Battalion.

In Military Region 4 (North Vietnam) an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element reported the movement of four battalions of artillery, possibly along Route 1A.
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

Communications serving unidentified PAVN engineer elements in the A Shau Valley have indicated that Route 547 to the Hue area may be used for both resupply and infiltration of artillery and armor. On 26 February an unidentified element of the 4th Battalion informed the 4th Company that 13 vehicles delivering supplies for "Tri-Thien" (probably MR Tri-Thien-Hue) had arrived at Kilometer 17 (possibly in the vicinity of 16-18N 107-19E, YD 493032). Mention was also made of bringing tanks into the area of Kilometer 17 when the route was completed. Construction apparently continues between Kilometers 20 (possibly near 16-18N 107-21E, YD 523042) and 25 (possibly in the area of 16-17N 107-23E, YD 553032), with work between Kilometers 21 and 22 scheduled for completion on 26 February.

Tactical communications previously identified as serving the PAVN 6th Regiment in the Hue area now appear to have been serving elements of the PAVN 29th Regiment, 325C Division. Battalion designators 7 and 9 as well as personalities previously associated with the 29th Regiment, were noted in these communications.

(2/G11/VCM/R375-68, 260934Z; R373-68, 260323Z)

Military Region 5

In the western highlands messages of 24 and 26 February exchanged between the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority and the probable element of the Hq, PAVN 1st Division continued to discuss plans for a forthcoming mortar attack, a strike against vehicles travelling on Route 15, and a popular uprising in the area west of Pleiku city.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5
On 24 February, the B3 Front Authority directed the 1st Division element to "prepare a really good position for the B-40's [i.e., rocket launchers]" to attack vehicles on Route 15. In addition, the subordinate was informed that "the 81-mm mortar ammunition [detail] will cross the river tonight." Later the same day, the 1st Division element reported that cadre had been assigned to assess the enemy, prepare for a mortar attack in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces, and rally the people to destroy an Allied post north of Le Thanh (13-50N 107-40E, YA 8930) upon the withdrawal of Allied forces.

The latest available message, passed by the 1st Division element on 26 February, stated that a detachment had been dispatched to check the extent of preparations for the mortar attack. "If preparations are satisfactory, the attack will take place on 27 February. If not...29 February." The probable Hq, 1st Division element was last located on 24 February near 13-53N 107-35E (YA 790379) in western Pleiku Province, and the probable Hq, B3 Front authority, in Cambodia near 14-03N 107-20E (YA 530557) on 23 February.

To the north in Kontum Province, continued evidence of hostile intent in the Dak To area has been noted in recent messages exchanged between the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 1st Division and three subordinates. On 24 February, the MIS instructed a subordinate located on that date near 14-41N 107-41E (YB 900239) to complete its mission "the sooner the better," stating that "after the points which you are determined to destroy have been destroyed, the enemy will have difficulty repairing the damages." The subordinate was ordered to return for a new assignment "when the destruction has been completed and the results observed." This subordinate had reported to the MIS on 23 and 24 February that it planned to blow up a probable bridge, designated "PL," on the night of 24 February and that "for the past three nights, reconnaissance
[elements] have been selecting sites for placing the explosives." According to collateral, there is a bridge at Polei Lang Lo (14-40N 107-41E, YB 902232), less than 1 km south of this subordinate's latest location.

Meanwhile, a second subordinate, located on 15 February near 14-39N 107-42E (YB 921229) 2 km east of Polei Lang Lo and 4 km south of Dak Ro Keng (14-41N 107-42E, YB 920264), continues through 24 February to report in detail to the MIS on Allied fortifications at Dak Ro Keng, including descriptions of rows of concertina wire and the number of troops, tents, trenches, bunkers, and artillery pieces. This subordinate had been instructed by the MIS on 23 February to "report in detail on the enemy's present strength at Dak Ro Keng."

In addition, a third subordinate, located on 25 February near 14-44N 107-43E (YB 938303), reported in two messages of 25 February that "the enemy set up positions at coordinates 2497 at Hill 810 [14-41N 107-46E, YB 972248]" and also continued to report on Allied air activity in and out of Dak To airfield.

In the coastal provinces of MR 5, in eastern Quang Nam Province, Hq, PAVN Rear Services Group 44 was located on 24 February near 15-52N 108-09E (AT 965548) approximately 18 km west of Hoi An and about 23 km northeast of its 23 February location. To the south in eastern Quang Ngai Province, the possible VC 48th Local Force Battalion was located on 25 February near 15-11N 108-59E (BS 782835) about 16 km northeast of Quang Ngai city and approximately 10 km north-northeast of its 22 February position. In eastern Binh Dinh Province the Hq, PAVN 18th Regiment, PAVN 3rd Division, was located on 25 February near 13-56N 109-10E (CR 026397) about 10 km south of its 21 February location.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN MR 1

BINH DUONG

LONG KHANH

HAU NGHIA

GIA DINH

BIEN HOA

SECRET SAVIN
Military Region 1

On 25 February, Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) was located on the northern Bien Hoa-Binh Duong Province border at 11-08N 105-59E (YT 033306), 16 km north-northwest of its 2 February position in north-central Bien Hoa Province. The division headquarters is now located approximately 17 km north-northeast of Bien Hoa Airbase and about 3 km west of the 24 February position of Hq, VC 9th LID near 11-07N 106-54E (YT 074307).

A subordinate of the MIS, 5th LID, located on 17 February in southern Long Khanh Province near 10-50N 107-15E (YS 475988), continued through 25 February to send detailed reports on Allied activities and troop dispositions in the Suoi Ram (10-50N 107-14E, YS 4498) and Xuan Loc (10-59N 107-11E, YT 4009) areas. The subordinate recently reported on the arrival of the 43rd, 48th, and 52nd Regiments of the ARVN 10th Division of Xuan Loc, and stated that the 2nd Battalion, 48th Regiment, was operating in the vicinity of Xuan Loc. According to collateral, the ARVN 10th Division Headquarters is located at Xuan Loc.

To the west, one of the two MI elements--the subordinate of an unidentified control authority--that have been reporting on the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area in central Binh Duong Province since 1 February, had relocated into extreme northern Hau Nghia Province by 24 February. On that date, the subordinate was located near 11-08N 106-25E (XT 550295) about 20 km southwest of its 11 February position in central Binh Duong Province. The subordinate and its control authority, which
was located in Binh Duong on 24 February, have previously indicated an association with the possible PAVN 7th Division, (2/G10/VCJ/R055-68, 251625Z; 2/G10/VCM/R127-68, 251650Z; 2/G10/VCM/T337-68, 250803Z; T338-68, 251233Z) (SECRET SAVIN)

Military Region 2

On 22 February, an unidentified subordinate of the probable My Tho Provincial Committee was located in western Dinh Tuong Province at 10-23N 105-57E (XS 059478) approximately 31 km west of its location on 21 January. This location represents a return of this unidentified subordinate to its normal area of operation. (SECRET SAVIN)

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

In the Khe Sanh area, an unidentified artillery-associated element mentioned that an unspecified type of attack is scheduled for 0900G on 27 February. Also in the area, a probable reconnaissance element of the 1st Battalion, 101D Regiment, reported on 25 February that PAVN artillery had hit an ammunition dump in the Khe Sanh Combat Base while other rounds reportedly hit the headquarters and supply dump area. The element continued to report Allied air and ground activity in the area. An Allied unit of 50 men was reported to have entered Chau Lang Chanh (16-38N 106-44E, XD 480410) at 1150G, 400 meters from the observer's position.

Farther east, on 26 February, an element associated with the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment stated it would not be able to conduct night firing into 241 (Camp Carroll, 16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) until 28 February.
Plans for an attack against An Lac (16-49N 107-05E, YD 241618), 2 km northwest of Dong Ha, were indicated by the 27th Independent Battalion elements on 25 February. The attack was planned for the night of 26 February with two Platoons of the probable 7th Company and local forces participating, and artillery from north of the DMZ was to fire into Quang Ngang (16-35N 107-05E, YD 222678), An Thai (16-49N 107-00E, YD 135613) and Dong Buc Ta (unlocated). Another attack was later mentioned to be made against Bot Cua (unlocated, possibly Cua area 16-45N 106-58E, YD 0952). Time and forces involved were not indicated, but plans called for the use of "firepower and explosives." A 26 February message from the battalion to the 7th Company indicated the battalion was to receive three 12.7-mm heavy machineguns for use in an antiaircraft role.

An unidentified possible supply element of the PAVN 803rd Regiment was ordered to utilize caution when passing Hill 31 (16-56N 107-07E, YD 269732) on the route from Cua Tung (17-01N 107-07E, YD 2582) to Cua Viet (16-52N 107-10E, YD 340700).

Military Region 4

On 24 February, an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element reported that "four battalions of artillery" will be moving, possibly along Route 1A between 25 February and 5 March. The message instructed the unidentified recipient to prepare probable wire and radio communications between Dong Chau (18-11N 106-03E XF 1210) and Luong Dong (18-44N 105-39E, WF 6872) during the above-indicated date period. Although neither the destination nor the subordination of these artillery battalions were revealed, both of the abovementioned place names are on or near Route 1A.
In other MR 4 activity, messages since 23 February have indicated that Hq, MR 4 Air Defense Command Post (ADCP) is again colocated with Hq, MR 4. Whether or not a geographical move by Hq, MR 4 ADCP was accomplished cannot be determined through SIGINT, since both headquarters were located in the Vinh area of MR 4 prior to 23 February. The colocation of these two headquarters also existed prior to 22 September 1966. SIGINT continues to locate a forward element of the ADCP at the DMZ Front.

PAVN High Command

On 21 February the apparent beginnings of a realignment of communications between High Command and certain of its subordinates in South Vietnam were evidenced in message activity between High Command and the major headquarters in or associated with South Vietnam. On that date, Hq, MR 5, B3 Front, MAS COSVN, and the tentative Forward Element of MR TTH were first noted in separate traffic-passing communications links with High Command. In the past, all four of these elements communicated with Hanoi as subordinates of communications groups; however, also as of 25 February only Hq, MR 5 and MAS COSVN continue to appear on their respective groups.

In another development, two new High Command-controlled traffic-passing groups were established on 21 February, each composed of two subordinates. Only one of the four new subordinates has been identified, i.e., the detached element of the DMZ Front. This element no longer appears on a larger High Command controlled group.
In addition, on 21 February, Hq, 812th Regiment joined a High Command group associated with the communications serving major headquarters in or associated with South Vietnam. This represents a transfer of the regiment from the complex serving forces infiltrating South Vietnam and indicates that the regiment is "in place" in the operational structure of the DMZ area.

While the full significance of these changes is not readily apparent, they do afford Hanoi and the units involved a greater communications capability, presumably a requirement growing out of the tactical situation in existence now or expected in the near future.

PAVN Rear Services

In an extremely fragmented message of 23 February, an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element reported that "rockets" had been deployed to destroy attacking aircraft, in particular F-100's, in an unlocated area. The unidentified recipient was instructed to insure that the positions were always well camouflaged and that reserve positions were prepared. The message further directed that false positions with false guns were to be constructed "with people in them to deceive the enemy." Although no specific location was observed, a possible reference to Route 1A was noted in the message.
Non-Responsive

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3/0/STY/R49-68
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