PDF Index: FISA SECTION 702 FACT SHEET
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is an invaluable source of intelligence on foreigners located outside the U. S. that has repeatedly produced vital information that protects American lives and U.S. national security, while requiring the Intelligence Community (IC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) to comply with robust civil liberties and privacy safeguards, overseen by all three branches of government.
Below, we provide illustrative statistics that exemplify Section 702’s value and efficacy along with its privacy and civil liberties safeguards, followed by a series of vignettes that demonstrate how Section 702 protects our national security.
702 Is A Critical And Unique Intelligence Authority
In calendar year (CY) 2022, 59% of President’s Daily Brief (PDB) Articles contained Section 702 information reported by the National Security Agency (NSA).
702 Contributes Vital Intelligence Across High Priority Missions
Section 702-acquired information revealed: Insights that have informed the U.S. Government’s understanding of the Chinese origins of a chemical used to synthesize fentanyl; foreign actors’ illicit plans to smuggle methamphetamine across the U.S. border; the quantities and potency of drugs, including fentanyl, destined for illegal transfer to the United States, as well as specific smuggling techniques used to avoid detection; and a foreign narcotics trafficker’s purchase of a vast quantity of pills for transfer to the United States.
Section 702 has helped uncover gruesome atrocities committed by Russia in Ukraine—including the murder of noncombatants and the forced relocation of children from Russian-occupied Ukraine to the Russian Federation—and the detention of refugees fleeing violence by Russian personnel.
Section 702-acquired information has been used to identify multiple foreign ransomware attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure. This intelligence positioned the U.S. Government to respond to and mitigate these events, and in some instances prevent significant attacks on U.S. networks.
Section 702-acquired information related to sanctioned foreign adversaries was used in U.S. Government efforts to stop weapons of mass destruction components from reaching foreign actors.
Section 702 has identified threats to U.S. troops and disrupted planned terrorist attacks at home and abroad, and contributed to the successful operation against Ayman al-Zawahiriin 2022.
Section 702 has resulted in the identification and disruption of hostile foreign actors' attempts to recruit spies in the United States or send their operatives to the United States.
Section 702 has identified key economic security risks, including strategic malign investment by foreign actors in certain U.S. companies.
702 Has Built-In Civil Liberties and Privacy Protections The Government’s use of Section 702 is subject to a robust compliance regime and overseen by all three branches of government:
The FBI only receives collection on Section 702 targets relevant to full FBI national security investigations, which amounts to 3.22% of the IC’s total targets under 702; this means that FBI queries run against this smaller set of 702 data, not against all unminimized 702 data.
After the FBI implemented a series of reforms in 2021 and 2022 to address concerns about query compliance, the FBI’s U.S. person queries of Section 702 information dropped over 93% from 2021 to 2022.
Section 702 information has only been used affirmatively against a defendant in nine criminal prosecutions; all of the defendants were given notice and an opportunity to challenge its use.
FISA procedures are subject to extensive court review and scrutiny. Every federal court to ever review the Section 702 program has found that it is constitutional.
Congress is kept fully informed on the implementation of Section 702 through Semiannual Reports and Joint Assessments provided to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees by DOJ and ODNI.
Every year, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence submit to the FISC certifications that specify categories of foreign intelligence that the IC can use Section 702 to collect. Targeting, minimization, and querying procedures are also submitted.
Every year, the FISC reviews these certifications and procedures to ensure they comply with FISA and the Fourth Amendment.
The IC dedicates significant compliance resources to the court-approved Section 702 program, using training, technology, and policy controls in order to protect privacy and civil liberties.
DOJ reviews IC compliance with Section 702 targeting, minimization, and querying procedures. DOJ also reviews 100%of all Section 702 tasking sheets.
DOJ reports all identified compliance incidents to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Congress
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PDF Index: SECTION 702: THE PROCESS
HOW IS THE PROGRAM APPROVED?
The Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) submit "certifications" lasting up to one year to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) specifying categories of foreign intelligence the IC can use Section 702 to collect. There are three certifications covering foreign governments and related entities, counterterrorism, and combatting proliferation.
CERTIFICATIONS
With the Certifications the AG and DNI also submit:
- Targeting Procedures-ensure that Section 702 is used only to acquire foreign intelligence information from foreign persons located outside the U.S.
- Minimization Procedures-rules designed to safeguard any U.S. person information incidentally acquired through Section 702.
- Querying Procedures-govern how agencies query unminimized information acquired via Section 702.
The FISC reviews the Certifications and Procedures to ensure they comply with both the FISA and the Fourth Amendment, taking into account the compliance history of collection under Section 702.
The FISC can appoint amici curiae (friends of the court) to provide further input into the court's deliberations.
ORDER
The FISC issues a written opinion explaining its reasoning.
When the FISC issues an order, the companies can appeal it to the FISC Court of Appeals.
Only upon FISC approval of the Certifications, including the Targeting and Minimization Procedures, can the AG and DNI compel U.S. electronic communication service providers to assist with collection against authorized Section 702 targets.
THREATS
The government uses information gathered under Section 702 to protect the U.S. and its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists, proliferators, spies, and cyber hackers.
HOW DOES THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECT UNDER SECTION 702?
1. Analyst identifies a selector, such as an email address or phone number. Analyst cannot collect using keywords or names.
2. Is the non-U.S. Person located outside of U.S.? No, then stop. Yes, step 3
3. Is there foreign intelligence such as information about terrorism or weapons proliferation? No, stop. Yes, step
4. Analyst completes targeting request
5. Checked by Senior Analyst
6. Double checked by Senior Analyst
7. Upstream (NSA Only) - Receive target's communications as they cross the backbone of the internet with the compelled assistance of companies that maintain those networks.
Downstream (all agencies)
Receive target's communications directly from the U.S. company that services the account.
8. Trained analysts review information in their respective access-controlled databases. Analysts are required to conduct post-targeting checks to verify that the target remains a foreigner overseas with foreign intelligence information.
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PDF Index: How FISA Section 702’s Compliance & Oversight Have Grown to Strengthen Privacy and Civil Liberties
Protections for U.S. Persons
Section 702 allows the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect communications of targeted foreign persons who are located outside of the United States:
- Based on an assessment that those persons are likely to communicate foreign intelligence.
- Using specific communications identifiers, such as an email address or phone number.
- Subject to court-approved targeting rules and multiple layers of oversight.
There are three certifications covering foreign governments and related entities, counterterrorism, and combatting proliferation.
In targeting foreign persons outside the United States, Section 702 may result in the collection of incidental U.S. person communications. The IC dedicates substantial compliance resources to protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons in handling these communications. This includes significant
safeguards added by Congress as a part of the 2018 FISA Section 702 reauthorization.
Section 702 – Safeguards Implemented Since 2018 Reauthorization
SEPARATE QUERY PROCEDURES
The 2018 reauthorization includes a new requirement for the Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to adopt procedures, reviewed and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), governing how agencies query unminimized information acquired via Section 702.
RESTRICTIONS ON FBI’S “EVIDENCE OF A CRIME” QUERIES
The 2018 reauthorization includes a new requirement for FBI to obtain a court order (called an “f(2) order”) before an analyst is permitted to review the contents returned by a U.S. person query when the purpose of the query is to retrieve evidence of a crime in a non-national security related FBI criminal investigation.
LIMITING 702’S USE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The 2018 reauthorization includes new restrictions on the U.S.
government’s use of Section 702 information in a criminal
proceeding, except where FBI has obtained a court order or in the
case of certain serious crimes like murder or child exploitation.
NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS IF NSA RESTARTS “ABOUTS” COLLECTION
Since 2017, when NSA ended “abouts” collection, all Section 702
collection must be “to” or “from” the target of the collection. The
2018 reauthorization requires that NSA must inform Congress
30 days prior to resuming “abouts” collection with an emergency
exception provision.
FBI COMPLIANCE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED SINCE 2020
1. Established the Office of Internal Auditing.
2. Updated its policies, training, and technology to address the
root causes of several compliance challenges:
n Requiring analysts to “opt-in” before their queries run
against Section 702-acquired information;
n Requiring prior legal approval for batch jobs that result
in 100 or more queries;
n Clarifying guidance and enhancing training regarding
the query standard; and
n Documenting case-specific justifications before
reviewing contents returned by a U.S. person query.
3. Requiring pre-approval for sensitive queries, including
personal approval by the Deputy Director for certain
sensitive queries.
ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY ACTIVITIES
The 2018 reauthorization increases transparency by directing the
DNI to publicly release significant or novel FISC opinions and
agency minimization procedures. It also expands Congressional
reporting, directing the AG to provide the total number of
subjects targeted by electronic surveillance, as well as requires
FBI to report to Congress the number of times the FBI opens
a criminal investigation into a U.S. person based in whole, or in
part, on Section 702-acquired information.
ADDITIONAL PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES SAFEGUARDS
The 2018 reauthorization requires Privacy and Civil Liberties
officers for NSA and FBI, allows the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board to exercise oversight functions even if the
Chair is vacant, and permits the FISC to compensate amici and
technical experts.
Section 702 – Current Safeguards for Civil Liberties and Privacy
POLICIES & PROCESSES
In addition to the FISC approved Targeting, Minimization, and
Query Procedures, each Agency has strengthened its policies and
technology, implementing internal controls that provide more detailed
directions to analysts on how to handle Section 702 information.
TARGETING POLICIES:
Two pairs of Eyes: NSA and FBI, the only agencies with Targeting
Procedures, each have at least two personnel review before a
selector can be tasked for collection under Section 702.
Post Tasking Reviews: All agencies receiving Section 702
information conduct initial and subsequent reviews of the
collection to ensure that the targeted selector is and continues to
be likely to produce foreign intelligence information and is not
used by a U.S. person or a person in the U.S.
NSA USP QUERY POLICIES & TECHNOLOGY:
- The NSA Office of the General Counsel must approve all U.S. person query terms prior to the query of Section 702 contents.
- NSA issued additional guidance for reviewing and approving sensitive query terms.
FBI NOTICE REQUIREMENTS, USP QUERY REQUIREMENTS, &
TECHNOLOGY:
- Technology: FBI users affirmatively “opt-in” if they are
seeking to query Section 702 information. FBI also
redesigned the user interface in its FISA database systems to
include “pop-up” prompts to remind users in real time of the
query rules and any necessary approvals they need to obtain.
- Requirements for Evidence of a Crime Only Queries: FBI must
seek a court order before an analyst is permitted to review
the contents of a U.S. person query when the purpose of the
query is to retrieve evidence of a crime in a non-national
security related FBI criminal investigation.
- Notice to Defendants: DOJ provides notice to defendants
when Section 702 information will be used against a
defendant in a criminal prosecution. This has been done in
nine criminal prosecutions since the beginning of the Section
702 program and all defendants were given notice and an
opportunity to challenge its use.
TRAINING & ACCESS
Access to Section 702 information is limited to personnel with mission
need who have completed mandatory training and who have been
specifically granted access to the system(s) that store the information.
TRAINING
Personnel must complete training on how to use Section 702
information, as well as instruction on the appropriate use of
intelligence systems and privacy protections to retain access to
raw Section 702 information.
EXPERT RESOURCES
Each agency designates FISA-trained attorneys to answer
questions related to technical, policy, or operational aspects of the
program, as well as expert compliance personnel to assist analysts.
Each agency that has access to Section 702 information has a
statutorily mandated Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer who
reports to the head of the Agency.
TECHNICAL CONTROLS
To enforce the above restrictions, all unminimized Section 702
information is stored in approved repositories with controls
designed to prevent unauthorized access by those, within or
outside the relevant agency, who do not meet the necessary
requirements.
Agencies further tag or segregate the information as a security
measure and the systems maintain audit logs that can be
reviewed in the event of a possible compliance incident related
to access and use of Section 702 information.
OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY
All three branches of the Government play a key role in overseeing the
Section 702 program. This oversight structure helps refine policies,
training, and technology to ensure agencies are operating in the most
compliant way possible.
DOJ reviews documentation and justification for all new
targeting decisions. ODNI and DOJ perform joint 60-day reviews
of the documentation and justification for new NSA targeting
decisions, U.S. person queries, and disseminations. The Targeting,
Querying, and Minimization Procedures for each element are
reviewed annually by the FISC.
Every six months, the intelligence and oversight committees in
Congress are provided with a semiannual report by the Attorney
General describing all identified compliance incidents, as well as
a Joint Assessment by DOJ and ODNI that identifies trends and
remedial efforts.
Reports of intentional violations, which are very rare, are referred
for investigation and further action—up to and including
suspension, loss of security clearance, or termination.
TRANSPARENCY
To enhance public understanding of the IC, ODNI and DOJ provide the
public with a broad range of information on intelligence activities and
authorities—including Section 702. No other nation provides more
transparency about its intelligence activities.
The IC has published all historic FISC opinions with significant
interpretations of law spanning the last 20 years, along
with Section 702 procedures for Targeting, Querying, and
Minimization.
ODNI publishes the Annual Statistical Transparency Report each
April, which provides not only statutorily required information,
but also other information that the DNI has determined can be
released regarding the IC’s use of national security authorities.
ODNI, FBI, CIA, and NSA have statutory Privacy and Civil
Liberties Officers who produce semi-annual public reports on
their activities.
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PDF Index: SECTION 702
Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 702: THE BIG PICTURE 3
FISA Section 702: At a Glance 4
Comparing FISA Section 702 & FISA Title I 5
MISSION IMPACT 6
702 Top Headlines 7
PROCESS & OVERSIGHT 10
Approval Process 11
Section 702 in Use 12
Oversight 14
PROTECTING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION 15
Protecting U.S. Person Privacy 16
U.S. Person Query Terms Explained 18
Why Would the IC Conduct a Query
Using a U.S. Person Query Term? 19
COMPLIANCE 20
NSA Compliance 21
FBI Compliance & Recent Remedial Measures 22
CIA & NCTC Compliance 23
SECTION 702: FAQ 24
702 FAQ 25
SECTION 702: REFERENCE MATERIALS 28
Additional Web Pages for Reference 29
Page 3
SECTION 702: THE BIG PICTURE
Page 4
FISA SECTION 702: AT A GLANCE
702 DEFINED
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is a key foreign intelligence authority that helps keep the United States, its citizens, and allies safe and secure.
The authority allows the U.S. Government to collect the communications of individual foreign intelligence targets located overseas who use U.S. electronic communication services such as email and telephone.
Intelligence from Section 702 is used every day to protect the nation from critical threats, inform U.S. Government strategy, and save American lives.
Section 702 provides robust privacy and civil liberties protections and is subject to rigorous oversight from all three branches of government.
TIMELINE
Absent Congressional reauthorization, FISA Section 702 will sunset Dec. 31, 2023. Any lapse in this law
would have a blinding effect on our insights into hostile foreign actors operating beyond our borders.
RELEVANCE
100% - of the President’s intelligence priorities topics reported on by NSA were supported by FISA in 2022.
65% - of all FBI raw technical reporting came from Section 702 in the first half of fiscal year 2023.
59% - of articles in the President’s Daily Brief contained 702 information reported by NSA in 2022.
40% - of products in CIA’s World Intelligence Review daily analytic publication relied on FISA Section 702 information in 2022.
WITHOUT THIS AUTHORITY, WE LACK A HOLISTIC PICTURE OF OUR FOREIGN THREATS
2: MISSION IMPACT
702 TOP HEADLINES
NORTH KOREAN IT FRAUD EXPOSED
FISA Section 702 data was vital in warning the international community, the private sector, and the public about efforts to deploy information technology workers to commit fraud against a global industry, including against U.S. businesses, to generate revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
nuclear program.
TERRORIST PLANS FOILED, TERRORIST LEADERS REMOVED
The authority has been critical to the IC’s successful counterterrorism program. In 2009, it protected the nation from an al-Qaeda attack by Najibullah Zazi, who intended to detonate explosives on Manhattan subway lines. In 2014, Section 702 again prevented attacks by assisting in the removal of ISIS leader, Hajji Iman. In 2022, 702 contributed to the U.S. Government operation against Ayman al-Zawahiri, a last remaining 9/11 architect.
CYBERATTACKS REVEALED, MITIGATIONS DEVELOPED
FISA Section 702-acquired information revealed that a foreign adversary had conducted a cyberattack against critical U.S. Government systems and gained extensive access to non-public records and documents.
FISA Section 702-acquired information enabled the IC’s development of mitigations to protect critical U.S. Government systems compromised by a foreign adversary’s cyberattack.
The IC used information from 702 to discover that a foreign adversary had used a cyberattack to acquire sensitive information related to the U.S. military.
MALIGN ACTIVITIES INTERRUPTED
FISA Section 702-acquired information helped the IC discover and interrupt a foreign adversary’s plan to obtain sensitive technological information that could be used to undermine U.S. national security.
FISA Section 702 has identified key economic security risks, including strategic malign investment by foreign actors in certain U.S. companies.
702 TOP HEADLINES, CONTINUED
WMD PROLIFERATION COUNTERED
FISA Section 702-acquired information related to sanctioned foreign adversaries was used in U.S. Government efforts to stop components for weapons of mass destruction from reaching foreign actors.
Without FISA Section 702 collection, the State Department’s ability to hold nations accountable for adhering to international obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction would be significantly
degraded. For example, FISA Section 702 information is a critical input to and provides some of the most meaningful reporting in the classified portion of the 2023 Annual Report on Compliance with
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
RANSOMWARE ATTACKS MITIGATED & PREVENTED
FISA Section 702-acquired information successfully identified and mitigated an Iranian ransomware attack against a non-profit organization’s systems in 2022. Within one week, this intelligence
enabled the U.S. Government to respond to, mitigate, and ultimately recover the organization’s information without paying the ransom.
FISA Section 702-acquired information has been used to identify multiple foreign ransomware attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure. This intelligence positioned the U.S. Government to respond to and mitigate these events — and in some instances prevent significant attacks on U.S. networks.
702 FAST FACTS
100% - of the President’s intelligence priorities topics reported on by NSA were supported by FISA Section 702 information in 2022.
70% - of successful weapons and counterproliferation disruptions supported by CIA from 2018 to 2022
were supported by FISA Section 702 collection.
59% - of articles in the President’s Daily Brief contained 702 information reported by NSA in 2022.
COLONIAL PIPELINE
RANSOM RECOVERED
FISA Section 702 played an important role in the U.S. Government’s response to the cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline in 2021. Using FISA Section 702, the Intelligence Community acquired information that verified the identity of the hacker, as well as information that enabled U.S. Government efforts to recover the majority of the ransom.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BOLSTERED
In 2021, information derived from FISA Section 702 enabled U.S. diplomats to demarche a Middle Eastern country over its efforts to monitor and track dissidents abroad, as well as dissidents here in the United States.
FISA Section 702 data helped expose efforts by foreign powers, including the People’s Republic of China, to coerce nations to oppose international responses to human rights violations. This reporting enabled U.S. diplomats to assist countries in shielding themselves from coercion and influence.
40% - of products in CIA’s World Intelligence Review daily analytic publication relied on FISA Section 702 information in 2022.
20% - of NSA's intelligence reports in 2022 contained FISA Section 702 information, 85% of which were sourced only to Section 702.
UNIQUE INSIGHTS ON FOREIGN CARTELS, DRUG TRAFFICKING
FISA Section 702-acquired information revealed:
Foreign actors’ illicit plans to smuggle methamphetamine across the U.S. border.
The quantities and potency of drugs, including fentanyl, destined for illegal transfer to the United States, as well as specific smuggling techniques used to avoid detection.
The involvement of a foreign official in one foreign narcotics trafficker’s scheme to transport fentanyl pills within the United States.
A different foreign narcotics trafficker’s purchase of a vast quantity of pills for transfer to the United States.
Insights that have informed the U.S. Government’s understanding of the Chinese origins of a chemical used to synthesize fentanyl.
PROCESS & OVERSIGHT
APPROVAL PROCESS
1. AG & DNI
The Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) submit certifications lasting up to one year, to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) specifying categories of foreign intelligence the IC can use Section 702 to collect.
CERTIFICATIONS
2. With the certifications the AG and DNI also submit:
Targeting Procedures: ensure that Section 702 is used only to acquire foreign intelligence information from foreign persons located outside the U.S.
Minimization Procedures: rules designed to safeguard any U.S. person information incidentally acquired through Section 702.
Querying Procedures: govern how agencies query unminimized information acquired via Section 702.
3. FISC
The FISC reviews the certifications and procedures to ensure they comply with both FISA and the Fourth Amendment, taking into account the compliance history of collection under Section 702.
The FISC can appoint amici curiae (friends of the court) to provide further input into the court’s deliberations.
4. ORDER
The FISC issues a written opinion explaining its reasoning.
5. AG & DNI
Only upon FISC approval of the certifications, including the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures, can the AG and DNI compel U.S. electronic communication service providers to assist with collection against authorized Section 702 targets. Assistance is compelled through directives, which a company can challenge in the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC-R).
6. COLLECTION
The government uses information gathered under Section 702 to protect the U.S. and its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists, proliferators, spies, and cyber hackers.
SECTION 702 IN USE
The use of Section 702 involves a number of key steps, each of which has specific privacy and civil liberties protections built into it. Words like targeting, querying, and collection are everyday words in the U.S. Government’s secure spaces. The specific meanings of those words are described in more detail below.
TARGETING
Targeting is when the IC directs its collection efforts to a specific person or entity (the target) to obtain foreign intelligence information. The target of the collection under 702 MUST be a non-U.S. person, outside the U.S., and be likely to possess, receive, or communicate foreign intelligence.
Research is performed to determine that the proposed target is a non-U.S. person, reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S., and expected to communicate foreign intelligence.
All targeting goes through NSA, where three analysts with specialized training review every proposed 702 targeting before it is approved.
COLLECTION
Once the IC approves targeting, the U.S. Government legally compels certain U.S. electronic communication service providers to give the government the target’s communications.
FBI, CIA, and NCTC only receive a small portion of the 702 collection relating to their agency’s missions.
The Department of Justice reviews a record of every targeting decision. External oversight occurs throughout the intelligence process.
QUERY
Once the collection is obtained, analysts conduct “queries” to retrieve specific communications by using terms designed to find relevant foreign intelligence or, in the case of the FBI only, evidence of a crime.
Queries do not produce new intelligence. Queries are how analysts identify the foreign intelligence information within previous, lawfully collected communications.
Additional rules apply to queries using terms associated with U.S. persons.
DISSEMINATION
Once foreign intelligence is identified, the IC takes action — such as writing a report for the president, military, or other U.S. Government agencies that can prevent or disrupt a particular threat.
The IC releases statistics annually on the number of intelligence reports that include masked references
to U.S. persons.
The IC protects U.S. person identities within the reports it writes from 702 information.
OVERSIGHT
FISA SECTION 702
The government's use of Section 702 is subject to extensive and rigorous oversight by all branches of government.
FISC
Evaluates the program annually to ensure compliance with FISA and the Constitution.
CONGRESS
Receives regular reports on the government’s use of Section 702 and all instances of non-compliance.
PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY
In addition to declassified and publicly released statements and FISC opinions, the IC publishes an annual report with statistics on how national security authorities, such as Section 702, are used.
IC ELEMENT INTERNAL
OVERSIGHT
Compliance officers, lawyers,
civil liberties and privacy officers,
and Inspectors General at each IC
element provide oversight.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD
Receives regular reports on the
Section 702 program.
DOJ & ODNI
Conduct compliance reviews at least every two
months at each agency that receives unminimized
Section 702 information, including reviews of
targeting decisions, disseminations of U.S. person
information, and U.S. person queries.
PROTECTING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION
PROTECTING U.S. PERSON PRIVACY
CAN THE IC USE SECTION 702 TO COLLECT
U.S. PERSON COMMUNICATIONS?
• The government cannot use Section 702 to target
U.S. persons or anyone located in the United States.
• It is possible that a foreign person who has been
targeted under Section 702 may communicate with, or
discuss information concerning, a U.S. person. Numerous
requirements protect U.S. person information throughout
the implementation of Section 702.
WHAT HAPPENS IF AN ANALYST FINDS
U.S. PERSON INFORMATION IN SECTION 702
COLLECTION?
• Each agency’s minimization procedures require that
the Agency properly handles and protects any U.S.
person information found in Section 702 collection.
Safeguards include:
• Access Controls: Only analysts who are trained on the
minimization procedures can see the collection.
• Age Off Requirements: After a set period of time, the IC
must delete any unminimized Section 702 information,
regardless of the nationality of the communicants.
• Dissemination Restrictions: Analysts cannot share (i.e.,
disseminate) any information that identifies a U.S. person
with another agency or entity, unless it falls within one of
a few exceptions, such as being necessary to understand
foreign intelligence information.
• Use Restrictions: The government can only rely on FISA
information in a criminal proceeding with the approval of the
Attorney General. The FBI or DOJ cannot use an American’s
communications collected incidentally (see next page) under
Section 702 to prosecute them unless the case relates to national
security or a handful of other very serious crimes. Each agency
applies enhanced protections to communications subject to
Attorney Client privilege.
• Query Restrictions: Querying Procedures impose additional
restrictions on how analysts retrieve information collected under
Section 702. Agency Querying Procedures direct limitations on
the purpose and scope of queries, record keeping requirements
and additional approvals required for certain queries involving
a term associated with a U.S. person. Refer to pages 18-19 for
additional information on queries using terms associated with
U.S. persons.
PROTECTING U.S. PERSON PRIVACY, CONTINUED
WHY WOULD U.S. PERSON INFORMATION BE COLLECTED
UNDER SECTION 702?
• Section 702 may only be used to conduct surveillance on non-U.S.
persons located abroad. However, it is possible that a foreign person
who has been targeted under Section 702 may communicate with,
or discuss information concerning, a U.S. person. The Intelligence
Community refers to collection of communications of non-targets
(including any U.S. persons) as incidental collection.
THE SCOPE OF INCIDENTAL ACQUISITION OF U.S. PERSON
INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 702
• The Intelligence Community has been unable to devise an accurate,
repeatable, and meaningful estimate of the rate at which collection
of incidental U.S. person communications occurs. The Intelligence
Community remains committed to exploring methodologies—including
by partnering with private sector experts—to devise such an accurate
estimate without unduly violating the privacy of any U.S. persons.
• The Intelligence Community has released a variety of other statistics
that provide insight into the scope of intelligence activities targeting
foreign persons that involve U.S. persons. The Intelligence Community
publishes an Annual Statistical Transparency Report including figures
relating to U.S. person queries, the number of intelligence reports
which include masked references to U.S. persons, and the number
of times the Intelligence Community shared such an un-masked
U.S. person’s identity with an intelligence customer.PROTECTING U.S. PERSON PRIVACY, CONTINUED
WHY WOULD U.S. PERSON INFORMATION BE COLLECTED
UNDER SECTION 702?
• Section 702 may only be used to conduct surveillance on non-U.S.
persons located abroad. However, it is possible that a foreign person
who has been targeted under Section 702 may communicate with,
or discuss information concerning, a U.S. person. The Intelligence
Community refers to collection of communications of non-targets
(including any U.S. persons) as incidental collection.
THE SCOPE OF INCIDENTAL ACQUISITION OF U.S. PERSON
INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 702
• The Intelligence Community has been unable to devise an accurate,
repeatable, and meaningful estimate of the rate at which collection
of incidental U.S. person communications occurs. The Intelligence
Community remains committed to exploring methodologies—including
by partnering with private sector experts—to devise such an accurate
estimate without unduly violating the privacy of any U.S. persons.
• The Intelligence Community has released a variety of other statistics
that provide insight into the scope of intelligence activities targeting
foreign persons that involve U.S. persons. The Intelligence Community
publishes an Annual Statistical Transparency Report including figures
relating to U.S. person queries, the number of intelligence reports
which include masked references to U.S. persons, and the number
of times the Intelligence Community shared such an un-masked
U.S. person’s identity with an intelligence customer.
WHAT IS “MASKING”?
NAMED U.S. PERSON #1
“MASKING” is one of the IC’s methods
for protecting U.S. person privacy.
Masking means replacing the identity
of the U.S. person with a generic
phrase such as “named U.S. person #1”.
Sometimes, however, it is necessary to
refer to a U.S. person to understand the
information in an intelligence report.
U.S. PERSON QUERY TERMS EXPLAINED
WHAT IS A QUERY?
Once the IC obtains 702 collection, analysts conduct “queries” to retrieve
specific communications for review by using terms designed to find relevant
foreign intelligence, much in the way a word or phrase could be used to
find a particular email message in an inbox. Court-approved 702 Querying
Procedures provide specific rules limiting how analysts can retrieve 702
targets’ communications for review.
WHAT IS A U.S. PERSON QUERY TERM?
Analysts can review 702 data using a query term — like an email address
or phone number — associated with a U.S. person. These queries do not
acquire any new information; they help an analyst review information that
has already been lawfully acquired. The only U.S. person communications
such a query could retrieve are communications with, or in the possession
of, an existing foreign intelligence target.
WHAT HAPPENS IF AN AGENCY PERFORMS AN IMPROPER
QUERY?
Any query that does not follow the court-approved querying rules,
even if due to a typo or similar mistake, is reported to Congress and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Agencies deploy a variety of
incident mitigations, including requiring additional training to prevent
future mistakes.
WHO IS A U.S. PERSON?
U.S. PERSONS
A citizen of the U.S.
An alien admitted for
permanent residence in
the U.S.
An unincorporated
association with a
substantial number of
members who are U.S.
citizens and/or legal
permanent aliens.
A corporation that is
legally formed in the U.S.
WHY WOULD THE IC CONDUCT A QUERY
USING A U.S. PERSON QUERY TERM?
Using a query term associated with a U.S. person can help analysts find foreign intelligence information (FBI can also identify evidence of a crime)
in the 702 data that has been lawfully acquired. U.S. person query terms are particularly useful in identifying further information about the plans,
capabilities, and activities of foreign targets directed against Americans, U.S. businesses, or the U.S. Government. U.S. person query terms support
the IC’s foreign intelligence mission in a number of ways, including:
PROTECTING CRITICAL U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE & U.S. VICTIMS
Queries into 702-acquired data using terms
associated with U.S. Government infrastructure
can help identify plans for cyberattacks in the
communications of known foreign actors — this
can help the IC to warn the potential victim,
develop patches, and prevent intrusions. Using
terms associated with the victim can help
understand the goals, intentions, and tradecraft
of existing foreign intelligence targets — that
can prove critical to preventing future attacks or
holding malicious cyber-actors accountable.
EXPOSING TERRORIST PLOTS
702 queries using U.S. person terms can help
the IC identify international threats to U.S.
persons or the U.S. homeland. This allows the
U.S. Government to better understand foreign
terrorist organizations, disrupt terrorist plots,
and expose terrorist recruiting efforts.
DETERMINING IF U.S. PERSONS OR
COMPANIES ARE BEING TARGETED
The FBI uses U.S. person queries of Section
702 data to help determine if U.S. persons or
companies are being targeted by hostile foreign
intelligence services or malicious foreign cyber
actors, so that the FBI can understand the full
scope of those malicious activities and provide
warnings to the U.S. victims. U.S. person
queries are used, in limited circumstances, to
help identify U.S. persons who actively work
with hostile foreign powers to harm U.S.
national security.
CONDUCTING SAFE OPERATIONS
U.S. PERSONS
The CIA uses U.S. person queries of 702 data
to protect officers and agents from adversaries,
and to determine if U.S. people or businesses
are under threat from foreign actors. CIA shares
FISA 702-based information about potential
threats with our U.S. Government partners,
who take action under their authorities.
NSA COMPLIANCE
NSA strives to continuously enhance its compliance posture by leveraging human and technical controls; its expert compliance organization; and advancing a culture of compliance from the top down.
ORGANIZATION
SPECIALIZED COMPLIANCE OFFICERS
• Compliance officers are positioned throughout NSA to provide
guidance, perform auditing, analyze trends, and mitigate and
report incidents. Analytic workflows require documentation
and justification before actions are taken. NSA tools are
certified against authority-specific rules. People focused on
analyzing compliance trends determine effectiveness of training
procedures. Analysis informs enhancements and improvements.
TECHNICAL CONTROLS
• Section 702 collection is stored in systems designed to comply
with court-approved rules. NSA leverages automation and
machine-learning to complement human controls and internal
oversight.
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
• NSA leadership reiterates that compliance is not only the
obligation of personnel with the word in their title.
When instances of non-compliance occur, NSA investigates,
reports it to overseers, and works to prevent it from reoccurring.
200+ Compliance Officers
100% of all Section 702 targeting decisions reviewed by DOJ
More than 99% of Targeting Decisions were compliant and
without incident since last reauthorization.
PROCEDURES
TARGETING
• NSA conducts Section 702 targeting on behalf of the IC,
including pre-targeting due diligence as well as ongoing
manual and automatic activities to ensure
continued compliance.
• Three analysts with specialized training review any proposed
702 targeting prior to approval.
QUERYING
• Pre-approval for U.S. person query terms to be used in
content queries requires Office of General Counsel and
NSA Compliance review.
• NSA developed policy requirements for certain U.S. person
queries such that they require additional pre-approvals by
leadership, up to and including the Director of NSA.
POST-QUERY AUDITING
NSA combines human review with machine learning techniques
to maximize auditing effectiveness.
DISSEMINATION
• Technical requirements restrict access to personnel with
appropriate training and a need to know.
• Systems enable record keeping of disseminations of previously
masked U.S. person identities for oversight purposes.
FBI COMPLIANCE & RECENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
The FBI implemented a series of remedial measures to improve its compliance.
2021-2022 CHANGES
OPT-IN
FBI systems for storing unminimized Section 702 information
now require personnel to affirmatively “opt-in” to query that
information, reducing the risk of inadvertent queries.
BATCH QUERY APPROVAL
FBI personnel must now obtain attorney approval to conduct a
“batch job,” consisting of the use of a specific tool in FBI system(s)
to conduct multiple sequential queries at the same time.
SENSITIVE QUERY APPROVAL
FBI personnel must now obtain attorney approval to conduct
sensitive queries, such as those involving members of academia or
religious figures. The FBI’s Deputy Director must also personally
approve certain sensitive queries, such as those involving domestic
public officials, political campaigns, or journalists.
NEW GUIDANCE & TRAINING
FBI has updated and expanded its Section 702 training,
incorporating new DOJ/ODNI guidance on query rules, and
personnel must now complete the training annually to maintain
their access to FISA information. This updated guidance was
recently declassified and publicly released on FBI’s website in the
interest of transparency.
2023 CHANGES
FISA QUERY ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES
Established a series of escalating consequences for violations
involving negligence:
• An initial violation will trigger immediate suspension of FISA
access while the employee:
1. retakes all mandatory FISA training,
2. executes a signed certification that will
be placed in the employee’s personnel files, and
3. receives mandatory one-on-one counseling
with their field office attorney.
• Subsequent violations will trigger further measures, up to
and including indefinite loss of FISA access, reassignment to a
new role, and/or referral to FBI’s Inspection Division to review
potentially reckless conduct and impose additional penalties
as appropriate.
EVALUATING FIELD OFFICE EXECUTIVES ON FISA COMPLIANCE
Beginning in fiscal year 2024, FBI field office leaders (i.e. Special
Agents in Charge and Assistant Directors in Charge) will be
evaluated on FISA compliance within their field offices in their
annual ratings, which can affect their eligibility for promotion and
annual bonuses.
INTERNAL AUDIT FINDINGS
FBI’s Office of Internal Auditing tested the effectiveness of the
query compliance controls implemented in 2021-2022, and
recommended a series of further reforms. The FBI is implementing
all eleven recommendations, including a requirement for users
to enter a written justification for all U.S. person queries prior to
conducting the query.
CIA & NCTC COMPLIANCE
CIA and NCTC deploy resources, policies, and care to ensure compliance with their applicable Querying and Minimization Procedures
CIA
CIA has a strong record of compliance with the FISA 702 program.
CIA has only had a small number of compliance incidents since
the program began in 2008, all of which have been reported
to Congress.
• Only a small percentage of CIA officers have access to CIA’s FISA
Section 702 systems. CIA requires officers to be trained on legal
standards, policies, and procedures before gaining such access.
Similarly, only officers with a mission need may access the data.
• CIA has a dedicated office and several lawyers responsible
for the FISA 702 program, to include training, access to FISA
information, requesting collection, compliance with all courtapproved
procedures, as well as use and dissemination of FISAderived
information.
• CIA officers conduct research and analysis to focus requests for
702 collection on a specific person or entity that would provide
foreign intelligence information. All requests for Section 702
collection are reviewed internally prior to being communicated
to NSA.
NCTC
NCTC maintains a strong compliance record, demonstrated by
the Center’s ability to optimize the use of FISA data in support of
its counterterrorism mission while consistently maintaining a low
number of compliance incidents over the course of several years.
• NCTC’s FISA Compliance Program is structured to prevent and
detect compliance violations and to facilitate compliance
monitoring and enforcement activities.
• NCTC compliance officers partner with ODNI Office of General
Counsel attorneys to lead NCTC’s FISA Compliance Program,
with direct support from mission users and supervisors, system
developers, and additional subject matter experts as required.
• FISA compliance officers manage, coordinate, and monitor
NCTC’s FISA compliance safeguards, including but not limited
to, conducting risk-based training and awareness activities;
managing NCTC access to FISA data; investigating, managing,
and reporting compliance incidents; providing guidance
and operational support to mission users; and capturing
programmatic data-use metrics and value assessments.
SECTION 702: FAQ
702 FAQ
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY THAT COULD REPLACE 702?
No other foreign intelligence authority can replicate Section
702’s speed, agility, and insights. It also plays an important
enabling function for IC operations that lead to new discoveries
in other authorities.
IS 702 USED TO TARGET U.S. PERSONS?
No — Section 702 may not be used to target Americans
anywhere in the world or any person inside the United States,
regardless of nationality — no exceptions. Rather, a 702 target
is a specific foreign person or entity outside the United States
reasonably likely to possess, receive, or communicate foreign
intelligence information.
WHY CAN’T THE IC GET A WARRANT BEFORE
CONDUCTING A QUERY USING A U.S. PERSON
QUERY TERM?
Changes to the IC’s limited authority to conduct queries using
U.S. person query terms, including the imposition of a specific
prior FISC authorization or warrant requirement on some or all
such queries, would jeopardize the IC’s ability to discover and
report on actionable (i.e. timely) threats to the national security
interests of the United States and its citizens.
DO QUERIES RESULT IN NEW COLLECTION?
Queries do not result in new Section 702 collection. Rather,
queries are the mechanism by which the IC reviews the
information that has been lawfully collected under Section 702.
CIA, FBI, and NCTC can only perform queries into the subset of
702 collection that they receive from NSA.
WHAT IS MASKING?
“Masking” is one of the IC’s methods for protecting U.S. person
privacy. In the vast majority of circumstances, U.S. person
information incidentally acquired pursuant to Section 702 is
not included in intelligence reporting. Sometimes, however, it
is necessary to refer to a U.S. person in an intelligence report.
In these cases, one way the IC continues to protect U.S. person
privacy is by “masking” the U.S. person’s identity. Masking means
replacing the identity of the U.S. person with a generic phrase
such as “named U.S. person #1.”
WHAT IS INCIDENTAL COLLECTION?
Communications generally happen between two or more people.
As a result, Section 702 collects communications by Section
702 targets with other Section 702 targets, but it also collects
communications between Section 702 targets and persons who
are not targeted under Section 702. The Intelligence Community
refers to collection of communications of non-targets (including
any U.S. persons) as incidental collection.
WHAT HAS THE FBI DONE TO ADDRESS THEIR
RECENTLY DISCLOSED COMPLIANCE ISSUES?
The FBI has implemented a number of remedial measures (see
page 22) aimed at addressing the kinds of query non-compliance
documented in recently released reports and court opinions.
In addition, FBI has new training that clarifies the standards that
all queries of Section 702 data have to meet. All FBI personnel
have been retrained since then, and must retake their training
annually to keep access to FISA systems.
WHAT TYPES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
CAN THE IC USE TO JUSTIFY A TARGETING?
Section 702 targets must be non-U.S. persons, located outside
of the United States, who are reasonably likely to possess,
receive, or communicate foreign intelligence about a topic
authorized through an approved certification. In April 2023,
the FISC reauthorized the IC to seek certain foreign intelligence
relating to 1) foreign governments, 2) counter-terrorism, and 3)
combating proliferation.
HOW DOES THE IC USE A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
TOOL TO SUPPORT CYBERSECURITY?
When the IC learns about adversaries’ plans to conduct malicious
cyber activities, the IC may use that information to inform U.S.
Government agencies, U.S. companies, and U.S. citizens about
the risks or possible mitigations.
WHAT INFORMATION DOES THE IC MAKE
AVAILABLE PUBLICLY ABOUT 702?
ODNI regularly releases various reports, court opinions,
assessments on compliance, and other 702 related
documents for the public. This information can be found
at Intelligence.gov/IC-on-the-record-database.
HOW MUCH 702 DATA DOES FBI GET ACCESS TO?
FBI only requests access to unminimized Section 702 data
that relates to an open, fully predicated national security
investigation. In 2022, FBI had access to data from approximately
3.2% of Section 702 targets. In 2021, FBI had access to data
from approximately 4.4% of Section 702 targets.
WHAT RULES ARE IN PLACE TO PROTECT THE
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF NON-U.S.
PERSONS?
In addition to the statutory requirements and FISC-approved
procedures, agencies are also required to apply additional
measures to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons.
The protections established by Presidential Policy Directive 28
– “Signals Intelligence Activities” and subsequently Executive
Order 14086 “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals
Intelligence Activities” apply to Section 702 activities.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A QUERY TO BE
REASONABLY LIKELY TO RETRIEVE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE?
The reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence standard
requires that:
1. a query cannot be overly broad, but rather must be
designed to extract foreign intelligence information;
2. a query have an authorized purpose and not be run for
personal or improper reasons; and
3. there must be a reasonable basis to expect the query
will return foreign intelligence information.
CAN THE IC TARGET A NON-U.S. PERSON TO
INTENTIONALLY ACQUIRE INFORMATION
ABOUT A U.S. PERSON?
No — the IC cannot target a non-U.S. person who is located
outside the U.S. for the purpose of collecting the communications
of a person reasonably believed to be located in the U.S. or a
U.S. person.
HOW DOES THE IC DETERMINE WHOM TO TARGET?
The National Intelligence Priorities Framework guides the IC’s
efforts to collect foreign intelligence insights most relevant to
the needs of the President and other senior policymakers.
DOES NSA STILL PERFORM “ABOUTS”
COLLECTION?
No – NSA is currently not performing “abouts” collection,
which was a form of collection where, in certain circumstances,
NSA could acquire a communication that was neither to nor
from the intended target, but included a reference to the target.
DOES SECTION 702 PERMIT WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLANCE?
Although Section 702 does not require an individualized
probable cause warrant to acquire the communications of
certain non-U.S. person targets located outside of the United
States, it does not mean that Section 702 is without judicial
oversight. The FISC reviews the certifications as well as the
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures annually
for adherence to statutory and constitutional requirements.
HOW DOES THE IC REMEDY COMPLIANCE
INCIDENTS?
Any instance of non-compliance must be reported promptly
to DOJ, the FISC, and Congress. IC elements take a variety of
steps depending on the circumstance to remedy an incident,
including but not limited to: deleting non-compliant data,
recalling intelligence reports, re-training personnel, or even
modifying systems.
SECTION 702: REFERENCE MATERIALS
Additional information is available at INTEL.GOV/FISA, including:
FISA SECTION 702: A One Page Overview
CATEGORIES OF FISA: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT: Understanding the Role of the FISC
TARGETING UNDER FISA SECTION 702: Who Can (and Can’t) Be Targeted?
MINIMIZING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION: Under FISA Section 702
FINDING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: Queries of Section 702 Information
OVERSEEING SECTION 702: Multi-layered Oversight to Protect Privacy and Civil Liberties
SECTION 702: Incidental Collection in a Targeted Intelligence Collection Program
WHEN IS IT PERMISSIBLE TO IDENTIFY AN AMERICAN IN AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT?
Minimizing, Masking, and Unmasking Identities
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PDF Index: HAJJI IMAN
•Before rising through the ranks to become, at one point, the second-in-command
of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Hajji Iman, a non-U.S.
person located overseas, was a high school teacher and Imam. His transformation
from citizen to terrorist caused the U.S. Government to offer a 7 million dollar
reward for information leading to him. It also made him a top focus of the NSA’s
counter ter rorism effor ts.
•NSA, along with its IC partners, spent over two years, from 2014 to 2016 looking for
Hajji Iman. This search was ultimately successful, primarily because of Section 702.
Indeed, based almost exclusively on intelligence activities under Section 702, NSA
collected a significant body of foreign intelligence about the activities of Hajji Iman
and his associates.
•Beginning with non-Section 702 collection, NSA learned of an individual closely
associated with Hajji Iman. NSA used collection, permitted and authorized under
Section 702, to collect intelligence on the close associates of Hajji Iman, which
allowed NSA to develop a robust body of knowledge concerning the personal
network of Hajji Iman and his close associates.
•Over a two-year period, using the Section 702 collection, and in close c\
ollaboration with IC partners, NSA produced more
intelligence on Hajji Iman’s associates, including their location. N\
SA and its tactical partners then combined this information
,
the Section 702 collection, which was continuing , and other intelligence assets to identify the reclusive Hajji Iman and \
track his
m
ovements.
•Ultimately, this collaboration enabled U.S. forces to attempt an apprehension of Hajji Iman and two of his associates. On March
24, 2016, during the attempted apprehension operation, shots were fired at the U.S. forces’ aircraft from Hajji Iman’s location.
U.S. forces returned fire, killing Hajji Iman and the other associates at the location. Subsequent Section 702 collection confirmed
Hajji Iman’s death.
SECTION 702: VA L U E HAS THIS TOOL PROVED TO BE VALUABLE?
Yes, extremely valuable. Section 702 is vital to keeping the nation safe\
. It
provides intelligence on activities of terrorist organizations, weapons \
proliferators,
spies, malicious cyber actors, and other foreign adversaries. Here are j\
ust a few
examples:
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCLOB)
• Issued a comprehensive public report on Section 702 in 2014
and concluded that the government’s Section 702 program
operates within legal constraints, collects valuable information,
and is both well-managed and effective in protecting national
security.
• Receives regular reports on the program. PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY
• To date, the government has declassified and publicly released
over 500 documents, many of which relate to Section 702,
including declassified FISC opinions and orders, IC-related
statements, testimony, and transparency reporting.
SECTION 702: OVERSIGHT
CONGRESS
• Receives regular reports describing the government’s use of
Section 702 and all instances of non-compliance. Including:
• Reports ever y six months from the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence that assess the government’s
compliance with the Section 702 targeting and minimization
procedures;
• Reports ever y six months from the Attorney General that
summarize all of the compliance reviews conducted by DOJ
and ODNI and describe any compliance incidents.
•
All significant interpretations of the law by the FISC;
• Annual reports from heads of agencies that collect foreign
intelligence under Section 702;
•
Reports from agency Inspectors General;
•
Copies of certifications submitted to the FISC; and
• Congressional notifications on the 702 program. In 2016
, alone the government provided over 500 pages
of reporting to Congress on the Section 702 program.
In 2016, DOJ conducted approximately 55 Section
702 over sight reviews.
Continued
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (FISC)
• Annually evaluates the program to make sure it complies
with FISA and the Constitution.
•
Updated throughout the year on every
identified
compliance
incident and receives regular reports from the
Department
of Justice and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on the program.
• Holds hearings, takes testimony, and requires written
factual statements and legal analysis to ensure that it fully
understands the implementation of Section 702 across the
IC.
DOJ & ODNI
• Conduct compliance reviews at least ever y two months
at each agency that receives unminimized Section 702
information, which include reviews of targeting decisions,
U.S. person queries, and U.S. person disseminations.
•
Report any
identified incidents of non-compliance to the
FISC and to Congress.
• Provide guidance on 702-related issues and review certain
systems that agencies use to acquire, retain, or disseminate
702 information.
IC ELEMENT INTERNAL OVERSIGHT
• Each IC element involved in implementing Section
702 has a cadre of individuals, such as compliance
officers, lawyers, civil liberties and privacy offices,
and
Inspectors General, that provide oversight on a
regular
basis. These internal oversight elements train their
employees and monitor their agencies’ compliance with
FISA and the targeting and minimization procedures .
•
On an annual basis, the IC publishes a report that provides
important statistics on how national security authorities, such as
Section 702, are used.
SECTION 702: U.S. PERSON QUERIES
WHAT ARE U.S. PERSON QUERIES?
WHY DOES THE IC NEED TO QUERY SECTION 702 COLLECTION
FOR U.S. PERSON INFORMATION?
COULDN’T THE IC GET A FISA ORDER OR A WARRANT TO RUN
THESE QUERIES?• A query is a means to identify previously acquired data in U.S.
government systems. Query terms can include , among other
things, names, email addresses, and phone numbers.
• The IC can only quer y Section 702 information if the quer y is
reasonably designed to return foreign intelligence information or, in
the case of FBI, evidence of a crime.
• As part of Section 702’s extensive oversight, DOJ and ODNI
audit
the agencies’ U.S. person queries of content to ensure the queries
satisf
y the legal standard.
•
A warrant requirement would hamper the speed and efficiency of
operations, and impair the IC's
ability to identify and prevent
threats to America. The IC often runs U.S. person queries t o identify
and protect potential victims of terrorist or cyber attacks, and also
as the first step in evaluating and detecting potential threats to the
homeland. In these situations, the IC may not have probable
cause to believe the U.S. person is a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power. Here are a few examples:
• Using the name of a U.S. person hostage t
o cull through
communications of the terrorist network that kidnapped her to
pinpoint her location and condition;
• Using the email address of a U.S. victim of a cyber-attack to
quickly identify the scope of malicious cyber activities and to
warn the U.S. person of the actual or pending intrusion;
• Using the name of a government employee that has been
approached by foreign spies to detect foreign espionage
networks and identify other potential victims;
• Using the email address of a U.S. person assisting the
government to see if the network he infiltrated is aware of his
connections to the U.S. government;
•
Using the name of
a U.S. businessman who is unwittingly
•
• CONNECT THE DOTS
: Querying lawfully acquired data is a basic
investigative step. When the government receives a tip from the
public, state and local law enforcement, foreign partners, or other
sources about a potential threat to the homeland, one of the first
steps is to see if the government already knows something about the
person or group. U.S. person queries help the government detect
and
evaluate connections between U.S. persons and foreign
adversaries involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks or other serious
national
security threats.
• Several commissions investigating terrorist attacks, including 9/11,
Fort Hood, the “Under wear Bomber,” and the Boston Marathon
Bombing, concluded that removing barriers to the use of
information already lawfully in the IC’s possession is essential to
better protecting the nation.
•
SPEED & EFFICIENCY : Analysts run queries to more quickly identify
information already in the government’s possession. Similar to how
you would sift through e-mails in your own inbox, queries allow an
analyst to readily identify a relevant message without having to
examine ever y single communication. The time it takes to examine
ever y single communication could prove to be the difference
between preventing an attack and investigating an attack.
• LESS INTRUSIVE
: Querying information the IC already possesses,
which is less intrusive than other investigative techniques, can rule out
potential subjects and eliminate the need for further investigation. providing equipment to a weapons proliferator so that
the IC
can warn the businessman and prevent the shipment; and
Using the name of a government official who will be travelin g to
identify any threats to the official by terrorists or other foreign
adversaries.
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