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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS LITIGATION CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL McCONNELL, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL This Document Relates to: INTELLIGENCE (1) All Actions Against the MCI and Verizon Defendants in the Master MCI and Verizon Consolidated Complaint, Dkt. 125; (2) Bready, SUBMITTED IN CAMERA, et al. v. Verizon Maryland (06-06313); (3) Chulsky EX PARTE et al. v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless (06-06570); and (4) Riordan, et al. v. Hon, Vaughn R. Walker Verizon Communications (06-3574)

IN CAMERA, EX PARTE DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL McCONNELL, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

I, J. Michael McConnell, do hereby state and declare as follows:

(U) INTRODUCTION

- 1. (U) I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have held this position since February 2007. Previously, I have served as the Executive Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence, as the Chief of Naval Forces Division at the National Security Agency, as the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Operation Desert Storm, and as the Director of the National Security Agency.
- 2. (U) In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the allegations at issue in the various complaints in this action brought against the Verizon

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Defendants, including the MCI entities. T	he statements made herein are based on my personal
knowledge as well as on information provide	led to me in my official capacity as Director of
Vational Intelligence. In particular, as set f	orth below, I have read and personally considered the
nformation contained in the Public and In	Camera, Ex Parte Declarations of Lt. Gen. Keith B.
Mexander, Director of the National Securit	y Agency, submitted in this case.
3. (TS//SI/TSP//OC/NF)	-As Gen. Alexander states, although the Plaintiffs'
laims in this lawsuit that the NSA has engi	aged in a dragnet of content surveillance of millions
f Americans are false, this case implicates	several highly classified and critically important
ntelligence activities of the National Secur	
	disclosed without causing exceptionally grave harm
U.S. national security. Specifically,	(1) targeted
ontent surveillance	pursuant to the
	("TSP") and recent orders of the Foreign Intelligence
	t''); (2) the bulk collection and targeted analysis of
	nd Internet communications—critically important and
	conducted pursuant to FISC orders and that enable
he NSA to uncover the contacts	
terrorist organizations;	
(U) Any reference to "Verizon" in his matter. "Verizon" also specifically inci Verizon, even though "MCI" may at times	n this declaration includes all Verizon Defendants in ludes the MCI Defendants, which are now a part of be referenced separately.
CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCC DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MDL NO. 06-1791	ONNELL,
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markings are set forth in the *In Camera* Alexander Declaration at ¶¶ 7-10 and are briefly summarized here. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified "TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET.

6. (S) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which is "subject to special access and handling requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods." 28 C.F.R.

§ 17.18(a). This declaration references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI), which is a subcategory of SCI that identifies information that was derived from exploiting cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from intercepted foreign communications. This declaration also references human intelligence (HCS), another subcategory of SCI that identifies information derived from individuals who provide intelligence information.

7.—(TS//SI
TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals intelligence program authorized by the President in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Information pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP."

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governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with DNI policy. The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the information controls to whom it is released. Finally, this document is marked Manual Review ("MR") indicating that it is not subject to automatic declassification at any specific date.

8. (S) Finally, information labeled "NOFORN" may not be released to foreign

(U) BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

9. (U) The position of Director of National Intelligence was created by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and 1097, 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of the National Security Act of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1), (2).

10. (U) The United States "Intelligence Community" includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the

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Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or jointly designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4).

- 11. (U) The responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence are set forth in the National Security Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1. These responsibilities include ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and committees thereof. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the objectives of, determining the requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community. Id. § 403-1(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). The DNI is also responsible for developing and determining, based on proposals submitted by the heads of agencies and departments within the Intelligence Community, an annual consolidated budget for the National Intelligence Program for presentation to the President, and for ensuring the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, and for managing and allotting appropriations for the National Intelligence Program. Id. § 403-1(c)(1)-(5).
- 12. (U) In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that "[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.". 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI

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establishes and implements guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives and access to and dissemination of intelligence. *Id.* § 403-1(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible for the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information ("SCI") to any officer or employee of any agency or department of the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout such departments and agencies. *Id.* § 403-1(j)(1), (2).

13. (U) By virtue of my position as the Director of National Intelligence, and unless otherwise directed by the President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national security that is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12958, 3 C.F.R. § 333 (1995), as amended by Executive Order 13292 (March 25, 2003), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 at 93 (Supp. 2004), the President has authorized me to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority.

(U) ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

14. (U) After careful and actual personal consideration of the matter, based upon my own knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the Public and In Camera Declarations of Gen. Alexander, I have determined that the disclosure of certain information—as set forth herein and described in more detail in the classified declaration of Gen. Alexander—would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and, therefore, must be protected from disclosure and excluded from this case. Thus, as to this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege. In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the privileged information described

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herein and in more detail in the classified declaration of Gen. Alexander and will therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.

(U) ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

15. (U) Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege held by the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act to protect the information described herein, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(l). My assertion of this statutory privilege for intelligence sources and methods is coextensive with my state secrets privilege assertion.

(U) INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE

- 16. (U) The information subject to my assertion of the state secrets and statutory privileges includes the following:
 - A. (U) Information regarding the specific nature of the al Qaeda terrorist threat
 - B. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether Verizon/MCI has assisted the NSA with any alleged intelligence activities
 - C. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the Plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence activities that may be at issue in this matter; and
 - U) Information concerning any NSA intelligence, activities, sources, or methods, including:
 - (1) (U) Information concerning the scope and operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information that may be needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to one-end foreign al Qaeda communications and that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and

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(2) (U) Information that would tend to confirm or deny whether the NSA collects large quantities of communication records information as the Plaintiffs allege.

(U) DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION AND HARM OF DISCLOSURE

A. (U) Information Concerning the Continuing al Qaeda Terrorist Threat

17. (S//OC/NF) Based on all of the intelligence information presently available to us, the U.S. Intelligence Community judges the al Qaeda terrorist network has the intention and the potential capability to carry out catastrophic terrorist acts on the U.S. Homeland. Indeed, intelligence indicates al Qaeda's central leadership is pursuing multiple, possibly related, paths to an attack against the Homeland. International counterterrorism efforts in 2006—especially the August disruption of a major aviation plot by United Kingdom (UK) and Pakistani authorities—have been successful, but they underscore that al Qaeda's core elements are resilient and continue to plot attacks against U.S. interests overseas. Preventing such attacks is the U.S. Intelligence Community's highest priority. The intelligence activities that are implicated by, and put at risk of, disclosure in this lawsuit must be understood in the context of the extremely serious threat faced by the United States.

18. (U) With the attacks of September 11, al Qaeda demonstrated its ability to introduce agents into the United States undetected and to perpetrate devastating attacks. As the President noted in his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address, "In the mind of the terrorists, this war began well before September the 11th, and will not end until their radical vision is fulfilled. And these past five years have given us a much clearer view of the nature of this enemy. . . . Our enemies are quite explicit about their intentions. They want to overthrow moderate governments, and establish safe havens from which to plan and carry out new attacks on our

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country."

19. (S//HCS//OC/NF) Since September 11, al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly promised to deliver another, even more devastating attack on America. For example, in October 2002, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stated in a video addressing the "citizens of the United States": "I promise you that the Islamic youth are preparing for you what will fill your hearts with horror." In an October 2004 tape, al-Zawahiri chastised the Muslim world—"Limiting the battle to fighting only the Jews in Palestine and leaving America without attacking it, will not restrain America and the crusaders against us." In an audiotape released on January 19, 2006, Bin Ladin warned United States citizens that "operations in America" are "under preparation and you will see them on your very own soil as soon as they are completed, Allah willing." And again, in June 2006 Bin Ladin claimed, "We will continue to fight you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan to run down your resources and kill your men until you return defeated to your nation."

20. (U) In recent months, al Qaeda has reiterated its intent to inflict a catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States. As recently as December 20, 2006, al-Zawahiri issued threats of attacking the U.S. Homeland saying, "You shall never dream of security until we truly experience it in Palestine and all lands of Islam . . . if we are struck in our countries, we shall never stop striking you in your countries . . . and as our commander, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin . . . told you, 'As you bomb, you will be bombed, and as you kill, you will be killed."

21. (S#NF) Since the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda has staged several large-scale attacks around the world, including in Indonesia, London, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Turkey, killing hundreds of innocent people. Foiled plots, including the plot disrupted in August 2006 to blow up multiple airliners transiting the Atlantic Ocean en route to North American cities, would

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have claimed thousands more innocent victims had they been successful.

(S//NE) Al Qaeda's Likely Presence in the United States

- 22. (S//HCS//OC/NF) Classified intelligence information provides a more specific and alarming picture of the continuing terrorist threat to the Homeland posed by al Qaeda. In sum, the U.S. Intelligence Community believes the al Qaeda terrorist network intends to execute a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland. For this reason, the President authorized the Terrorist Surveillance Program and related activities described in this Declaration. The intelligence activities at issue in this case are thus being utilized to meet a known, real, and perhaps imminent threat to the lives of thousands of Americans and, indeed, to the continuity of the United States Government. The threat we face cannot be understated.
- 23. (TS//HCS/ P/OC/NF) British and Pakistani authorities in early August 2006 disrupted the most significant known, advancing threat to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests abroad since September 11, 2001.

24. (S//HCS/ /OC/NF) In addition, based on April 2006 and February 2007 assessments by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a national intelligence center that is an element of the ODNI, the U.S. Intelligence Community continues to receive reliable intelligence that all Queda remains intent on conducting

a grand-scale attack on the Homeland with a likely focus on U.S. symbols of power or economic might. Al Qaeda continues to have these intentions despite the degradation of its leadership,

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33. (S//HCS//OC/NF) Although not eliminating al Qaeda's plotting to conduct a spectacular

attack against the U.S., constraints on al Qaeda's capabilities and increased security measures at

airports, government buildings, and other high-profile targets in the United States could be

making lower profile, less-protected targets increasingly attractive. An attack in the United

States, like those against London's transport systems, would probably meet al Qaeda's objectives

without requiring the planning, resources, and expertise necessary for a complex September 11-

style attack. This shift in al Qaeda's planning has become apparent from our current

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Ayyub al-Masri publicly called for scientific assistance for AQI's CBRN efforts-

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Although al Qaeda has long desired a nuclear capability, to date we assess it is

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unlikely al Qaeda has acquired sufficient materials and expertise to do so.

43. (S//NE) Among al Qaeda and associated jihadist networks, information is proliferating on how to produce chemical and biological agents, how to build chemical and radiological dispersal devices, and the theory behind nuclear weapon design, according to various sources, including Internet sites


This continued interest and pursuit of unconventional weapons increases the likelihood al Qaeda or an associated group will attempt to conduct CBRN attacks against the United States or U.S. interests worldwide.

44. (TSI *OCINF) These various examples of some of our intelligence information demonstrate the al Qaeda network continues to plan ways to inflict a catastrophic attack. In sum, based on all of the intelligence presently available to us, the U.S. Intelligence Community judges al Qaeda poses a grave danger to the U.S. Homeland. The severity of that threat and the difficulty of tracking al Qaeda members is precisely the reason the Government is utilizing all lawful intelligence-gathering capabilities. I set forth this threat information not only to provide the Court with crucial background as to why the intelligence activities at issue in this case are being undertaken, but also to assert a claim of privilege over this threat information. Although the foregoing threat assessment demonstrates precisely why we undertake these activities, the Government cannot disclose this information in defending the legality of the intelligence activities being challenged, since to do so obviously would disclose to our adversaries what we know of their plans and how we may be obtaining information about them. Such disclosure would lead our adversaries not only to alter their plans, but also to implement greater security for their communications, thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In addition, disclosure of threat information might reveal human sources for the United States and, thus, compromise those sources and put lives at danger. Accordingly, although I believe such threat information is

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crucial	to understanding the context in which NSA conducts the intelligence activities put at
issue by	y Plaintiffs' lawsuit, I must assert the state secrets privilege and DNI statutory privilege
over the	e information because of the grave damage to national security that could reasonably be
expecte	ed to result from its disclosure.
	B. (U) <u>Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether Verizon/MCI Has</u> <u>Assisted the NSA With Any Alleged Intelligence Activities</u>
45.	. (TS//SI TSP//OC/NF) As set forth in more detail in Gen. Alexander's In
Camero	a Declaration, the United States faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges after
he Sep	stember 11 attacks, and the President authorized signals intelligence activities designed to
	ose challenges and to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and its
	es. The NSA
and the second	intelligence activities, including the Terrorist Surveillance
Program	m and related content surveillance now subject to orders of the Foreign Intelligence
	lance Court; the bulk collection of telephony and Internet meta data currently authorized
by the	FISC and used to discover contacts
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 As should be obvious, to confirm or deny whether someone is a target of surveillance would disclose either who is being targeted—thus compromising that collection—or who is not being targeted, thus revealing to adversaries that an individual is a secure source for communicating or, more broadly, the methods being used to conduct surveillance. While it may seem innocuous to disclose that law-abiding citizens are not being targeted, this may provide insight to a trained eye as to the scope of the NSA's activities. Moreover, providing assurances that someone is not being targeted becomes unworkable, and itself revealing, in cases where an individual may be targeted. A refusal to confirm or deny only in cases where surveillance is occurring would effectively disclose and compromise that surveillance.

The only recourse for NSA is to

neither confirm nor deny whether someone has been targeted or subject to NSA collection, regardless of whether the individual has been targeted or not. To say otherwise when challenged in litigation would result in the frequent, routine exposure of NSA information, sources, and methods and would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.

D. (U) Information Concerning Any NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods

52. (U) I am also asserting the state secrets and DNI statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods that would be needed to resolve this case,

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including (1) facts concerning the operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited as the President stated to the interception of one-end foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise intercept the content of millions of communications sent or received inside the United States by millions of Americans as the Plaintiffs allege; and (2) facts that would confirm or deny whether the NSA collects large quantities of communication records information. In my judgment, the disclosure of such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.

- 53. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Specifically, based on my personal consideration and judgment as to the harm disclosure would cause to national security, my privilege assertion includes but is not limited to the following activities discussed by Gen. Alexander:
- (A) (TS//SI/TSP//OC/NF) First, I assert privilege over classified details about the operation of the TSP, including how targets were selected under the program, how specific methods were used to intercept telephone and Internet communications and to minimize the risk of collecting non-target communications and purely domestic communications, as well as related classified details

 I also assert privilege over facts that would disclose the operational swiftness and agility of the TSP and meta data analysis,

over information that would reveal the effectiveness and success of the TSP. In my judgment, these operational details constitute vital intelligence sources and methods, even now that the program is no longer authorized, because they would reveal the NSA's capabilities and methods, including those now being utilized under the current FISC orders.

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terrorist plots and would also undermine this activity as now authorized under current FISC orders.

(D) (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Finally, I also assert privilege over information concerning the various FISC Orders that are described by Gen. Alexander. In my judgment, disclosure of current surveillance activities of the FISC, either directly or indirectly, would seriously compromise, if not destroy, vital ongoing intelligence operations.

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activities described herein—the content and meta data collection activities authorized by the President after 9/11 and subsequently authorized by the FISC—are among the most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the Horneland from another catastrophic terrorist attack. These intelligence activities have given the United States unparalleled ability to understand the interconnected groups and agents that al Qacda has become. They also have allowed us to identify and track terrorists as they move around the world

Disclosing the information described herein and by Gen. Alexander would compromise these critical activities, sources, and methods, thereby helping our adversaries evade detection and causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.

(U) RISK OF LITIGATION

55. (TS//SI OC/NF) Finally, I concur with Gen. Alexander's conclusion that further litigation of this case will inherently risk the disclosure of highly classified activities.

56. (TS#/SH/OC/INF) The stakes we face in the U.S. Intelligence Community are of the

highest magnitude. We know al Qaeda is planning to attack inside the United States again,

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whether it be a "small" scale attack on shopping malls or "fun" places that kills dozens, a devastating attack on aviation or rail systems that kills hundreds, a catastrophic, mass-casualty attack that kills thousands, an attack on government or economic sector infrastructure that would cause severe economic harm or threaten the continuity of government. The NSA's activities described herein and by Gen. Alexander are all directed at this terrible threat.

57. (TS#NF) For these reasons, in addition to invoking the state secrets and DNI statutory privilege to protect the intelligence information, sources, and methods at issue, I respectfully urge the Court to dismiss this case.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATE: 20 APR 07

J'MICHAEL McCONNELL
Director of National Intelligence

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